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This dissertation focuses on how Russian TV viewers make sense of the news in the 
context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is based on focus groups with TV viewers and 
borrows the conceptual apparatus of political communication, psychology, and political 
science to analyze three separate domains of news processing under an electoral 
authoritarian regime: the formation of political opinions based on television news, the 
use of heuristics to evaluate the credibility of TV news, and the use of a range of 
information sources, both offline and online, in a high-choice media environment. 
Based on the existing literature, this study relies on the premise that citizens under 
authoritarian regimes lack incentives, cognitive tools, and opportunities to 
substantively process news and investigates how these three features are reflected in 
the political psychology and news processing of TV viewers. First, this study 
contributes to the literature on news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes. 
While scholars have identified numerous factors which affect how citizens (dis)trust 
news in authoritarian contexts, the role of political engagement in news processing is 
rarely taken into account in the analysis of electoral authoritarian regimes. My findings 
suggest that crucially affects how citizens make sense of the news. I find that a 
minority of focus group participants are politically engaged and rely on consistent 
political schemas to make sense of the news and demonstrate signs of consistency 
bias. Most participants are politically disengaged. They rely on the ideas which are 
more accessible in memory, contain both criticism and approval of state policies, and 
support the authoritarian equilibrium by being unable to articulate consistent opinions. 
Second, this study contributes to a better understanding of the functioning of low-
information rationality under an electoral authoritarian regime. Scholars assume that 
in dealing with the news and political information, TV viewers rely on a wide variety of 
heuristics which are drawn from both daily life and the political environment. However, 
the literature on how citizens use heuristics outside democratic contexts is limited. I 
find that in dealing with the news, TV viewers prefer to rely on common sense and 
cultural stereotypes because political and media institutions under an electoral 
authoritarian regime are not seen as independent and authoritative. Finally, the study 
contributes to a better understanding of how the development of high-choice media 
environments affects news processing outside of democratic contexts. I find that 
politically engaged participants often find information which fits their pre-existing 
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preferences demonstrating signs of selective exposure. Participants who are less 
politically engaged participants rely on TV news in combination with news aggregators 
to simplify information search. Since Russian news aggregators include information 
which is not different from TV news, this synchronization verifies the credibility of TV 
news. While the original concept of the personalized filter bubble is based on the 
complex interaction between individuals’ preferences and algorithms, I identify the 
orchestrated filter bubble effect which is based on the agenda of state-controlled 
television. Imposed in top-down fashion by the state, this filter bubble effect is used to 
reinforce the messages of the state-controlled television rather than citizens’ individual 




One can say that this project started in Winter 2013-2014 when Russian state-
aligned media switched to a new mode of functioning in response to the protests in 
Ukraine. Not that Russian television channels were particularly prone to follow the 
rules of objective journalism before, but this mode was characterized by particularly 
aggressive and biased reporting. This, in turn, provoked scholars, experts, and 
commentators to fill the intellectual public sphere with simplistic narratives about 
information war and citizens as victims of crude propaganda. While not a media 
scholar yet, I was working on my master’s thesis and involved in a number of research 
projects on social movements in Russia and Ukraine as part of a self-organized 
independent research group called the Public Sociology Laboratory. The complexity 
of political engagement which I regularly encountered in my fieldwork was a good 
demonstration that citizens who are exposed to political information are far from being 
passive victims of propaganda: they actively interpret media messages in complex 
and diverse ways. This initial intuition became the cornerstone of this dissertation.  
Most research projects are collective endeavors. This dissertation is not an 
exception. Many people invested their time and effort in helping to transform this initial 
intuition into a dissertation. The number of people who invested their time and effort 
in helping to transform this initial intuition into a dissertation is great. There is simply 
not enough space to thank all of them, and I have to limit myself to several names. I 
started this journey at the European University at St. Petersburg. I want to thank 
Artemy Magun – my first supervisor – for encouraging me to venture into this area. 
The members of my first doctoral committee – Ellen Mickiewicz, Olessia Koltsova, and 
Boris Firsov - also significantly contributed to this work by providing insightful 
feedback. Special gratitude goes to Ellen Mickiewicz for being both a wonderful person 
and a theoretical inspiration who shaped my understanding of media early on. Through 
her attention to the complexity of human judgment and methodological rigor I felt what 
one can call a lineage – from Ellen Mickiewicz to Doris Graber, from Doris Graber to 
Robert Lane and other key scholars in the field combining rigorous psychological 
theory with in-depth close observation of small groups of people. Thanks to generous 
funding of the European University at St. Petersburg, I later spent several months at 
the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University where I had a chance to 
observe Ellen Mickiewicz’s profound expertise and wit during our regular meetings.  
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After this visiting fellowship at Duke University, the educational license of the 
European University at St. Petersburg was revoked under the pretext of violation of 
licensing rules. As this university is one of the best social science graduate schools in 
Russia, it was clear that the real reason was its role in shaping critical intellectual 
community. After some time in a limbo with no clear prospects to defend the 
dissertation, a joint effort of colleagues from the University of Helsinki and the 
European University at St. Petersburg helped me and other ex-EUSP PhD students 
to transfer to the University of Helsinki. I thank Ira Janis-Isokangas and other 
colleagues from the Aleksanteri Institute for making this transfer happen and hosting 
me during YRUSH fellowship which allowed me to further advance my dissertation. A 
special gratitude goes to Vladimir Gel’man for his tremendous contribution to this 
undertaking, but also for bringing another intellectual perspective to my project and 
simply being a good mentor and supervisor. Through discussions with Vladimir 
Gel’man, my approach shifted more towards political science situating news 
processing within the context of political regimes and institutions. His incredible 
attention to every passage and statement in the text allowed me to hone my arguments 
and stay on point when I was torn apart being fascinated by different disciplines and 
approaches. His sensitivity and tact made this process a fantastic experience. My 
other two supervisors – Saara Ratilainen and Dmitry Yagodin – complemented 
Vladimir’s expertise in political science with their deep understanding of media, 
context, and culture thus forming a perfect trio. I thank Dmitry Yagodin for forcing me 
to frame my theoretical and methodological approach more rigorously. Saara 
Ratilainen greatly compensated for my positivist spin by forcing me to think about the 
complexities of particular social and cultural contexts. I am also grateful for her 
thorough reading of the text, insightful feedback on argumentation and clarity, and just 
the opportunity to chat casually about anything while having a lunch or just stopping 
by her office.  
I also thank two external examiners who spent their time reviewing this 
dissertation and providing insightful feedback – Joanna Szostek and Stephen 
Hutchings. Joanna Szostek’s expertise in political communication made me refine my 
arguments, situate them better within prior research, and saved me from many 
spurious generalizations. Stephen Hutchings’ attention to the complexities of audience 
reception and meaning made me rethink many unspoken assumptions and limitations 
of my straightforward positivist approach. Ian R. Dobson provided excellent editorial 
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assistance. Anna-Liisa Heusala and Mikhail Kopotev were kind enough to agree to 
serve as faculty representatives during the defense.  
Marielle Wijermas, Olga Dovbysh and many other scholars at the Aleksanteri 
Institute helped me on my way by discussing my research with me during 
presentations and casual talks. Special thanks goes to Margarita Zavadskaya for her 
comments and ideas. Being interested in similar processes but approaching them with 
quantitative methods, she was a person who knew exactly what I was doing and why. 
Her deep understanding of partisanship, public opinion, and other complexities of 
political psychology reassured me that I was on the right track, and our methodological 
differences brought more rigor to my understanding of methods. My time at the 
Aleksanteri Institute was also just fun. I am grateful to Margarita Zavadskaya, Eemil 
Mitikka, Teemu Oivo, Tatiana Tkacheva, Lena Gorbacheva and other great colleagues 
for having parties and creating a supportive and friendly environment.  
I am finishing this last section of the dissertation sitting in my office in the 
building of the School of Advanced Studies at the University of Tyumen. I am grateful 
to my colleagues who created a vibrant intellectual environment around me, filled with 
discussions about biology and medieval history, economics and computer science, 
historical sociology and neuroscience. I am especially grateful to Matvey Lomonosov 
and Krishna K for being wonderful colleagues. Matvey Lomonosov surrounded me 
with endless discussions about historical sociology and political science, nationalism 
and citizenship, and thousands of tiny details of the craft of research. Krisha K 
expanded my understanding of the brain, memory, and emotion, encouraged my 
growing interest in neuroscience, and deepened my understanding of the complexities 
of human mind. Moreover, they have also been good friends who used support, 
humor, and compassion to create a protective sphere around me which allowed me to 
withstand many difficulties. I also thank students for asking challenging questions and 
forcing me to form a more comprehensive understanding of relationships between 
media, politics, and society during my courses. 
I want to thank my friends and colleagues at the Public Sociology Laboratory - 
Svetlana Erpyleva, Oleg Zhuravlev, Natalia Savelyeva, and Ilya Matveev – for 
providing feedback on all my articles and ideas. They have been my co-authors in 
multiple research projects even before the media sparked my interest. Natalia 
Shapkina was a good friend who helped me to distract myself from the dissertation by 
constantly discussing psychoanalysis, art, and philosophy. Zachary Reyna 
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surrounded me with discussions about political philosophy and thoroughly edited all 
my articles making them clear, eloquent, and easy to read. My special gratitude goes 
to Svetlana Erpyleva. She has been a demanding reader commenting on this 
dissertation and all my articles numerous times, a co-author who encouraged me to 
advance my ideas further and move towards political psychology, and a close friend 
who blurred the boundary between life and research by filling journeys, vacations, and 
day-to-day experience with intellectual experience. I cannot express my gratitude 
enough for the contribution of these people to my academic career, thinking, and life.  
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Russia’s biggest problem… The biggest Russia’s 
problem is that there are so many problems, and 
information about them is so unclear, so that it is 
almost impossible to identify the biggest problem.  
(From an interview with a TV viewer) 
Russia is a TV nation. Describing post-Soviet society, Russian sociologist Boris Dubin 
describes “nearly total televization [televizatsiia]” of leisure in Russia (Dubin, 2015). 
Although television is less popular among youngsters and the population of St. 
Petersburg and Moscow, it still dominates media consumption. According to the 
market agency Deloitte, 92% of Russians watch television at least once per two weeks 
(Deloitte, 2018). The popularity of television news varies around the world. For 
instance, according to the Pew Research Center, only 44% of Americans relied on 
television news in 2018 (Pew Research Center, 2018). According to the U.K. Office of 
Communications, almost 75% of British citizens relied on television news in 2019 
(Ofcom, 2020). Russia is among the television-centric countries. According to scholars 
with Russian pollster Levada Center Volkov and Goncharov, 72% of Russians rely on 
television for the news, while 55% of Russians consider television news to be an 
objective source of information (Volkov & Goncharov, 2019).  
This centrality of television in social and political life makes it a lucrative asset 
for the ruling elite. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2013, the 
Russian political regime’s attempts to manipulate the public agenda have been 
particularly intense. Although even prior to the conflict, Russian TV was considered to 
be deviating from the ideals of objectivity and biased in favor of the Putin regime (e.g., 
Lipman, 2009), the Russia-Ukraine conflict has elevated these concerns to a new 
level. Mainstream Russian television news programs allocated a third of their time to 
the conflict and can be characterized as inaccurate, lacking balance, and biased in 
favor of the regime’s version of the conflict (“Messages of Russian TV”, 2015). Russian 
TV has been accused of using Soviet-style techniques of propaganda (Paul & 
Matthews, 2016), confusion and disinformation (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014), and 
outright fake news (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016). Russian media describe the conflict 
as a war, the Donbass rebels are sympathetically called “people’s militia” and 
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portrayed as a defense against the punishers from Kiev who are identified as a fascist 
threat spreading in Ukraine (Hansen, 2015). The conflict between Russia and Ukraine 
is framed as the struggle between Russian values and the West within Ukraine. The 
West is as framed as a threat and strongly demonized (Nygren et al., 2018). To 
complement television news, the regime has been attempting to instrumentalize other 
types of media spreading similar messages across social media (Stukal et al., 2017; 
Suslov, 2014) and attempting to control news aggregators and search engines 
(Daucé, 2017; Sivetc, 2019).  
These policies and techniques of control do not make Russian media sphere 
completely homogeneous or perfectly aligned with the narratives propagated by the 
regime. Journalists working for both state-controlled television channels (Schimpfossil 
& Yablokov, 2014) and state-controlled media (Tolz et al., 2020) can enjoy a significant 
degree of autonomy in covering social and political issues depending on the nature of 
the topic, audience, and particular context. However, the diversity of media content in 
Russia decreases proportionally with the increasing political nature and sensitivity of 
the topic. As Oates points out, “There are three key points necessary to understand 
about the Russian media: There is a large amount of media diversity except on key 
political topics; the vast majority of the media do not challenge the state on these key 
political topics; and Russian audience members are enthusiastic consumers of media 
content. Thus, there is an appearance of media diversity, but little meaningful 
challenge to the regime” (Oates, 2006, p. 402).  
In this context, it is not surprising that scholars agree that Russian TV news 
greatly affects domestic audiences. While the fact that “national TV effectively shapes 
public opinion by boosting, playing down or ignoring any figure or event” (Lipman, 
2009, para. 27) was widely assumed before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, after 2014 
this assumption had become even more entrenched. As Schimpfossil and Yablokov 
argue, “television is the primary, and most effective, tool employed by the political 
regime to influence its people, and the federal television networks are critical elements 
of the political system in Putin’s Russia” (Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014, p. 296). 
Similarly, Gerber and Zavisca claim that “the Russia government’s efforts to promote 
its particular narrative about geopolitical issues and alternative sociopolitical models 
have enjoyed some success” (Gerber & Zavisca, 2016, p. 95). Khaldarova and Pantti 
found that “the aggressive media campaign has been effective in that approximately 
70 per cent of Russian viewers believe that the events in Ukraine are covered by the 
 16 
government-owned channels truthfully and without bias” (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016, 
p. 892). Some scholars argue that television is effective in manipulating public opinion 
due to limited access to other sources of information (Volkov, 2015). Other scholars 
claim that Russian TV reporting plays into the “the sense of frustration over losing the 
Cold War, and Russia’s uncertainty over its new identity” (Lipman, 2016, para. 30).  
However, the assumptions about significant and linear media influence are 
problematic for several reasons. Some of these reasons are Russia-specific. 
Specifically, there is a shortage of research on news processing in Russia. The more 
authoritative accounts of how audiences make sense of the news are partly outdated 
and belong to the 2000s. Some of these reasons are characteristic of the research on 
news processing under authoritarian regimes in general. While existing studies have 
yielded rich results regarding the effects of state-controlled media on citizens in 
authoritarian contexts, scholars diverge in their estimations of how much capacity and 
inclination citizens have to interpret news critically under authoritarian regimes. In 
addition, most often than not these accounts do not take into account the complexity 
of contemporary media environments where online sources crucially mediate the 
influence of television. This study addresses these issues and contributes to the 
understanding of news processing in both contemporary Russia and other electoral 
authoritarian regimes.  
The first two goals of this study focus on elaborating more nuanced and up-to-
date theoretical apparatus for the study of Russian TV viewers. This study engages 
with political communication, psychology, and political science to explain the process 
of news processing in Russia. The last two goals of this study focus on using Russia 
as a case study to address some of the gaps in the research on news processing in 
electoral authoritarian regimes. Since Putin’s regime shares many common elements 
with other electoral authoritarian regimes, this study puts news processing in 
contemporary Russia in a broader context of political regimes and attempts to use 
Russia as a case study to enrich the current knowledge about news processing in 
other electoral authoritarian regimes.   
1.1. Explaining News Processing Under Authoritarian Regimes 
The first and foremost goal of this dissertation is to see how TV viewers make sense 
of the news in contemporary Russia and to contribute to a theoretically rich but small 
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field – the research on news processing in Russia. The assumptions about linear 
media influence are mostly shared by scholars who focus on the content, production, 
and political and economic context around media rather than investigate the process 
of understanding the news. The content, production, political and economic context 
around the media in Russia is a saturated field which has generated a great deal of 
research in the past 20 years (e.g., Androunas, 1993; Kiria & Degtereva, 2010; Kiriya, 
2018; Koltsova, 2006; Lipman, 2009; Lipman & McFaul, 2001; Mickiewicz, 1999; 
Nygren et al., 2018; Oates, 2014; Oates & Lokot, 2013; Rulyova, 2007; Strukov & 
Zvereva, 2014; Vartanova, 2011;  Vartanova & Smirnov, 2010; Vartanova et al., 2016; 
Zassoursky, 2002). While the influence of the media is routinely assumed in these 
studies, it requires separate analysis. Analysis of the audience and media effects in 
contemporary Russia is rare. Few scholars have tried to address this issue for the past 
twenty years - most of them before crucial changes in the Russian media sphere in 
2013-14 years related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, such as increased government 
pressure on media organizations and heightened anti-Western rhetoric in the news.  
Quantitative Qualitative 
  Project  Project 
1999 Enikolopov et al. (2011) 2000 Oates (2006) 
2001 White & Oates (2003) 2002 Mickiewicz (2005; 2008) 
2009 Rosenfeld (2018) 2006 Hutchings & Rulyova (2009) 
2014 Stoycheff & Nisbet (2016) 2011 Toepfl (2013; 2014) 
2014 Szostek (2017a) 2014 Szostek (2018) 
2016 Savin et al. (2018)   
2016 Sirotkina & Zavadskaya (2020)   
2019 Shirikov (2021)   
Table 1. Research on News Processing in Russia 
As of 2021, eight quantitative research projects had addressed the issue of 
media effects and news processing in Russia, five of them after the start of the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. In fact, only five of them focus on news processing as such. However, 
I also count the work of Rosenfeld (2018), Stoycheff and Nisbet (2016), and Sirotkina 
& Zavadskaya (2020) as research on news processing because these projects touch 
on psychological mechanisms underlining news processing. Five qualitative research 
projects addressed the issue of news processing in Russia, only one of them after the 
start of Russia-Ukraine conflict. As Mickiewicz eloquently puts it, “When almost an 
entire population depends on television for its news (…) the other side of the television 
screen – the one where the viewers are arrayed – is invisible” (Mickiewicz, 2008, p. 
1).   
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Made a decade ago, this claim largely holds true today. While explaining this 
gap would require a separate piece of research, there seem to be two important factors 
which explain this blind spot. Although empirical social science gained prominence in 
several reputable Russian research centers in recent decades, Russia still does not 
have an established tradition of empirical social science across the country. This 
tendency is common for the countries where social science research has been 
introduced only recently. Much like Chinese communication scholars (Luo, 2013), 
Russian scholars work in a non-empirical way more often than not. This lack of 
empirical social science research is partly explained by the Soviet legacy. Mass 
surveys began to appear in the Soviet Union only in the 1960s. In addition, they were 
primarily based on ideological conceptions of the reader and the citizen (Lovell, 2000) 
and considered to be a tool to monitor the effectiveness of ideological work rather than 
to investigate audiences or public opinion (Slider, 1985).  
Finally, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become an important tipping point 
which surprisingly, has put the empirical research on how citizens make sense of the 
news in even less favorable position. While one could expect that the intensity and 
complexity of the conflict would generate more in-depth analysis, instead it 
reinvigorated some older concepts, such as a linear model of media influence. While 
this concept was discredited in social sciences long ago, after the start of the conflict 
“it lives on in another world altogether, where social media blogs, comments, and 
advertisement as well as press reportage are thought to produce a deep, immediate, 
and lasting effect on the whole population exposed to it” (Mickiewicz, 2019, p.101). If 
one assumes that media have immediate, deep, and long-lasting effect on the 
population, in-depth analysis of news processing is redundant.  
The second goal of this dissertation is to address the issue of news processing 
in a partly new environment. Most studies of news processing in Russia were 
conducted before the turning point of Russia-Ukraine conflict. Two factors are 
important here. First, it is media diversity. The previous studies capture the moments 
of relative media diversity (e.g., Mickiewicz, 2008; Oates, 2006). Since then, the 
freedom of the press in Russia has been plummeting as a result of the regime’s 
takeovers and constraining of the press. According to Freedom House’ s expert rating, 
the freedom of the press in Russia decreased from 60 in 2002 to 83 in 2017 on the 
scale from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). It Russia on par with full-fledged authoritarianisms, 
such as Belarus (83) or Saudi Arabia (86) (Freedom House, 2002; 2017). Similarly, 
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Russia’s rating of Internet freedom has decreased from 51 (“partly free”) in 2009 to 30 
(“not free”) in 2020 which places Russia on par with a number of authoritarian regimes, 
such as Kazakhstan (32), Sudan (30), UAE (29) (Freedom House, 2009; 2020). 
Second, the scale of social and political turbulence before the Ukraine-Russia conflict 
pale in comparison to a nearly full-scale war in the neighboring country which started 
in 2014. While TV viewers analyzed by scholars in the 2000s witnessed terrorism (e.g., 
the Beslan school hostage crisis) and protests (e.g., 2005 protests against the 
replacement of benefit allowances with direct payments; 2011-12 post-electoral 
mobilization) and other dramatic episodic events, the intensity and duration of these 
events do not come close to the coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict 1 . As 
Khaldarova and Pantti put it, “The Ukrainian crisis has triggered claims that Russia 
has raised the information war to a new level” (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016, p. 1). 
The third goal of this dissertation is to use Russian TV viewers’ understanding 
of the news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a case study to enrich the current 
knowledge about news processing in electoral authoritarian regimes. While existing 
studies have yielded rich results regarding the effects of state-controlled media on 
citizens under authoritarian regimes, scholars have mostly focused on how, why, and 
under what conditions citizens trust or distrust news (e.g., Geddes and Zaller, 1989; 
Moehler & Singh, 2011; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Truex, 2016; Ursin, 2017). 
However, the influence of political engagement - a factor which crucially determines 
how citizens make sense of news (Lodge & Hamil, 1986; Zaller, 1992) - on news 
processing has largely been outside the scope of analysis. It is not surpising that 
scholars diverge in their estimations of how much capacity and inclination citizens 
have to interpret news critically under authoritarian regimes. Several studies indirectly 
suggest the low degree of political engagement is a crucial factor which explains the 
nature of news processing in authoritarian contexts (Meyen & Schwer, 2007; Leeson, 
2008; Mickiewicz, 2008; Zhang, 2012; Toepfl, 2013; Savin et al., 2018). There is a 
need for a new approach which would help to factor political engagement in analysis 
 
1 Other major turbulence which should be mentioned here is the war in Chechnya. However, I am not 
aware of any studies fully focusing on the processing the news about the war in Chechnya by TV viewers. 
Oates (2006) pays some attention to the reactions of TV viewers to the war in Chechnya. Yet, she does 
not investigate how TV viewers make sense of the news about the war, and the topic itself receives only 
scant attention in her study. 
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to suggest a more comprehensive explanation for the nature of news processing in 
authoritarian contexts.  
Finally, the fourth goal of this dissertation is to address the issue of news 
processing under an electoral authoritarian regime by considering highly saturated 
information environments which include both television and a variety of new media, 
such as online news outlets, social media, and news aggregators. Contemporary 
scholarship on media consumption demonstrates that people form mixed news 
repertoires which include various media, such as broadcasting television and online 
sources (e.g., Bos et al., 2016; Edgerly, 2015; Lee & Yang, 2014). The influence of 
broadcasting television in contemporary media environments is crucially mediated by 
online sources. In the context of nearly total digitalization of the population, it is 
impossible to understand TV viewers’ understanding of television news without taking 
into account the ways it is intertwined with digital environments. Going beyond the 
offline/online distinction and investigating the combined effect of television news and 
online media is a crucial task for understanding media environments under 
authoritarian regimes which employ intricate persuasion strategies engaging both 
television and new media (Oates, 2014).  
1.2. Research Questions, Methods, and the Main Argument 
In the context of the scarcity of and partly outdated status of the research on news 
processing in Russia, the unclear role of political engagement in news processing 
under authoritarian regimes in general, and the growing importance of the Internet in 
addition to broadcasting and other forms of media, there is an urgent need for new 
research. To address these gaps, in this dissertation I have asked the following 
research question: How do citizens make sense of TV news under an electoral 
authoritarian regime?  The secondary research questions are: 1) How do citizens form 
opinions based on information from TV news under an electoral authoritarian regime? 
2) How do citizens evaluate the credibility of TV news under an electoral authoritarian 
regime? 3) How does the combination of TV news and online news affect citizens’ 
opinions about politics an electoral authoritarian regime? This study uses Russian TV 
viewers’ understanding of the news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict to address these 
questions.  
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Unlike the bulk of research on news processing under authoritarian regimes, I 
have relied on political communication and political psychology to address these 
questions. It is difficult to locate the disciplinary affiliation of this study unambiguously. 
Political communication and political psychology are themselves interdisciplinary 
fields. When it comes to news processing, political communication and political 
psychology are informed by the concepts borrowed from social psychology, and social 
psychology itself is shaped by cognitive psychology. At the same time, political 
communication and political psychology are often considered to be branches of 
political science. As a result, theoretical assumptions existing across these 
interdisciplinary fields rather than these fields themselves are better markers for 
locating this study. The first assumption existing across these fields is that human 
cognition acts as an information processing system. Just like a computer, it encodes 
new information, stores it in internal memory structures, and then retrieves it to use as 
a framework for encoding new information (McGraw, 2000). The second assumption 
existing across these fields is the Herbert A. Simon’s modified version of rational 
choice theory which posits that human cognition is governed by bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1955; 1979). Just like an economic agent, it deploys mental resources 
strategically 2  depending on tractability of the problem, available resources, 
constraints, and expected outcomes. Hence computer jargon: information processing, 
memory, schemas, and heuristics. 
Following landmark studies by Doris A. Graber (1984; 2001), I refer to the 
process of making sense of the news as news processing. Similar to information 
processing, processing news is a cycle of acquiring and encoding information from the 
news, integrating it with prior knowledge, and applying prior knowledge to process new 
information. The alternative terms are interpretation, perception, and reception. 
Interpretation is too general a term. Perception emphasizes perceptive rather than 
cognitive aspects of the process of making sense of the news. Reception is tightly 
connected with the wave of research on audience reception within humanities and 
cultural studies which followed the inception of British cultural studies and Hall’s (1973) 
famous “encoding/decoding” paradigm. While this tradition provides deep insights into 
the process of interpretation of media messages by audiences, it emphasizes 
 
2 Strategy and rationality in this case are not equal to deliberate intentions. Rather, they are understood 
to be adaptive strategies of human cognition and may as well be semi-automatic or automatic.  
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audiences’ active choices in producing meanings. Instead, news processing puts 
emphasis on psychological mechanisms which underline the process of learning from 
the news.  
To address the research questions, I conducted focus group interviews and 
considered how Russian TV viewers process the news about the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict and form opinions about politics. In the context of psychology-driven 
theoretical framework, the focus group method can seem to be a strange choice. Yet, 
the flexibility of group discussions and their quasi-experimental structure when many 
groups of participants are exposed to the same sequence of video materials has made 
the focus group a popular method of choice for many scholars of political 
communication (e.g., Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994; Kern & Just, 1995; Mickiewciz, 
2008). This study relies on eight focus groups conducted in St. Petersburg in 2016 
and in Moscow in 2017 and structured around the viewing of three news episodes 
about the Russia-Ukraine conflict from Channel One. The news reports focus on the 
Maidan protests in Ukraine in Fall 2013, the referenda in the Eastern Ukraine in Spring 
2014, and the military confrontation in the Eastern Ukraine in Summer 2014. In 
addition to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, I discussed a broad array of topics with 
participants, such as Russian and international politics, domestic economy, everyday 
life concerns, and practices of media consumption. The focus group discussions were 
supplemented with questionnaires focusing on participants’ socio-economic status, 
media consumption, and political knowledge.  
Poets and writers can provide deep insights into motives, emotions, and 
psychological mechanisms. Vladimir Vysotsky’s Dialog in Front of TV3 (1973), a song 
which was probably familiar to many of my focus group participants, can briefly 
summarize my main argument. Vladimir Vysotsky is often considered to be a mirror 
and encyclopedia of the Soviet society. Dialog in Front of TV is a perfect illustration of 
his critical commentary. It juxtaposes two realms of reality: a bright reality of circus 
and the reality of everyday life of a Soviet family. It depicts a married couple - Zina and 
Ivan - watching a circus performance on TV. Zina is empathetic and agitated. Being 
attracted by the salient features of the performance, she immediately comments on 
 
3The song is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PO8MY0Vj-MU; a short video excerpt 
from Vysotsky’s live concert featuring a part of this song is also available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PO8MY0Vj-MU 
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them trying to engage her husband in a conversation and draws all sorts of familiar 
parallels. One clown reminds her of her boss. Another one looks like her husband’s 
heavily drinking brother-in-law. The third one wears a mini skirt which she immediately 
asks her husband to buy. Ivan is angry and defensive. He tries to deflect all her 
comments and requests that refer to the harsh work conditions and tiredness. He even 
reminds Zina about the complaint regarding family issues she sent to his workplace 
provoking Ivan’s salary cut. Discussing the circus performance, they get distracted by 
familiar parallels and go into detail about the modest conditions of their family life only 
to return to the circus performance later. Vysotsky portrays people whose thinking and 
feelings are made of contradictions. Being skeptical about the Soviet Union, Zina and 
Ivan are part and parcel of it. They mix established Soviet clichés with implicit and 
explicit criticism of the Soviet system. While Ivan and Zina live in the world of ideology, 
they are interested in family, career, and other more down-to-earth issues rather than 
politics. As a result, their criticisms are simply reflected in their consciousness forming 
incoherent ensembles rather than coherent articulated visions.  
If the circus is replaced with politics on TV, this song is an accurate 
representation of my argument. It can be read as a criticism of the TV viewer. A man 
and a woman in the song are glued to the TV and return to it after each round of the 
discussion. However significant the problems they discuss are, they still return to the 
magical image. It can be read as an apologetics of the viewer. The TV image works 
only as a starting point making them discuss daily problems and ironically criticize TV. 
They hardly succumb to the power of the magical image and make a critical reading 
of it. I offer a psychological reading of this song. When TV viewers are engaged with 
politics on a routine basis, they elaborate a coherent worldview which allows them to 
criticize or approve of TV reporting on politics and the government’s policies. However, 
when they do not consider engaging with TV news as a meaningful activity, they are 
neither fully critical of the TV image nor fully enchanted by it. Rather, depending on 
particular associations and memories, they can hold both attitudes without integrating 
them in a coherent attitude.  
In essence, I argue that TV viewers under electoral authoritarian regimes are 
much like Ivan and Zina. Although Putin’s regime has been relying on the “rally around 
the flag effect” for some time (Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020), electoral authoritarian 
regimes tend to rely on demobilization rather than mobilization (Linz 2000; McAllister 
& White, 2017; Robertson, 2011). In addition, a wide variety of factors associated with 
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authoritarian rule, such as constrained media freedom (Leeson, 2008), electoral 
corruption (Kostadionva, 2009; Martinez i Coma & Trinh, 2016; Simpser, 2012; 
Stockemer et al., 2012), and absence of competitiveness in elections (Croke et al., 
2015; Frantz, 2018; McAllister & White, 2008; Turovsky & Korneeva, 2018), make 
political engagement seem a less meaningful activity and decrease the incentives for 
citizens to engage in politics. Relying on restricted political participation, electoral 
authoritarian regimes secure the fragile equilibrium between various elites, 
international community, and dissatisfied populations.  
When political participation, elections, and media are constrained, citizens 
understand that acquiring political knowledge can hardly influence elites’ decisions 
and they rationally choose to invest in other activities which have more tangible 
outcomes. Ordinary citizens find it difficult to learn the complexities of politics due to 
both limitations of their cognitive apparatuses and relatively low priority they assign to 
public affairs compared to other matters, such as families, jobs, and daily lives 
(Graber, 2001). To borrow some of Anthony Downs’ insights (1957), those citizens are 
rationally ignorant: their rationality consists in minimizing the effort invested in learning 
and processing information. Thus, they acquire information only when its benefits 
outweigh the cost of learning it. Rational ignorance under electoral authoritarian 
regimes translates into learning from the news in a peculiar way. Being politically 
disengaged, citizens have no incentives to learn about politics and form coherent 
political opinions. At the same time, they are bombarded with astonishing amounts of 
information. As a result, their opinions are incoherent. They are susceptible to the TV 
influence. They are enchanted by the TV image, emotionally react to it, and borrow 
the TV lens for the interpretation of public affairs because they do not have consistent 
political worldviews. Yet, for the same reason, they cannot assimilate the TV lens and 
shrug off TV influence easily. It is being drowned in the discussions of mundane 
problems and implicit criticisms. 
Specifically, electoral authoritarian regimes affect several prerequisites which 
are essential for citizens’ engagement with politics. Only small minorities of citizens 
lean towards politics and are ready to invest energy in searching for and analyzing 
information no matter what. Most citizens need incentives to acquire political 
information – the perception that political learning can have tangible effects (Downs, 
1957); cognitive tools to help them navigate political information - the opinions of 
politicians, parties, and media organizations which are considered to be credible and 
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authoritative (Popkin, 1994); and opportunities to acquire easily accessible information 
in mainstream media outlets (Prior, 2007). While scholars generally lament the lack of 
political knowledge in democratic countries, and these prerequisites vary depending 
particular on institutional settings in democracies, authoritarian regimes put these 
prerequisites into question in a more serious way. Under electoral authoritarian 
regimes, the incentives to engage with politics are extremely weak (citizens do not feel 
that acquiring political knowledge can have tangible effects), opportunities to acquire 
political knowledge are constrained (citizens are not satisfied with the quality and 
credibility of state-run television but are not ready to spend time and energy looking 
for and analyzing alternative sources), and heuristics provided by the political 
environment are not considered to be reliable (citizens do not consider parties or 
politicians to be independent institutions whose opinions are authoritative enough to 
be relied on).  
The dissertation uses this nexus between news processing, political 
engagement, and political regime as a heuristic and looks through its lens at three 
different domains of news processing under an electoral authoritarian regime. First, I 
used this lens to understand better how TV viewers make sense of the news and form 
opinions with special focus on political engagement or incentives to acquire political 
information. I rely on the assumption that citizens under an electoral authoritarian 
regime do not have enough incentives to acquire political information. At the same 
time, they live in an information-rich environment and are being bombarded with an 
astonishing amount of information. I argue that these processes result in a specific 
type of news processing. Dealing with large amounts of political information the best 
they can, TV viewers process the news by mobilizing the most accessible 
considerations. As a result, their opinions contain both critical and supportive reactions 
about the media and the regime.  
Second, I use this lens to investigate the cognitive heuristics used by TV 
viewers to evaluate credibility of the news. I rely on the assumption that citizens under 
an electoral authoritarian regime do not media and political institutions as independent 
and authoritative. I argue that this distrust results in a specific type of evaluation of 
political information. When the political and media environment does not provide tools 
that are useful for evaluating political information, TV viewers rely on other tools which 
seem more reliable, such as common sense and cultural stereotypes.  
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Finally, I use this lens to investigate the cross-media repertoires of TV viewers 
which include a variety of media sources, both offline and online, with special focus 
on opportunities to acquire political information. As electoral authoritarian regimes 
transitioned to high-choice media environments where abundant online sources are 
available, such regimes often use intricate persuasion strategies attempting to control 
many media at the same time. I argue that for less politically active participants, this 
strategy may result in the orchestrated filter bubble effect as they find similar and 
consistent information from many sources. The investigation of these three domains 
– making sense of TV news, evaluating the credibility of TV news, and combining 
television with online media – has allowed me to build a stereoscopic, complex, and 
holistic view of news processing in Russia and to enrich the understanding of news 
processing under electoral authoritarian regimes.  
1.2. The Structure of the Work 
This section details how this argument is developed throughout the dissertation. To 
explain how this dissertation works as a coherent logical whole, I outline the structure 
of the work and briefly describe functions, main ideas, and findings of each chapter.  
Chapter I sets the stage for further investigation of the Russian TV viewers and 
their processing of the news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict by paying attention to 
the media environment around them. The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize 
the process of news processing by highlighting key tendencies which shape the news 
in particular, and media content in Russia in general. I argue that the structure of the 
contemporary Russian media landscape is a product of several consecutive waves of 
glocalization or “the simultaneity and the inter-penetration of […]  the global and the 
local” (Robertson, 1995, p. 30). The first wave of glocalization included the introduction 
of market-based ownership structures in the 1990s. These structures were included 
in various oligarchic pyramids leading to the formation of the statist media model. The 
second wave of glocalization included the introduction of digital television. While 
digitalization was supposed to democratize and diversify broadcasting, controlling 
nationwide multiplexes, the regime could selectively digitalize preferred channels 
while filtering unwanted ones. The third wave of glocalization included the regime’s 
managing of the growing spread of the Internet. After the 2011-12 post-electoral 
protest, the regime recognized the Internet as both a resource and a threat and took 
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the divided approach toward it. While embracing its potential and facilitating its 
development for economic purposes, the government took a hard line over its political 
regulation and started to use it as an instrument to compete in both domestic and 
international information spaces. However, the presence of some independent media, 
the increased role of new media in political and social life, and tight integration with 
the global communication and media market still prevent the Russian media sphere 
from complete homogenization and fully aligning with regime’s narratives. By 
analyzing the structure and the evolution of the contemporary Russian media 
environment, this chapter describes entertainment and political media content which 
a regular TV viewer typically encounters in Russia. 
Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework of the dissertation by reviewing 
the relevant literature in political communication, cognitive and political psychology, 
and research on news processing under authoritarian regimes. By reviewing findings 
across several fields and disciplines, I construct the theoretical lens essential for 
understanding news processing in Russia and identify gaps and issues in the literature 
on news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes. In this chapter, I consider 
three major issues in political communication: media effects, heuristics and cues, and 
high-choice media environments. Discussing communicative, psychological, and 
political aspects of media effects, cognitive heuristics for processing political 
information, and polarization in high-choice media environments, I use this theoretical 
lens to look at these same processes in under an electoral authoritarian regime. I show 
how all these three elements can vary depending on different institutional 
environments. These three bodies of literature (media effects, heuristics, high-choice 
media environments) serve as the theoretical frameworks for three respective 
empirical chapters which focus on how people form political opinions based on news, 
use heuristics to make sense of news, and use a variety of media in a high-choice 
media environment under an electoral authoritarian regime.  
Chapter III outlines the research design of the study. After describing the 
Russian media environment and calibrating the theoretical lens for understanding 
news processing both in Russia and other authoritarian contexts, in this chapter I 
provide descriptions of methods for the analysis of empirical results and answering 
research questions. In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of methods, data, 
and materials used in answering the research questions. In particular, I critically reflect 
on the focus group as a method, its advantages and shortcomings, and explain why 
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this method is especially valuable for the research on news processing. I explain the 
organizational details of the study, the design of questionnaires and scenarios for 
focus groups, the structure of focus groups themselves, and the description of news 
episodes screened during focus group discussions. Finally, this chapter ends by 
providing detailed information about characteristics which are thought to impact on 
political information processing. The description includes socio-demographic profiles 
of participants, media diets, and the level of political knowledge.  
Chapter IV demonstrates how Russian TV viewers make sense of the news 
with special focus on motivation to acquire political information. I provide a detailed 
account of how participants express different opinions responding to TV news. A 
politicized minority of focus groups participants are more interested in politics, have 
coherent political schemas, and demonstrate applicability effect. They filter and 
reinterpret incoming information through their already established views 
demonstrating the signs of consistency bias. The less politicized majority do not have 
motivation to engage with politics. As a result, they do not have coherent political 
schemas and demonstrate the accessibility effect. They use the more accessible ideas 
to interpret incoming messages. I use these results to contribute to several fields. On 
one hand, these findings allow me to develop a new theoretical lens for more nuanced 
understanding of news processing in Russia. While some scholars acknowledge the 
role of political engagement in news processing in Russia, this study goes further by 
showing how political engagement determines news processing by comparing 
politically engaged and disengaged TV viewers. On the other hand, this argument 
allows me to contribute to the literature on news processing under electoral 
authoritarian regimes. While electoral authoritarian regimes can vary from less to more 
mobilizational types, in general they tend to offer fewer incentives for political 
engagement. This study allows me to clarify some of the psychological correlates of 
this situation. This type of news processing supports authoritarian survival. While 
citizens might be dissatisfied with the life under authoritarian regimes, they do not have 
incentives to substantively process political information and do not challenge, rather 
than genuinely support, authoritarian equilibrium due to being unable to articulate 
consistent opinions.  
Chapter V focuses on the process of evaluation of credibility of TV news with 
special focus on the heuristics used by TV viewers. This chapter seeks to contribute 
to a wider and largely unaddressed issue in scholarly debates: the functioning of low-
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information rationality outside of democracies. In this chapter, I document heuristics 
used by TV viewers to evaluate credibility of TV news, the content and sources of 
these heuristics, and particular cues which trigger them. Scholars report that citizens 
in democracies rely on a variety of heuristics based on the institutional and political 
environment, such as party agendas, ideologies, opinions of politicians and experts, 
and reputation of media organizations. My findings show that citizens cannot entrust 
them with the job of interpreting public affairs under an electoral authoritarian regime 
because they are not considered as independent and authoritative. Adapting to an 
authoritarian environment in which political and media institutions enjoy little trust, they 
rely on other tools which are drawn primarily from daily life, such as common sense 
and cultural stereotypes. These tools seem more reliable in the context of 
compromised institutions. In addition, these findings allow me to explain the effect of 
profound distrust in media on news processing under authoritarian regimes identified 
in previous research. I show that while citizens can be skeptical about the media, there 
is a gulf between reported critical attitude to the media and the psychological 
machinery which is at work when TV viewers are asked to evaluate specific elements 
of news broadcasts.  
Chapter VI explores cross-media repertoires of TV viewers with special focus 
on opportunities to acquire political information. This chapter seeks to detail news 
processing under an electoral authoritarian regime by placing it within the context of 
the discussion on high-choice media environments. In this chapter, I detail TV viewers’ 
cross-media repertoires which include both television and a variety of online sources, 
such as social media and news aggregators, and show how these combinations affect 
news processing. Since Russian state attempts to control several types of media at 
the same time, I find that less politically active participants have the impression that 
information in different sources is consistent and similar. This similarity allows them to 
conclude that TV news is credible. These findings both illuminate the effects of the 
regime’s strategy of controlling multiple media in the high-choice media environment 
and show how the proliferation of sources of information can affect political 
communication differently depending on specific political and institutional factors. The 
tendency to form personalized algorithmic filter bubbles in market-based media 
systems in democracies is underlined by the complex interaction between citizens’ 
preferences and algorithm-assisted filtering of media content. I show that under an 
electoral authoritarian regime, concerted and direct pressure over many media leads 
 30 
to the orchestrated filter bubble effect. Unlike filter bubbles based on algorithms and 
personalization, this orchestrated filter bubble effect is imposed in a top-down fashion 
by the state and used to reinforce the messages of the state-controlled television 
rather than citizens’ individual preferences.  
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main argument, reintegrates the 
theoretical framework of the study with findings, and explains the contributions of this 
dissertation to various fields. It explains how this study helps us to understand the 
process of news processing in Russia and under electoral authoritarian regimes 
better, and ties together all separate aspects of this process addressed throughout the 
work: the process of making sense and forming opinions based on TV news and 
motivation to obtain political information, the heuristics used to deal with news and 
political information, the combined effect of television news and different online media 
in the high-choice media environment. In addition, the conclusion critically discusses 
essential topics and issues which the study could not address and formulates them as 
avenues for further research. Last but not least, the conclusion uses the results of this 
study as a vantage point to provide research-informed reflection on the current status 
of Russian media, politics, and citizenry.   
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CHAPTER I. RUSSIAN MEDIA AND POST-SOVIET CONTEXT 
1.1. Introduction 
The process of news processing ultimately depends on the type of content audiences 
are supplied with. In turn, the content audiences are supplied with depends on broader 
political, economic, and technological context shaping the process of news production. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for further investigation of Russian TV 
viewers and the processing of news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict by surveying 
the media environment around them. By highlighting key tendencies which shape 
news and media content in Russia, this chapter demonstrates the full spectrum of 
media content which the Russian TV viewer encounters while navigating Russian 
media landscape and portrays the audiences who consume this content.  
This chapter surveys the structural features which characterize the post-Soviet 
Russian media environment. Two factors are the most important for the understanding 
of contemporary Russian media environment: its political economy and technological 
development. In terms of both political economy and technological development, 
Russian media environment is an illustrative example of what sociologists call 
glocalization. Rethinking the concept of globalization, Roland Robertson defines it as 
“the simultaneity and the inter-penetration of what are conventionally called the global 
and the local, or - in more general vein - the universal and the particular” (Robertson, 
1995, p. 30). Being determined by the Soviet historical legacy and specificity of the 
Russian political and economic environment, Russian media are also shaped by 
global trends, such as market economy and new communication technologies. Vice 
versa, being situated in a particular Russian context, market economy and new 
communication technologies are being reshaped by the post-Soviet historical legacy 
and peculiarities of the Russian political and economic environment. This chapter 
traces these intersections of global and local in a variety of contexts, such as turbulent 
history of Russian media, the development and digitalization of Russian television, 
and the development of the Internet. Relying on the concept of glocalization, it shows 
how these intersections affect both the evolution of television and digital content 
encountered by the TV viewer and practices and preferences of the audiences.  
Based on the analysis of structural tendencies shaping the post-Soviet Russian 
media environment, this chapter explains the evolution of both television and digital 
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content encountered by the TV viewer. I show that the overlapping of global economic 
and technological trends with local political and economic circumstances led to the 
formation of an uneven media environment accommodating contradictory tendencies. 
While it is entertainment-oriented, it is also used for propaganda purposes. The 
regime’s narratives are present in both news and non-news entertainment content, 
such as talk shows, TV series, movies, and cultural content. At the same time, these 
narratives are being redefined due to more active digital audiences and pressures of 
global communication and media market. While being extremely biased and anti-
Western in terms of its contents, Russian television is Western in terms of its genres. 
Both entertainment and news are strongly reliant on Western formats. While being 
actively co-opted by the regime, digital media still provide access to all points of view 
and information which can be found at will. However, one has to possess considerable 
interest and knowledge to make sense of this enormous amount of information. 
Finally, the chapter portrays the audiences who consume this content in terms 
of their demographic characteristics, media practices, and preferences for content. 
While television audiences have been undergoing the process of fragmentation based 
on preference-based fragmentation similar to other countries with high-choice media 
environments (Prior, 2007), central television channels still remain dominant. They 
supply TV viewers with political information either in the form of highly popular news 
or incorporating politics in non-news entertainment formats. Similarly, while digital 
audiences strongly gravitate towards entertainment, a number of online news outlets 
and news aggregators still attract the second-largest number of visitors after 
ubiquitous social media. Provided that the absolute majority of Russians rely on both 
television and digital media, these patterns are likely to overlap. People receive 
information from both television and digital media at the same time. In sum, while the 
media market is entertainment-oriented and has been undergoing fragmentation to 
satisfy audiences’ preferences, state-aligned channels and online media are still 
dominant in this market. It is unlikely that one can fully escape from political information 
and the official political narratives. These patterns provide an important background 
for further investigation of news processing of Russian TV viewers.  
The chapter has the following structure. First, I describe the main stages of the 
development and the structure of Russian media model which combines commercial 
orientation and state control. Second, I describe the digitalization of Russian television 
which followed global communication trends and was adjusted to Russian political 
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reality in a specific way. Finally, I describe genres and contents of television which 
result from these tendencies and the preferences of the audiences who consume this 
content. Since the influence of television in contemporary media environments is 
crucially mediated by the digital media, I describe the main stages of the development 
and the structure of Russian online sphere, genres and contents of digital media, and 
the preferences of the audiences who consume this content. In addition, I survey the 
changes in Russian media landscape since the start of Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
Finally, I conclude the chapter by summarizing the main features of television and 
digital content and the structure of the audiences to provide more general background 
for further investigation of news processing of Russian TV viewers. 
1.2. The Russian Media Model 
One dimension of glocalization in the Russian media environment is its political 
economy. Namely, it is the installation of the market-based media model in the context 
of political and economic structures which remained after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. These changes in the media environment coincide with more general 
transformations of the society in the 1990s, a large-scale privatization program which 
allowed for the emergence of small groups of political and economic elites, or 
oligarchic clans, to gain valuable state assets at low costs. This large-scale 
privatization led to frequent changes in the patterns of media ownership, the use of 
media as instruments in political, economic, and personal struggles, and media 
organizations’ dire economic position resulting in constant maneuvering between 
bankruptcy and co-optation. All these circumstances are well described by the term 
“media in transition” (Androunas, 1993). Scholars offer slightly different political and 
economic periodizations of the Russian media history which result from this 
intersection of local and global patterns. Yet, they are organized approximately along 






The Soviet Period 
• The soviet centralized system of control; 
media are mouthpieces of various party 
structures serving the Leninist purposes of 
“propaganda, agitation, and organization” 
(McNair, 1991); 








• The press is still subsidized by the 
government, but journalists are allowed full 
freedom of expression; 
• The new media law №2124-1 provides a 
legal framework for the independence of the 
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“The “golden age” of the 
Russian press” (Zassurskii, 









media from the state. Censorship is banned 
by the constitution;  
• The growing prestige of the journalistic 
profession; 
• Journalists strongly deviate from the idea of 
disinterested reporting and instead assume 
the role of “spiritual leaders” trying to 
“enlighten, agitate, and organize in the name 













Economic collapse of the press 
• Liberalization of prices in 1992; 
• Economic collapse of most media 
organizations included in the wide network of 
the Soviet media system: most of them go 
bankrupt (Koltsova, 2006, p. 36);  
• Media organizations’ financial 
unsustainability and elites’ view of media as 
lucrative resources turn media environment 
into a battlefield where media are acquired 
and used to discredit opponents and advance 








Sponsorship and media empires 
• In order to survive, media organizations have 
to seek sponsorship; 
• Sponsorship leads to the formation of “media 
empires” (McCormack, 2002); 
• This period culminates in 1996 when media 
organizations are used by the alliance of 
president Yeltsin and oligarchs to win 











Centralization of power and 
takeover of independent media 
by the state 
• Putin eliminates all alternative centers of 
power. Transition from the “competing 
pyramid” system of power to the “single-
pyramid” system of power (Hale, 2010); 
• The takeover of most influential independent 
media by the state (Lipman, 2009); 
• Selective application of financial law to media 
oligarchs Gusinksiy and Berezovskiy as well 
as the takeover of the most influential TV 
channels in Russia - Gusinkiy’s independent 
NTV and Berezovskiy’s pro-government ORT 
(Koltsova, 2006; Oates, 2006); 
Table 2. Russian Media History 
The contemporary Russian media model which results from this mix of market 
ownership structurers and local political and economic structures cemented by Putin 
in the early 2000s has a dual nature. As Kiriya argues, some of the media’s  
elements, including commercial advertising, news journalism and the various 
privately owned media properties, are borrowed or imported from Western 
models, while others, such as relations with political power, the prohibition on 
private ownership of certain types of media, the use of media for forceful 
advancement of government policy and the generally narrow participation of 
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the population in the public sphere, are largely indigenous to Russia (Kiriya, 
2018, p. 98).  
This intersection of market-driven logic and statist political environment creates a 
continuum of different forms of media ownership. As Kiriya and Degtereva (2010) 
argue, there are three main forms of ownership which combine market mechanisms 
and state control in the biggest post-Soviet media market – broadcasting. Media are: 
1) directly owned by the state; 2) indirectly owned by the state through the state 
companies; or 3) indirectly controlled by the state through owners who are loyal to the 
state. Similarly, Vartanova and Smirnov argue that  
The main tendency in the evolution of large media ownership in this country in 
the 2000s has been a decrease in commercial capital and the proportionate 
increase in state capital and mixed capital. The media are concentrated 
(directly or indirectly) in the hands of governmental or government-controlled 
structures (Vartanova & Smirnov, 2010, p. 25). 
To put Russian media in comparative perspective (Hallin & Mancini 2004; 
2011), Vartanova introduced the concept of the “statist commercialized model” which 
elegantly summarizes these heterogenous tendencies (Vartanova, 2011). On one 
hand, this model is purely commercial and profit-driven (Vartanova, 2019). 
Russian media organizations rely on advertisement for survival and feature a 
wide variety of entertainment content. Like the processes in the market media 
systems, Russian media are quite diversified which leads to the fragmentation of 
audiences. While the main TV channels attract the largest audiences, a plethora of 
niche channels also enjoy considerable attention (Nazarov, 2019). On the other hand, 
the main TV channels are in one or another way affiliated with or controlled by the 
state. In other words, the Russian media model has a high degree of political 
parallelism. Instead of being independent and disinterested, media reflect distinct 
political orientations and are tied to political actors. While many pluralist models in 
democratic countries have high degree of political parallelism (e.g., Italy, Spain, 
France), the use of media by Russian political elites constitutes a distinct “Russian 
form of political parallelism” (Vartanova, 2011, p. 129). The specificity of this form of 
political parallelism is reflected in the fact that “integrated state–business elite,” rather 
than competing political elites, “has supported the use of political media in new 
circumstances as traditional instruments of political elite management” (p. 129).   
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1.3. Digital Challenge 
The statist commercialized model is a glocalized hybrid combining global and local: 
the elements of market economy/private ownership and statist patterns of control. 
Another dimension of glocalization in Russian media environment is the process of 
development of global communication technologies which have being taking root in 
the Russian context: digitalization of broadcasting, the economic transformation of 
media industries under the pressure of new technologies, and the development of the 
Internet. Since the early 1990s, European and American media industries experienced 
the transition to digital television. It included the conversion of analog broadcasting 
into digital broadcasting, the increase of quality of broadcasting, the decrease of 
interference, the introduction of HD (high definition) television, the increase in the 
number of channels, interactivity, and additional information provided for each 
broadcast. In Russia, this transition was delayed. In the 1990s, Russian television was 
busy solving other problems, such as privatization. In 2019, all Russian regions made 
a complete transition to digital television (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2019).  
Just like commercialization, digitalization of broadcasting significantly 
diversifies media environment. Multiplying available sources of information, digital 
media create high-choice media environments where preference rather than access 
becomes a key predictor of media consumption (Prior, 2007). While the introduction 
of digital broadcasting diversified broadcasting in Russia, this process also had a 
political logic. As in case of the installation of the elements of market ownership after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global communication trend of implementation of 
digital television was reshaped by the statist nature of the system of media control. 
Russian digital television uses the terrestrial DVB-T2 standard with MPEG format. All 
channels are packed into two multiplexes – data packages for broadcasting by the 
same transmitter. The first multiplex RTRS-1 includes Pervii Kanal (Channel One), 
Rossiia 1 (Russia 1), Rossiia 2 (Russia 2), NTV, Piatii Kanal (Fifth Channel), Rossiia-
K (Russia – Culture), Rossiia 24 (Russia 24), Karusel’ (Carousel), TV Tsentr (TV 
Center); the second multiplex RTRS-2 includes Ren-TV, SPAS, STS, Domashnii 
(Home Channel), TV3, Sport Plus, Zvezda (The Star), Mir (The World), TNT and Muz-
TV (Music-TV). The transition to digital television via multiplexes was strongly shaped 
by political circumstances. The first multiplex included only state channels, while the 
second multiplex included commercial ones. As a result, multiplex structure was used 
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as a filter to cement the role of the state-controlled television in the country. As Strukov 
and Zvereva argue, “digital revolution, which is being implemented in Russia in the 
area of television in the ‘top-down’ fashion, retains many features of the pre-digital 
model of television despite new opportunities offered by the very ‘digital’” (Strukov & 
Zvereva, 2014, p. XV). Implementing digitalization in the top-down fashion, the 
government and government-affiliated television channels attempted both to achieve 
diversification of content which can satisfy the preferences of the population and 
generate profits, and to cement the leading role in controlling the broadcasting. As 
Strukov and Zvereva proceed, “the population has access to this process only as 
consumers of a new product except for the cases when people are directly involved in 
the area of communication [as professionals]” (Strukov & Zvereva, 2014, p. XV). In 
other words, while TV viewers are provided with diverse content, their preferences 
play little role in determining this content. The framing and focus of political content in 
Russian TV news are mostly dictated by the state, while the characteristics of 
entertainment content are dictated by the preferences of media professionals rather 
than audiences. 
While the threat of uncontrolled multiplication of information sources due to 
digitalization of broadcasting was successfully overcome by the Russian state via 
introduction of the state-supervised multiplexes, further digitalization, such as 
customization of content, non-linear TV, and the spread of mobile applications, still 
challenges the statist commercialized model. As Vartanova puts it,  
In the past two decades the statist character of the Russian media has been 
challenged by the growing commercialism of the media industry. The profit-
based logic of media organizations using the matrix of the Liberal model has 
put Russian media far beyond traditional practices (Vartanova, 2011, p. 142).  
Scholars outline four scenarios for the future development of the media industry:  
• Inertial: advertising-driven model and broadcasting TV remain dominant; 
stagnation of printed press and the growth of online media. 
•  Nonlinear television-based: television is being gradually replaced with smart 
nonlinear television; gradual replacement of an advertising-driven model with a 
content-based model; growth of online media and the development of niche 
media). 
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• Revolutionary: overcoming the digital divide between regions; broadcast 
television is replaced with mobile television; the advertising-driven model is 
replaced with a content-based model; stagnation of printed press and the 
growth of mobile applications. 
• Customization-oriented: decrease in the proportion of broadcast television; 
advertising-driven model is retained but with maximum customization of content 
and advertisement; increase of the role of Big Data methodologies and news 
aggregators.  
Media professionals from different areas of the media market interviewed by 
Vartanova agree that the inertial scenario dominates media market and is more likely 
to dominate in Russia in the nearest future. Broadcast television will remain dominant, 
and an advertising-driven model will be the key business model. The dominance of 
broadcast television will be accompanied by the further stagnation of the printed press 
and the growth of online media. The growth of online media will not overcome the 
digital divide between major cities and the rest of the country. In a nutshell, the global 
trend of further digitalization of media content is not strong enough to challenge the 
television-dominant and advertising-based model. While growing in importance, it is 
still displaced and channeled to the outskirts of the media market. In the near future, 
the media market is likely to split into co-existing marginal high-quality content-based 
personalized paid market and dominant “basic market, which will force its way through 
endless advertisers’ curtains” (Vartanova et al., 2016, p. 73).  
1.4. Television: Genres, Contents, Audiences  
The combination of market structures and state control is reflected in the contents and 
genres of Russian television. The political economy of the statist commercialized 
model partly explains the content of Russian TV. On one hand, most of the TV 
programming is diverse entertainment. According to Mediascope agency (2019a), fifty 
most popular TV channels feature the following content: TV series, movies, 
entertainment talk shows, satirical programs, reality shows, socio-political broadcasts, 
content for children, documentary, news, sports. Three main categories of content 
dominate television content: TV series, movies, and content for children.  
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Figure 1 Genre Breakdown (Mediascope, 2019a) 
 
As in the case of the statist commercialized model, Russian television borrows 
Western genres and content adopting them for local audience. Game shows are an 
illustrative example: Pole Chudes (The Field of Wonders) and Kto Khochet Stat’ 
Millionerom? (Who Wants to be a Millionaire?), the two most popular game shows of 
the 1990s and 2000s, are adapted versions of the Western Wheel and Who Wants to 
Be a Millionaire? While the former was licensed by the original provider (Pervii Kanal, 
2008), the latter was appropriated illegally but significantly changed (Rulyova, 2007). 
Other popular entertainment content includes Western-style reality TV shows, soap 
operas, police dramas, true crime shows, talk shows, and movies. Russian television 
strongly depends on importing Western entertainment formats because of the 
necessity to attract audiences. By providing a wide variety of entertainment content, 
Russian television generates advertising revenue which is the main source of income 
regardless of the type of ownership or control by the government (Vartanova & 
Smirnov, 2010).  
On the other hand, the other type of content which constitutes a large share of 
total broadcast time is news. Important news broadcasts include Vremia (The Time, 
Channel One), Vesti Nedeli (The News of the Week, Russia 1), Vechernie Novosti 
(The Evening News, Channel One), Vesti (The News, Russia 1), and Mestnoe Vremia 
(The Local News, Russia 1). The news on federal channels mostly focuses on the 
ruling elites (the leaders of the government, government representatives, members of 
legislative bodies), bureaucratic elites (public officials) with rare inclusions of economic 
elites (owners of the big business and managers of the financial or industrial 
corporations). Domestic news focuses on Moscow almost exclusively. Russian 
regions appear in the news broadcasts only when the events being covered have 
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something to do with the ruling, bureaucratic or economic elites, or when something 
extraordinary happens (Novikova, 2014).  
Similar to liberal media models, there is a great deal of reliance on the tabloid-
style reporting and sensationalism even among non-entertainment news broadcasts. 
Just like political reporting in market models merging news and entertainment 
(Moeller, 1999; Thussu, 2007), Russian television reporting relies on sensationalism 
and ignores in-depth analysis (Oates, 2006). However, what makes Russia different 
from typical commercial broadcasting systems is the relative monopoly of the state 
over political content. The news on Russian TV channels lacks diversity and 
represents the Kremlin’s line (e.g., Lipman, 2009; Oates & Lokot, 2013). The state 
uses three main tools to control political reporting. Funding is one of the main tools 
Russian government uses to control television (Kiriya, 2018; Koltsova, 2006). 
However, the cases of direct intervention in the editorial policy by owners are actually 
rare – on a day-to-day basis, it is rather based on journalists’ good understanding of 
the line (Oates, 2006) and reproduced by journalists’ self-censorship embedded in 
journalistic routines (Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014). This self-censorship has 
developed as a way to adapt to pressure from owners and the political sphere (Nygren 
et al., 2018). These tools do not guarantee complete control over political narratives. 
In fact, journalists on state-aligned television enjoy some autonomy in approaching 
social and political issues (Koltosva, 2006; Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014). However, 
this autonomy decreases proportionally to the increasing sensitive nature of reported 
issues. As Oates argues, “There is a large amount of media diversity except on key 
political topics […] Thus, there is an appearance of media diversity, but little 
meaningful challenge to the regime” (Oates, 2016, p. 402)  
Finally, in addition to clearly delineated entertainment and news, Russian 
television features a wide variety of broadcasts which blur the lines between political 
and non-political content. Several types of non-news broadcast feature political 
content which incorporates some of the regime’s narratives. Documentary projects 
and movies, such as Osnovano Na Realʹnykh Sobytiiakh (Based on Actual Events), 
Sekretnye Spiski (Secret Lists), and Zabytye Vozhdi (Forgotten Leaders), use some 
of the regime’s narratives to cover Soviet history, international and domestic politics. 
Similarly, many socio-political talk shows and broadcasts, such as 60 minut (60 
minutes) and Vecher s Vladimirom Solovʹevym (An Evening with Vladimir Solov’ev), 
reproduce the regime’s narratives regarding current politics, the Russia-West standoff, 
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and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, wrapping them in more entertaining formats similar to 
infotainment in market-based models (Thussu, 2007).  
Overall, Russian television relies on the combination of entertainment to attract 
audiences, news to propagate the regime’s narratives, and the blurred zone in 
between which includes both. The normative models of the press dictate that in 
commercial media systems market-oriented nature of the media is connected to 
political independence. While commercialization can lead to many adverse effects, 
such as tabloid-style reporting, sensationalism, ignoring important issues and 
concerns of minorities, advertising revenue as the main source of income guarantees 
certain degree of autonomy from the state and political pressures and the 
professionalization of journalists (Baran & Davis, 2011; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Siebert 
et al., 1963). In Russia, advertising revenue and political independence of media are 
decoupled. Just as other liberal commercial models, Russian media rely on 
entertainment, advertising revenue, and Western formats and genres including all 
adverse effects, such as tabloid-style reporting and sensationalism. However, the 
commercial nature of the media model does not provide political independence. 
Rather, commercial elements of the Russian media system allow for financial survival 
and naturally blend with the statist system of political control. As Vartanova and 
Smirnov argue, competition, which is supposed to result from the diversity of 
entertainment content in market media model, cements statist measures of control 
instead of undermining them:  
The paradox of the Russian media market is that competition, an inherent value 
of Anglo-Saxon ideal of independent journalism, does not guarantee economic 
freedom to the Russian media. Far from it: the decentralization of economic 
resources in the regional markets and the strong competition between 
newspapers and TV companies turn out to be beneficial not to the media and 
their audiences but to the authorities, enabling them to control the media more 
efficiently. In fact, competition in economically weak markets should be 
regarded as a shortcoming of the modern media system in Russia (Vartanova 
& Smirnov, 2010, p. 26).  
As a result, the content of Russian TV is a peculiar mix of entertainment and politically 
biased news.  
Who are the audiences who watch this diverse mix of entertainment and 
politically biased news? According to Mediascope (2019a), Russia is very television 
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centric. Sixty-seven percent of the population watch TV at least once a day. Twenty-
nine percent of the population tune in to their screens every prime-time period. The 
average Russian TV viewer spends four hours a day watching TV. However, while 
Russians watch television a lot, watching is stratified by region, gender, age, and 
preferences. Watching television is slightly stratified by region: the more developed 
and central is the region, the less people watch television. For instance, Siberian and 
Far Eastern federal districts are the leaders of watching television. On average, in 
these regions people tune in to television for 266 and 250 minutes a day respectively, 
while in the Central district people watch television for only 220 minutes a day 
(Mediascope, 2019b). Watching is stratified by gender and age significantly more. 
Women watch television more. Being discovered in the 1960s (Firsov, 1972), this 
tendency is still present in Russia. On average, women watch television for 246 
minutes a day, while men watch television for only 190 minutes a day (Mediascope, 
2019c). Watching television is also stratified by age in terms of number of channels 
people watch and duration of watching. On average, people from 4 to 44 years old 
tune in to six channels a day, and people older than 45 years old tune in nine channels 
a day. The duration of watching also varies widely. From 88 minutes for people who 
are 18-24 years old to almost 400 minutes for people who are older than 65 years old 
(Mediascope, 2019a).  
Figure 2 Average Duration of Watching (Mediascope, 2019a) 
 
Similar to the trends in other market media systems in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Russian audiences have undergone significant fragmentation. In response to the 
formation of high-choice media environments, the audiences in the U.S. and European 
countries have become significantly fragmented (Prior, 2007). The structure of the 
media landscape diversified by cable television and the Internet often has the “long 
 43 
tail” structure. Few nationwide channels-leaders target nationwide audiences without 
adapting to particular preferences. They are followed by medium-sized channels with 
smaller audiences. Medium-sized channels are followed by a plethora of small-size 
channels targeting specific age groups and tailored to satisfy specific preferences 
(Anderson, 2006). While Russia follows this tendency with a delay, in the recent 
decade, Russian audiences have been undergoing significant fragmentation as well. 
Like fragmented high-choice environments in the U.S. and Europe, Russian media 
landscape has the “long tail” structure. The “big three” - Channel One, Russia 1, and 
NTV - are the leaders who attract the largest audiences. They are followed by several 
middle-sized channels, such as TNT and REN TV, who attract fewer viewers. The 
middle-sized channels are followed by a plethora of preference- and interest-based 
channels, such as Disney, Match, Russia-K, which tailor their content to meet specific 
preferences, such as culture, sports, and music (Nazarov, 2019). While this 
fragmentation was present in the 2000s, it has become significantly deeper in the last 
decade. For the past ten years, the importance of the “big three” decreased, and the 
importance of niche channels increased for both older and younger cohorts 
(Mediascope, 2019a).   
Figure 3 Audience Fragmentation (Mediascope, 2019a) 
 
Preference-based fragmentation and the declining role of the large channels 
which target broader audiences without tailoring their content to specific preferences 
evolve along the same lines for both older and younger cohorts. However, the effect 
is more pronounced in the case of younger cohorts. Although niche channels were 
important for the younger cohorts already in the 2000s, they successfully challenged 
the dominance of the “big three” in the 2010s. On the contrary, in the case of older 
cohorts, fragmentation is not that pronounced, and the “big three” are more influential.  
The audiences’ preferences more or less mirror the breakdown of content and 
genres featured by the “big three” of Russian TV channels discussed above. The most 
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popular content comprises TV series and movies followed by the news and socio-
political broadcasts. The ratio of news and entertainment varies across age groups. In 
general, younger people tend to consume more entertainment and pay less attention 
to the news and socio-political broadcasts. On the contrary, older people consume 
less entertainment and watch twice as much news and three times more socio-political 
programs.  
Figure 4 Content Preferences by Age (Mediascope, 2019a) 
 
For instance, the list of top 10 programs for Fall 2019, a fairly representative of 
total broadcasting time on the most popular channels, includes a mix of TV series, 
various entertainment TV shows, news, and sports.  
Name Channel Type Rating 
Znakharʹ (“The Healer”) Channel One TV Series 6.8% 
Golos (“The Voice”) Channel One Competition TV 
Show 
5.9% 
Sekret Na Million (“A Secret Worth a 
Million”) 
NTV Competition TV 
Show 
5.8% 
Pust’ Govoriat (“Let Them Speak”) Channel One Talk Show 5.6% 
Formula Mesti (“The Formula of Revenge”) Channel One TV Series 5.5% 
Vremia (“Time”) Channel One News 5.3% 
Smeshannye edinoborstva (“Mixed Martial 
Arts”) 
Channel One Sport 5.3% 
Mestnoe Vremia (“Local Time”) Russia - 1 News 5.5% 
Skoraia pomoshchʹ 2 (“Paramedics 2”) NTV TV Series 5.0% 
Golos. 60+ (“The Voice. 60+”) Channel One Competition TV 
Show 
5.0% 
Pole Chudes (“The Field of Wonders”) Channel One Game Show 4.7% 
Table 3. Most Popular Content, Fall 2019 
While socio-political talk shows and broadcasts are not in the top 10 programs, they 
also enjoy considerable attention. For instance, the ratings of Moskva. Kreml’. Putin 
(“Moscow, Kremlin, Putin”) and 60 minut (“60 minutes”) - the most popular socio-
political broadcast and talk show of 2019 – are 3.6% and 3% which is not far from the 
top 10 programs.   
In general, Russian broadcasting is uneven and accommodates contradictory 
tendencies. While used for propaganda purposes, it is extremely entertainment-
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oriented. As British journalist Peter Pomerantsev who worked for Russian TV in the 
2000s argues in his memories,  
The new Kremlin won’t make the same mistake the old Soviet Union did: it will 
never let TV become dull. The task is to synthesize Soviet control with Western 
entertainment. Twenty-first-century Ostankino mixes show business and 
propaganda, ratings with authoritarianism (Pomerantsev, 2015, Ch. 1, para. 5) 
Russian television relies on the combination of entertainment to attract audiences, 
news to propagate the regime’s narratives, and the blurred zone in between, such as 
socio-political talk shows and programs, which blend entertainment and politics. All 
these genres enjoy considerable attention. While preference for entertainment trumps 
the popularity of other forms of content, the news and socio-political programs still 
enjoy considerable attention. The news and socio-political content constitute 10% and 
23% of the media diets of younger and older cohorts respectively. However, even if 
one prefers to escape politics by paying attention only to entertainment, they are still 
likely to encounter the regime’s narratives which are incorporated in movies, TV series, 
cultural content, and non-political talk shows. This presence of the official narratives 
in television content guarantees that a regular TV viewer – including those who take 
part in this study – is likely to be familiar with the regime’s narratives if even he or she 
attempts to escape them.  
1.5. New Media and the Government: The Divided Approach 
Television broadcasting is one of the largest segments of the Russian market and an 
important part of Russian culture and society. It has traditionally been considered to 
be an important political asset by both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian elites. Unlike 
television, the Internet is a fairly recent technology which started to take hold in Russia 
in the early 2000s. It has been recognized as an important political and economic 
resource only recently. Before the early 2010s, Russia lacked any comprehensive 
legislation regulating Internet nor did it have any significant governmental projects 
facilitating the development of the Internet. As Oates argues, it was regulated via 
indirect legislation, such as constitutional and federal law, the laws related to mass 
media and national security, and electronic commerce law (Oates, 2013). Although 
there were some repressive laws limiting freedom of speech online, such as SORM-2 
(System for Operative Investigative Activities) allowing for surveillance communication 
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on the Internet, they were balanced by a number of pieces of legislation which were 
surprisingly democratic. For instance, the constitutional law and the 2010 Russian 
Supreme Court Resolution 16 set a limit on the control of freedom of speech and were 
“surprisingly liberal for a state that has pursued relatively strict controls in much of its 
media sphere” (p. 94) and lacking “sweeping controls for the Russian internet” (p. 97). 
In general, “a large amount of dissidence and a wide range of free speech was 
tolerated in the online sphere prior to the end of 2011. As a result, the state was 
content to allow, and even foster, discussion in the online sphere to maintain an illusion 
of a civic space” (p. 49). Since the early 2010s, the Russian government has taken a 
divided approach to this burgeoning new media sphere, welcoming global 
communication trends and incorporating elements of political control similar to 
television. As Oates argues, “while the government clearly promotes the use of the 
internet for social and economic development, it also uses the internet as an additional 
political tool for control and co-optation” (p. 87).  
In the early 2010s, the Internet was recognized as a social and economic 
resource. This change resulted in former President Medvedev’s broader 
“modernization” agenda. This agenda implied moving from the dependence on gas 
and oil revenues to high-tech knowledge-based economy and included the 
development of information technologies and infrastructure for communication 
(Wilson, 2015). The government introduced a number of programs and allocated 
significant resources to develop telecommunication infrastructure, implement digital 
technologies in economy, and provide access to the Internet across Russia. For 
instance, in the 2010s, the government introduced the program “Information Society 
(2011-2020)” which aimed at the development of the Internet. The program covered a 
broad array of issues, such as facilitation of economic and market growth, overcoming 
the “digital divide” between regions, realizing the rights of citizens for access to 
information and protection of private data, the development of the Internet 
infrastructure, and integration of Russia in the global information community. The 
government allocated 1.15 billion rubles to achieve these goals (Informatsionnoe 
Obshchestvo, 2013). Similarly, in 2018, the government introduced the national 
project “Digital Economy”. The program aimed at the development of Internet 
regulation, Internet infrastructure, training specialists for digital economy as well as 
implementation of e-governance. The government allocated 1.63 billion rubles to 
achieve these goals (Tsifrovaia ekonomika, 2019).  
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In the context of the current Russia-Ukraine crisis and Russia’s standoff with 
the West, one might find the goal of “integration of Russia in the global information 
community” surprising. Opinions change rapidly, and several years later the 
government would repurpose global digital technology pursuing control and isolation. 
Since the early 2010s, the Internet has also been perceived as a significant threat. As 
Oates argues, “the development of internet law in Russia has grown more slowly than 
the use of the internet” (Oates, 2013, p. 93). Indeed, until the 2011-2012 post-electoral 
cycle of protests, Russian government did not have comprehensive law regulating 
Internet nor did it try to significantly constrain it. However, after the 2011-12 
mobilization, the Internet was recognized as a significant threat to the regime. As a 
result, the government passed a number of laws replotting the online sphere to 
minimize the potential threat of political dissent facilitated by the new media. There are 
several key laws which have significantly constrained online freedom of speech in the 
recent years reshaping the global communication trend of the development of the 
Internet.  










• The government can block 
websites containing 
pornography, information about 
drugs or suicide without a court 
order;  
• The creation of common list of 
blocked websites; 
 
• Increases the power of the 
Roskomnadzor, Russia’s media 
watchdog, in controlling freedom 










• The government can block 
websites containing extremist 
information without a court 
order; 
• What falls under “extremism” is 
defined by the Office of the 
Prosecutor General. As a result, 
the law gives the government 
sweeping powers to block 













• Compels Russian companies to 
store citizens’ personal data 
only inside Russia; 
 
• Foreign Internet companies 
operating on the territory of 
Russia, such as Google and 
Facebook, are also required to 
store personal data of Russian 
citizens on Russian territory; 
• Increases power of 
Roskomnadzor in controlling 
freedom of speech online;  
• Since it is technically impossible 
to compel foreign companies to 
store data in Russia, the law can 
be used selectively to persecute 
particular companies and media; 
• In 2016, this law was applied to 








• Modifies anti-extremism articles 
280 and 282 of the Criminal 
Code to include extremist 
messages and hate speech 
disseminated online; 
• What falls under “extremism” is 
defined by the Office of the 
Prosecutor General and, as a 
result, gives the government 
sweeping powers to persecute 
political opposition and regular 
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• Internet is being equated to 
other media; 










• Bloggers with more than 3,000 
unique monthly visitors have to 
register with Roscomnadzor and 
indicate the name and electronic 
address on their websites; 
• The law was supposed to 
facilitate control of 
Roskomnadzor over Internet but 
provoked harsh criticism and was 















• Compels communication 
providers to store personal data, 
including calls and messages, 
and metadata, such as name, 
time, and location, for 6 months;  
• Authorizes law enforcement to 
demand this data from providers 
without a court order ;  
• Messaging services which use 
encryption are required to pass 
encryption keys to the Federal 
Security Service; 
• Gives sweeping powers to FSB 
to monitor regular citizens’ 
communications at will; 
• Imposes significant financial 
burden on the Internet and 
telecommunication providers;  
• In 2018, Roskomnadzor 
attempted to block messaging 
service Telegram for the failure to 
comply with the law and pass 











• The government can block 
information which falls under the 
law’s definition of “fake news” 
without a court order. The 
application of the law also 
results in fines for the bearers of 
the “fake news”; 
• What falls under the “fake news” 
is defined by the Office of the 
Prosecutor General and, as a 
result, gives the government 
sweeping powers to block 













• Internet providers are obliged to 
install devices filtering traffic;  
• The access to websites 
prohibited in Russia can be 
restricted;  
• The creation of the national 
system of Internet domains; 
• Roskomnadzor can disconnect 
Russian Internet from the rest of 
the world; 
• Although the creation of the 
sovereign Internet space is 
hardly possible technically, the 
law increases the authority of 
Roskomnadzor in constraining 
freedom of speech online and 
further disadvantages Internet 














• News aggregators have to 
register with Roskomnadzor; 
• When disseminated information 
is taken from unregistered 
media, a news aggregator bears 
legal responsibility if it violates 
the law; 
• If media is registered with the 
state, a news aggregator avoids 
legal responsibility; 
 
• The law creates stimuli for news 
aggregators to disseminate 
information taken only from the 
media registered with the state 
restricting diversity of media 
content and freedom of speech 
online; 
Table 4. Legal Restrictions of the Internet in Russia 
As can be seen from the list, Russian government attempts to constrain the 
online sphere via several kinds of legal control. Some laws, such federal laws 139, 
398, 179, 97, 28, 208, target the contents of online sphere. Other laws, such as federal 
laws 242, 374, 90, target the infrastructure of online sphere – Internet providers. In 
addition, legal infrastructural control is also combined with extra-legal measures. As 
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Sivetc (2019) shows in a case study, Yandex, Mail, and Rambler, the companies 
owning the main Russian search engines and news aggregators, cooperate with 
private-public partnership between Netoscope - a project combating malware, spam, 
and bots - and Roskomnadzor – a state agency regulating the media. Some prominent 
liberal news outlets, such as Novaya Gazeta and Grani.ru, were included in the 
Netoscope database as containing malware and then removed. As a result, they were 
downgraded in search queries. This case study demonstrates that in addition to 
traditional methods “based on post ante techniques, such as penalizing by courts” the 
government also relies on new extra-legal techniques which are “focused on ex ante 
tools, such as filtering and blocking by private intermediaries” (p. 7). 
The government has exhibited a divided approach to Internet sources, such as 
online news media, news aggregators, and social media. While clearly encouraging 
the development of the Internet infrastructure, universal access to the Internet as well 
as implementation of digital technologies in economy, it increasingly tries to regulate 
every aspect of it in order to prevent any possible threat to the regime. According to 
Freedom House’s expert rating, Internet freedom in Russia has been plummeting in 
recent years.  
Figure 5 Freedom House Internet Score 
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From 49 in 2009 (“partly free”), the restrictions of online freedom increased to 
67 in 2018 (“not free”) on the scale from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). It places Russia on 
par with a number of authoritarian regimes, such as Kazakhstan (62), Belarus (64), 
Sudan (65) and Turkey (66). Freedom House uses three variables to assess general 
freedom score – obstacles to access (based on Internet penetration), limits on content 
(legal constraints imposed in the online sphere), and violations of users’ rights (legal 
persecution as well as extra-legal violence) (Freedom House, 2018). Interestingly, the 
variables which contribute most to the decrease in general freedom score are limits 
on content and violations of users’ rights, while obstacles to access vacillates around 
the same level. The statistics seems to result from the divided approach of the 
government to the online sphere. While encouraging growth in digital technologies and 
expanding access to the Internet, it strongly constrains the online sphere legally and 
politically at the same time. 
Like the ownership model and the process of digitalization, the politics of the 
government in the area of new media is also an illustrative example of glocalization. 
While embracing global universal trends and facilitating the development of the 
Internet due to its contributions to economy and social communication, it glocalizes 
them by introducing multiple restrictions which constrain the democratic potential of 
the Internet in the attempt to cement the regime’s monopoly on political power. These 
contradictory tendencies lead to the formation of an uneven digital environment. Being 
actively constrained by the regime, digital media still provide access to all points of 
view and information which can be found at will, provided one has enough interest and 
knowledge to make sense of the enormous amount of information. Given the total 
digitalization of the population, it is clear that digital media crucially mediate the 
influence of broadcasting television. As a result, understanding patterns of control of 
digital media and digital media audiences is essential for understanding the Russian 
TV viewer. To understand the influence of digital media on Russian society better, the 
audience of digital media should be further considered.  
1.6. New Media: Genres, Contents, Audiences 
The audience which navigates this diverse but politically constrained landscape is 
large. According to the Russian Federal Agency on the Press and Mass 
 51 
Communication (2019), Internet usage in Russia has risen threefold in the last ten 
years– from 25% in 2008 to 79% in 2019.  
Figure 6 Internet Usage (GFK Russia, 2018) 
 
The increase in the usage of the Internet in the recent years is related to several 
factors: the digitalization the of older cohorts of the population and the spread of mobile 
devices. First, while Russian youth is already extremely digitalized, the digitalization 
of older cohorts of the population has significantly contributed to the increase in use 
of the Internet use in the recent years. According to the GFK Russia business agency 
(2018), total (not daily) Internet usage of the younger cohort aged 16-29 is 99%. Total 
Internet usage by people aged 30-54 and 55+ is 88% and 36% respectively. According 
to Russian pollster, the Levada Center (2018), while Internet usage has remained 
constant among youth (85-90%), more than 25% of people falling within the 25-39 and 
40-54 age cohorts have started to use Internet in the past three years. Internet usage 
among those in the oldest cohort of the population has risen by 15%. 
Figure 7 Internet Usage and Age (Levada Center, 2018; GFK Russia, 2018) 
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Second, the active digitalization of society in recent years is partly underlined 
by the spread of mobile devices. According to GFK Russia, the usage of the mobile 
Internet on smartphones increased dramatically from 2013 to 2018. In total, 61% of 
people aged 16+ use mobile Internet on tablets and smartphones. 41% of people aged 
16-29, 30% of people aged 30-54, and 9% of people aged 55+ use mobile Internet 
exclusively (GFK Russia, 2018). 
       Figure 8 Devices (GFK Russia, 2018) 
 
    Figure 9 Mobile Only (GFK Russia, 2018) 
 
Being much cheaper than computers, mobile devices mitigate socio-economic 
and geographic inequalities in usage of the Internet by providing access to the Internet 
to broader strata of the population. According to the Mediascope agency (Mediascope, 
2019d), poor people are more likely to use mobile Internet exclusively than well-to-do 
people. The professional breakdown of the Internet usage shows a similar pattern: 
among those who tend to use desktop Internet more than mobile Internet are 
managers, professional specialists, and pensioners. Among those who tend to use 
mobile Internet devices more than desktop Internet devices are blue and white collars, 
students, the unemployed, and housewives (Mediascope, 2018)4. These data suggest 
that people of lower socio-economic status are the primary group who benefit from the 
expansion of the Internet penetration caused by cheaper mobile devices, while people 
of higher economic status are already quite digitalized. 
 
4 Affinity index - the weight of a target audience compared to the total population under investigation. 
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Figure 10 Internet and Inequality (Mediascope, 2019d) 
 
Similarly, the mobile Internet mitigates some of the geographical inequalities, 
giving access to the Internet to a wider population across the country. According to 
Mediascope, the number of people who use desktop and mobile Internet devices in 
bigger cities (100k+) and smaller cities (0-99k) is approximately the same. However, 
in smaller cities, the mobile Internet is significantly more widespread than the desktop 
Internet is (Mediascope, 2019d). Given the rise in mobile Internet use, these data 
suggest that people living in small cities are the group which benefits from the 
expansion of Internet penetration resulting from cheaper mobile devices more than 
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their counterparts living in bigger cities. People living in bigger cities are already quite 
digitalized.  
Figure 11 Internet Usage and City Size (Mediascope, 2019d) 
 
A wide variety of media content is available via the Internet. According to the 
automated Yandex Radar rating system (Yandex Radar, 2019), online preferences of 
Russian users can be ordered as follows: search engines, social media, video and 
audio content services, and news media. Being used for everyday life purposes, such 
as communication with friends and looking for information, search engines and social 
media constitute the most widely used digital media.  
Figure 12 Preferences for Media Content (Yandex Radar, 2019) 
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Like television preferences, entertainment-related content trumps preferences 
for the news. The most widely-used media after utility- and communication-related 
social media and search engines are a variety of services used for watching videos 
and movies, looking and reading recommendations of movies, and listening to music. 
However, the news still enjoys considerable attention.  
Figure 13 Preferences for News (Yandex Radar, 2019) 
 
Russian news aggregator Yandex News outperforms any online news media. News 
aggregators Rambler News and Mail News lag far behind. The most popular news 
media outlets online are state aligned: RIA Novosti, Lenta.ru, Komsomolʹskaia Pravda. 
However, some independent news media outlets also enjoy popularity. According to 
Russian pollster Levada Center, independent news media outlets are defined as those 
news media which “regularly publish viewpoints which differ from the official ones” 
expressed by the government, pro-government politicians, and covered in state-
aligned media. Such news media as RBK, Echo of Moscow, Vedomosti fall within this 
category. The total audience of all independent news outlets in Russia is around 35% 
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of the population (Levada Center, 2019b). The websites of state-aligned TV channels, 
such as RT, Channel One, and NTV, are also widely popular.  
The data on Internet access demonstrate that Russians are quite digitalizied. 
They use the Internet for a variety of purposes. Some of them are unique for digital 
media, such as communication and searching for information. Some of them are 
similar to the rationale for watching television – the data suggest that other purposes 
are entertainment (music, videos, movies) and the news. The popularity of both 
television and digital media suggests there is a high degree of convergence (Jenkins, 
2006). Television use and Internet use overlap: people consume entertainment 
content and watch news both on television and online. Moreover, while political 
content on television is strongly censored, digital media content is not. While the 
government attempts to constrain and censor online media, people still have access 
to a variety of viewpoints, both critical and supportive of the regime. This pattern 
provides an important context and background for the research on the reception of 
television. For those who consume both television and online news, the reception of 
television news is most likely to be mediated by online news consumption, and 
receiving online news is mediated by television news. These processes have to be 
considered in research on the reception of television news.  
1.7. After 2014: The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Russian Media 
While the previous subsections described the general development, structure, 
contents, and audiences of offline and online Russian media, the start of the Russia-
Ukraine conflict represented a tipping point in the evolution of the regime’s strategies 
towards the media. Before 2014, television was the main vehicle delivering the 
regime’s narratives, while the regime’s attempts to control the online sphere were 
limited to imposing constraints. The state’s attempts to use, rather than to constrain, 
new media to achieve strategic goals were present in Russia before. However, only 
after 2014, various new media and technology assisted information tools, such as 
social media, online new media, “troll” and “bots,” were mobilized in a concerted 
fashion to promote the regime’s agenda and to discredit opponents. The factor 
spurring this media mobilization was the deteriorating Russia-Ukraine relationship 
resulted from the Euromaidan protests and regime change. The regime had attempted 
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to manipulate both television and new media in a concerted fashion to achieve its 
strategic goals. 
On one hand, Putin’s regime has been intensively attempting to instrumentalize 
television. Although Russian TV was considered to be deviating from the ideals of 
objectivity and highly biased in favor of the president Putin before (e.g., Lipman, 2009; 
Oates & Lokot, 2013), the Russia-Ukraine conflict has elevated these concerns to a 
new level. Most of the TV programming in Russia is still diverse entertainment. 
However, the amount of coverage focused on Ukraine has dramatically increased, 
displacing other political content. In recent years, the news on the main Russian TV 
channels allocated almost one-third of their time to Ukraine. Their coverage can be 
characterized as inaccurate, lacking balance, and highly biased in favor of the regime’s 
version of the conflict (“Messages of Russian TV”, 2015). Russian TV uses confusion, 
disinformation (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014), and outright fake news (Khaldarova & 
Pantti, 2016). In addition to news, political talk shows, once thought of as a dying 
genre, have become an important element of Russian TV programming. As Tolz and 
Teper (2018) argue, broadcasters’ strategy during Putin’s third presidential term 
represents a decisive break with the previous approach focusing on depolitization and 
infotainment. Instead, television channels have started to rely on what Tolz and Teper 
call agitainment – a format characterized by both a “drastic increase in ideological and 
political messaging displayed in the state – controlled media output” and a “systematic 
employment of specific global media formats to enhance its impact on viewers” which 
attempt to “appeal to less engaged and even skeptical viewers” (p. 1; p. 2).  
The main topics covered during the conflict since 2014 are: the fighting and 
civilians, humanitarian aid, international politics and sanctions, and the downing of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014. Russian media describe the conflict as a war, 
the rebels are sympathetically called “the people’s militia” and described as a defense 
against the punishers from Kiev who are identified as a fascist threat spreading in 
Ukraine (Hansen, 2015). The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is framed as the 
struggle between Russian values and the West within Ukraine. The West is framed as 
a threat, strongly demonized (Nygren et al., 2018), and accused of pursuing hostile 
policies based on self-interest in Ukraine (Cottiero et al., 2015). These specific frames 
are a part of more general narrative accusing Western states of undermining the 
sovereignty of other states to achieve political goals (Hutchings & Szostek, 2015).  
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On the other hand, the regime has been trying to complement television with 
spreading its narratives across new media environment. Contemporary media 
environments in which digital media took hold are characterized by specific features 
which make active engagement with media, rather than constraining media, a more 
efficient strategy for authoritarian governments. Specifically, they are convergent and 
hybrid. In these environments, interactivity becomes the central principle, the 
boundaries between legacy media and new media and bottom-up agency and top-
down control blur, and content flows across platforms (Jenkins, 2006; Chadwick, 
2013). Although it is definitely “a significantly more difficult task than traditional 
propaganda carried out within a single authoritarian state that could control information 
flows” (Oates, 2014, p. 15), to an extent the Russian state managed to benefit from 
these features and harness the power of new media by being increasingly present in 
social media, exposing news aggregators and online news to political pressures, and 
creating its own online mouthpieces. Specifically, the regime actively co-opts the 
online sphere via several methods. It attempts to shape perceptions of the conflict by 
offering its own versions of events and reporting on controversial topics in Western 
countries, such as migration crisis, political correctness, and protests, in online news, 
such as online TV channel RT and online media outlet Sputnik (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 
2014; Paul & Matthews, 2016; Yablokov, 2015). In addition, the regime actively 
circulates official discourses in social media (Suslov, 2014) and complements 
grassroots sentiments with paid “trolls” and automated bots which post comments 
favorable to Russia, criticize Western leaders, and move specific news stories up in 
the rankings of search engines (Linvil & Warren, 2018; Stukal et. al, 2017;).  
1.8. The Limits of Media Control  
The regime’s attempts to use a variety of media in a single mobilization effort 
have led many scholars to rely routinely on the concept of the information war which 
implies linear and direct influence spreading from Kremlin to state-aligned media, and 
from state-aligned media to both domestic and international audiences. The regime is 
thought to control both state-controlled broadcasting which affects domestic 
audiences and online news media, such as RT, which affect international audiences 
with the help of bots and “trolls” (e.g., Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). However, there 
has been growing skepticism among scholars rejecting simplistic and outdated 
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assumptions of this concept. Scholars point out that even within a tightly controlled 
media sphere there is a place for journalistic autonomy.  
There are several factors which set limits on the regime’s control over media 
and its ability to propagate political narratives. As Egorov et al. (2009) show, the 
regime’s ability to control media crucially depends on available resources. Even 
resource-rich autocrats cannot control the whole media sphere. Instead, they tend to 
be selective and capture only “commanding heights,” such as national television 
channels (Gehlbach, 2010; Gehlbach & Sonin, 2014). However, even state-owned 
media allow for some degree of journalistic autonomy because state officials and 
media executives cannot micromanage all media production. For instance, Russian 
media executives often rely on journalists’ good understanding of the “line,” such as 
criticism of Putin and sensitive political issues, to ensure compliance (Oates, 2006). 
The content which does not cross this line, even coverage of social and political 
issues, is often left up to journalists’ judgment and creativity (Koltsova, 2008; 
Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014).  
The transnationalization and mediatization of Russian media in the recent 
decades further complicate the idea of linear and uniform control over media 
organizations implied in the concept of the information war. On one hand, the Russian 
media model is still a statist commercialized model (Vartanova, 2011) which makes it 
necessary for Russian media to compete for audiences. When intersected with global 
market imperatives, marketization forces journalists to comply with the standards of 
objectivity and impartiality even more as they have to compete in international, rather 
only domestic, markets. On the other hand, the increasingly important digital media 
can additionally limit the regime’s control over its narratives. For instance, Oates 
(2016) demonstrates the “trickle-up” effect during 2011-2012 cycle of protests in 
Russia. As online news media and citizens in social media reported on protests in a 
more truthful and realistic manner, this liberated commercial television to report on 
protests in a more truthful and realistic manner. In turn, even state-owned television 
channels had to adjust their reporting to compete for the viewers.  
RT is an illustrative example because it has to compete in the global market 
and relies on social media presence more than other media. Several scholars show 
that both marketization and the participatory nature of social media set limits on RT’s 
ability to deliver the regime’s narratives to international audiences effectively. For 
instance, Tolz et al. (2020) show that to protect professional credibility in the global 
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media environment, RT journalists had to distance themselves from the line of the 
Russian regime in covering Skripal’s poisoning. Some RT journalists even openly 
acknowledged the fact that the Kremlin could order the poisoning. Moreover, the 
interview of Margarita Simonyan with poisoning suspects Bashirov and Petrov – RT’s 
attempts to deny the accusations – failed and forced both RT and Channel One to 
ignore this interview altogether. Similarly, in the attempt to estimate RT’s audiences, 
Crilley et al. (2021) demonstrate that the majority of RT Twitter followers are interested 
in entertainment rather than politics. As a result, it is highly probable that they are 
attracted by RT’s nonpolitical entertainment videos and broadcasts which constitute 
the majority of its content in social media and YouTube (Mickiewicz, 2018), and RT 
itself is driven by market imperatives just as by political logic. 
In short, the regime’s attempts to use a variety of media in a single mobilization 
effort does not necessarily translate into real practices of journalists directly. As 
Hutchings argues, “official Russian media discourses do not come ‘ready-made’ for 
transmission. Instead, they are forged from a dynamic process of interaction between 
journalists, the Kremlin, and diverse popular and intellectual discourses. State-aligned 
television channels are as much actors within a global communications network whose 
information flows they both absorb and contribute to as they are Putin’s dedicated 
propaganda storm-troopers” (Hutchings, 2018, para. 5). The interactions, 
negotiations, and fissures between these elements open space for journalistic 
autonomy, reinterpreting, and even challenging the regime’s narratives.  
1.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the major structural tendencies underlying the Russian 
media landscape in a chronological perspective. The transformations of the Russian 
post-Soviet media landscape can be described as several consecutive waves of 
glocalization. First, imported market media ownership structures were reassembled to 
be included in various oligarchic neopatrimonial pyramids and eventually, a single 
pyramid. The Russian media became instrumentalized by political and economic 
elites. Once the alternative centers of power were eliminated by Putin’s regime in the 
early 2000s, so was the independence of the media and journalism. The last 
independent channel was taken over by the state in 2002. The second wave of 
glocalization included the introduction of digital television. Putin’s regime could not 
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ignore the global digitalization of television because of its obvious technological and 
economic advantages. Neither could it embrace its full potential because of potential 
costs of losing grip on information space. As a result, digitalization was conducted in 
the predigital top-down fashion. Having full power over nationwide multiplexes, the 
regime could selectively digitilize preferred channels while filtering unwanted ones 
which further strengthened control of the regime over television. The third wave of 
glocalization included the regime’s managing of the growing spread of the Internet. 
Since the Internet did not present potential risks for the regime until the 2011-12 
protest cycle, there were no incentives to create a comprehensive form of system 
control. After that, it was recognized both as an economic resource and as a 
technology facilitating political dissent. Since then, the regime has been exhibiting a 
divided approach to the Internet. While embracing its potential and facilitating its 
development for social and economic purposes, the government took a hard line over 
its political regulation via both legal and infrastructural control. In addition, after the 
start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the regime also recognized its political potential. 
In addition to constraints, it was used as an instrument to compete in both domestic 
and international information spaces. However, the growing integration of Russian 
media in the global media market and the increased role of digital media still limit the 
regime’s monopoly over media creating spaces for journalistic autonomy.  
These circumstances led to the formation of an uneven media environment 
accommodating contradictory tendencies. Just as in other commercial market-
oriented media models, Russian television produces a vast amount of entertainment 
content and relies on Western formats to satisfy the preferences of viewers and 
reflects some side-effects of commercialization, such as audience fragmentation and 
sensationalism. Unlike commercial market-oriented media models, Russian television 
includes a significant degree of centralized political control. Since television is 
controlled by the government in a centralized manner, the regime’s narratives are 
present in both news and non-news entertainment content. Similarly, while being used 
primarily for entertainment, personal communication, and everyday life needs, digital 
media still provide political information. Online news media and news aggregators are 
widely popular and co-opted by the regime to spread the regime’s narratives. While 
digital media still provide access to all types of views and information which can be 
found at will, one has to possess considerable interest and knowledge to look for them 
and make sense of the enormous amount of information.  
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Television and digital audiences partly reflect these patterns. While television 
audiences have been undergoing the process of fragmentation, central television 
channels still enjoy wide popularity among the audiences. While TV viewers are more 
interested in entertainment, they are still supplied with political information either in the 
form of highly popular news or non-news entertainment formats incorporating politics. 
Similarly, while digital audiences strongly gravitate towards entertainment, a number 
of popular online media and news aggregators supply them with political information. 
In addition, since many Russian TV viewers consume both television and online 
content, these patterns are likely to overlap leading to the mediation of television 
influence by online media and vice versa. These patterns provide an important 
background for further investigation of media reception of Russian TV viewers. 
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CHAPTER II. MEDIA, PYSCHOLOGY, AND INSTITUTIONS 
2.1. Introduction  
The Russian media environment is saturated by entertainment but used by the 
state to convey the regime’s political narratives, television-centric but mediated by 
online communication, anti-Western in terms of its contents but Western in terms of 
its formats. Investigating news processing in such an environment would require an 
integrative theoretical lens and a well-calibrated method. This chapter attempts to find 
a robust theoretical ground for the analysis of news processing under an electoral 
authoritarian regime. Informed by the insights in cognitive, social, and political 
psychology, and political communication, this chapter presents several conceptual 
tools which proved to be reliable instruments in the analysis of complexities of news 
processing, such as the theory of media effects, the concept of heuristics, and the idea 
of high-choice media environments. After carefully reviewing the results of research 
and scholarly discussions in these three areas, I use them as a vantage point to review 
the results of the research on news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes 
and in Russian specifically. Applied to news processing under an electoral 
authoritarian regime, these three concepts serve as theoretical frameworks for three 
empirical chapters of the dissertation – the chapter on television news and political 
opinions (Chapter 4), the chapter on television news, heuristics, and credibility 
(Chapter 5), and the chapter on television news in a high-choice media environment 
(Chapter 6). In essence, I have attempted to understand how an electoral authoritarian 
regime and its institutions affect these three aspects of news reception. Although the 
design of this study is neither experimental nor comparative, metaphorically speaking, 
these three aspects – political opinions, heuristics, and news reception in a high-
choice media environment– represent dependent variables. In turn, political regime 
and institutions represent independent variables which affect how people form political 
opinions, use heuristics to process news, and how political information from various 
sources, both offline and online, affects their opinions.  
This chapter has four parts. 1) The first subsection reviews the literature on 
media influence and political opinions. After briefly touching on early propaganda 
theories and limited effects perspective, the subsection considers the two most 
influential contemporary traditions in the research on news – British cultural studies 
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and political communication. Focusing on political communication, I discuss three 
influential theories of media effects - agenda-setting, priming, and framing – and 
identify core memory structures which underline these effects – associative and 
schematic memory. Finally, I place these theories in a broader context of political 
environment and explain how news processing is connected with citizens’ political 
engagement, and how political engagement is determined by political and media 
institutions. 2) The second subsection focuses on heuristics. After presenting the 
concepts of heuristics and cues, I identify the psychological foundations of this 
distinction - dual-process structure of cognition - and explain how heuristics and cues 
are connected with broader media and political environment. 3) The third subsection 
considers the research on the impact of high-choice media environments on political 
communication. After identifying psychological foundations of polarization, I consider 
three types of polarization in high-choice media environments – preference-based 
polarization, political polarization, and algorithmic polarization. Putting these three 
types of polarization in a broader context, I explain how they are connected with media 
and political environment. 4) Finally, the fourth subsection focuses on electoral 
authoritarian regimes and news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes. 
Synthesizing and integrating the results of research on news processing under 
electoral authoritarian regimes, I attempt to hypothesize how these three elements of 
news processing – the formation of political opinions based on the news, heuristics 
used to make sense of the news, and news reception in the high-choice media 
environment – work under an electoral authoritarian regime. This theoretical 
framework guides my analysis of data in three subsequent empirical chapters.  
2.2. Media Effects and Political Opinions 
2.2.1. A Very Brief History of Media Effects Research 
The first theories explicitly dealing with the nature of media influence were a 
product of the 1930s. Then, the omnipresence of mass communication in politics and 
everyday life and the rise of totalitarian regimes seemed to prove the dramatic power 
of the media (McQuail, 2010). Many stimulus-response theories of media effects, such 
as the hypodermic needle and magic bullet models (e.g., Lasswell, 1927), were a 
product of this specific historical moment. In the post-World War II era, scholars 
responded to the earlier stimulus-response theories with skepticism and regarded 
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them as being relicts of the turbulent past. Experimenting with sophisticated 
methodology, Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (Columbia School) pioneered an 
approach known as limited or minimal effects perspective (Katz et al., 1955; Lazarsfeld 
et al., 1944). As Berelson puts it, earlier propaganda theories were asking “by-and-
large” questions. Yet, they are ill-suited for a scholarly analysis. A proper formula for 
scholarly analysis should focus on specific aspects of the process: “some kinds of 
communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of 
people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects” (Berelson, 1948, 
p. 172). Focusing on concrete rather than general questions, Columbia School made 
the first inquiry into the “black box” of media reception. Based on solid empirical 
analysis, Lazarsfeld and colleagues showed that the power of media effects is 
drastically overestimated. Media effects are strongly limited by many factors, such as 
citizens’ social networks and political partisanship (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944).  
Shrugging off the spell of the “limited effects” perspective (Lang & Lang, 1981), 
the 1970s witnessed a new shift in media effects research. The arrival of television as 
a centralized mass communication system and new advances in psychology and 
communication research revived “the concept of powerful mass media” (Noelle-
Neumann, 1973). It appeared that media effects are quite powerful rather than limited 
if one considers long-term change in attitudes, climates of opinion, ideology, and other 
issues which were beyond the Columbia School’s narrow focus on short-term changes 
in attitudes (McQuail, 2010, p. 473). This revived interest in the power of the media 
gave birth to an agenda-setting approach in political communication (McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972) and encoding/decoding paradigm (Hall, 1973) in British cultural studies. 
The 1980s and early 1990s further extended political communication by introducing 
priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) and framing (Iyengar, 1994) models.  
Some European scholars rejected the Columbia School’s positivist spin and 
proposed alternative semiology-inspired paradigm. Richard Hoggart, Raymond 
Williams, and Stuart Hall are credited with the founding of the British cultural Studies 
which focused on a broad array of culture-related topics, such as language, literature, 
race, and gender. Stuart Hall was specifically interested in media and television and 
proposed encoding/decoding paradigm as a part of broader agenda of cultural studies. 
Based on the Marxist analysis of class, ideology, and hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Marx 
& Engels, 1845) as well as semiotic concepts of signified/signifier and 
denotation/connotation (Barthes, 1957; De Saussure, 1916), Hall (1973) introduced 
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the encoding/decoding paradigm for the analysis of media reception. According to this 
approach, media messages are encoded by communicators and decoded by 
audiences based on social, cultural, and political frameworks of knowledge. As a 
result, a message can have different meanings depending on particular frameworks 
on knowledge and should not be read literally. This semiotic nature of mediated 
communication opens space for alternative interpretations. While the creators of a 
message intend to deliver the “preferred meaning,” audiences have a certain degree 
of autonomy and can accept, reject or reinterpret it. Encoding/decoding a paradigm 
served as a theoretical basis for the empirical research of other scholars within British 
cultural studies. For instance, David Morley (1980) applied the encoding/decoding 
model as a part of a larger project, The Nationwide, and found that different types of 
media reception depend on different class positions. In sum, this neo-Marxist 
approach suggests that class affects media reception through culture. 
2.2.2. Accessibility and Applicability Effects 
While Hall rejected “the lingering behaviorism” (Hall, 1973, p. 5) of previous 
approaches, American media scholars continued to rely on it and cross-fertilized 
quantitative survey-based sociological research with experiment-based research in 
psychology leading to the formation of American political communication as it is known 
today. Although introduced quite a while ago, agenda-setting, priming, and framing 
still represent three of the more influential theories of media effects in political 
communication. Throughout almost 40 years, agenda-setting proved to be “one of the 
most robust theories, if not the most robust theory, in communication” (Ghanem et al., 
2009, p. 516). It postulates a simple principle: “the mass media set the agenda for 
each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political 
issues” (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 177). McCombs and Shaw share skepticism of 
the Columbia school about the immense power of mass media and borrow Cohen’s 
statement that media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what 
to think” (Cohen, 1967, p. 13). Yet, at the same time, comparing the emphasis Chapel 
Hill media put on particular issues of electoral campaign and voters’ emphasis on 
these issues (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), they find plausible evidence that media are 
“stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1967, p. 13). 
Agenda-setting theory posits that “media agenda and the public agenda correlate” 
(Ghanem et al., 2009, p. 517) or that there is “the transfer of salience from the mass 
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media’s pictures of the world to those in our heads” (Ghanem & McCombs, 2001, p. 
67). In sum, agenda-setting theory hypothesizes that news media determine the 
importance people assign to the issues on the public agenda by repeatedly 
emphasizing these issues and making them more easily retrievable from memory. 
In contrast to agenda-setting, priming theorizes how media are “telling people 
what to think.” In political communication literature, priming is defined as the process 
which “by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news 
influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates 
for public office are judged” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 63). In the landmark study, 
Iyengar and Kinder tested priming effects experimentally. By showing newscasts 
emphasizing defense, inflation, energy or unemployment to subjects, they found 
correlations between the subjects’ evaluation of the president’s performance on these 
issues and the subjects’ evaluation of the president’s general performance. As they 
conclude,  
When television news increases its coverage of a particular problem, viewers 
weigh their ratings of the president’s performance on that problem more heavily 
(…) problems covered by television news become more accessible and 
therefore more important in the viewer’s political calculus (Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987, p. 70).  
In sum, priming theory hypothesizes that by repeatedly emphasizing certain issues 
and making them more easily retrievable from memory, news media influence the 
standards used by people to evaluate governments, policies, and political issues.  
Theories of media effects in political communication research do not form a 
logical evolutionary sequence. Unlike agenda-setting and priming models which 
development can be considered linear – the latter is based on the former – the idea of 
framing was omnipresent across different disciplines to be appropriated by political 
communication research in the 1980-90s. According to Entman (1991), frames are 
understood as structures which exists at different levels: “as mentally stored principles 
for information processing and as characteristics of the news text” (Entman, 1991, p. 
7). At the cognitive level, frame is a cognitive schema or “a data-structure for 
representing a stereotyped situation” (Minsky, 1974, p. 1). At the level of news texts, 
frames are “easy-to-understand interpretative packages” (Kim et al., 2002, p. 8). As a 
cognitive media effect, the framing effect operates according to the principle which is 
qualitatively different from agenda-setting and priming effects. Agenda-setting and 
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priming effects appear when media repeatedly emphasize certain ideas in media 
making them more easily retrievable from memory and more likely to be used in rating 
importance of matters of public concern (agenda-setting) and evaluating leaders and 
policies (priming). Unlike agenda-setting and priming, the framing effect appears when 
frames in news resonate with cognitive schemas in memory. When the overlap 
between media message and existing knowledge is sufficient, the framing effect is 
likely to be triggered. The degree of fit between a news frame and the audience’s 
cognitive schema determines whether this news frame affects the audience. As 
Cacciatore and colleagues argue, “the presence of a cognitive schema that matches 
the frame should produce a framing effect, whereas a mismatch between frame and 
schema should fail to produce such an effect” (Cacciatore et al. 2016, p.13)5. 
From a psychological standpoint, agenda-setting and priming effects on one 
hand and framing effect on the other has been dubbed accessibility and applicability 
effects (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). Both agenda-setting and priming are based on 
salience of issues and, consequently, on the same psychological effect: accessibility. 
When particular ideas are repeatedly emphasized in the media, they become more 
easily retrievable from memory, and therefore more likely to be used in rating 
importance of matters on public agenda (agenda-setting) or as benchmarks for 
evaluating political leaders, policies, and issues (priming) (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007, p. 11). Due to this conceptual kinship, priming can be considered to be an 
extension, or second level, of agenda-setting theory (Ghanem et al., 2009; Ghanem & 
McCombs, 2001; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Weaver et al., 2004). While accessibility 
implies that more accessible ideas are more likely to be used in making judgments, 
the framing effect is based on a completely different effect: applicability. Instead of 
making certain ideas more easily retrieved from memory, applicability  
refers to the relation between the features of some stored knowledge and the 
attended features of a stimuli (…) The greater is the overlap between the 
 
5 It is important to emphasize the distinction between frames as structures within news texts and 
cognitive structures in memory. Framing analysis as analysis of media content (“the characteristics of 
news text”) is very widespread in media research. As a result, it may create an impression that framing 
is the method of analysis of media content only. However, in research on media effects, the main 
conceptual heuristic is the frame as cognitive structure (“mentally stored principles for information 
processing”) rather than rhetorical structure within news texts: e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016; Scheufele, 
2000; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017.  
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features of some stored knowledge and the attended features of a stimulus, the 
greater is the applicability of the knowledge to the stimulus and the greater is 
the likelihood that the knowledge will be activated in the presence of the 
stimulus (Higgins, 1996, p, 134).  
In other words, rather than retrieving the most accessible ideas for interpreting media 
messages, framing operates “by invoking interpretative schemas that influence the 
interpretation of incoming information” (Scheufele, 2000, p. 309). The retrieved 
interpretative schema is applied to incoming information. By matching incoming 
information against the retrieved schema, one can interpret media messages through 
the schema. The message is then accepted if it fits the schema or rejected if it does 
not fit the schema.  
Accessibility-based agenda-setting and priming and applicability-based framing 
represent the most influential theories of media effects in general and television 
influence in particular. However, to understand the media and television influence at 
a deeper level, it is necessary to consider the psychological structures underlying 
them. Accessibility and applicability effects are related to more general principles of 
organization of knowledge and memory. As Todorov, Chaiken and Henderson (2002) 
put it, accessibility and applicability are rules of knowledge activation. First, in order to 
be activated, knowledge should be available, i.e., stored in memory. Second, it should 
accessible – when certain cues associated with stored knowledge appear in the 
environment, they increase the accessibility of this knowledge and its likelihood to be 
used. Finally, it should be applicable - i.e., appropriate and suitable for a given 
judgmental task. While availability is the foundation of any knowledge activation (it is 
not possible to activate particular knowledge if it is not present in memory), two other 
principles – accessibility and applicability – constitute key mechanisms for two types 
of memory and information processing – associative and schematic memory.  
Accessibility-based associative models of memory information processing can 
be traced back to the British associationism (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Hume, [1739] 
1978). Influential models of associative processing are developed by Quillian (Collins 
& Quillian, 1969; Quillian, 1967; Quillian, 1966), Collins and Loftus (Collins & Loftus, 
1975), and Anderson (Anderson & Bower, 1972, 1974; Anderson, 1972). Associative 
models of memory posit that memory consists of interconnected concepts or nodes 
which are connected by associative links. Each node is related to a specific concept. 
Links between nodes have different “criterialities” representing importance of these 
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links for a particular concept (e.g., Quillian 1967; Collins & Quillian 1969). When a 
particular node is triggered, spreading activation triggers nearby connected nodes via 
associative pathways. Spreading activation leaves tags which make specific nodes 
more likely to be activated in the future (Collins & Loftus 1975). 
Associative memory is an established theory which was tested through 
simulation and psychological experiment and further supported by evidence from 
neuroscience. For instance, Qullian (1967) and Anderson (1972) designed computer 
simulations to investigate human associative memory. When receiving input 
(concepts), these programs activate nodes one by one via spreading activation 
triggering the whole associative network. Quillian, Anderson and Bower 
complemented computer simulations with psychological experiments to investigate 
associative memory. These experiments operationalize the model of associative 
memory via measuring reaction time (Quillian, 1969) and the number of lists of words 
connected into one associative network (Anderson & Bower, 1972) to complement 
simulations. They confirm that human memory is structured as a network of 
associations. In addition, the findings in contemporary neuroscience suggest that 
associative memory can be a product of neuronal signaling and strengthening of 
synaptic connections. Neurons communicate via propagating electrochemical signals 
(action potentials - AP) within neuronal cells and chemical signals (neurotransmitters 
- NT) between neuronal cells via synapses. When a synapse is activated repeatedly, 
the connection becomes stronger via the process of long-term potentiation (LTP), and 
the signal between neurons is propagated easier (Nicholls et al., 2011). Hippocampus 
(HPC) is thought to be the main area involved in associative memory. It encodes 
information by forming associative connections which can last for days, weeks, and 
years forming memories (Abraham & Otani, 1991; Barnes, 1979; for review, see 
McNaughton & Morris, 1987; McNaughton & Nadel, 1990). The damage to HPC leads 
to inability to learn new associations and retrieve recently acquired memories (Kim & 
Fanselow, 1992; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire, 1981; Winocur, 1990; Zola-Morgan 
& Squire, 1990). If ideas in memory are equated with neurons, and associative 
connections with synapses, this model explains associative learning and memory. By 
learning something, human mind strengthens connections between particular 
concepts. Vice versa, by forgetting something, human mind weakens connections 
between particular concepts.  
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Associative models of memory shed light on the psychological and neural 
nature of the accessibility mechanism and effect. Theories of associative memory 
suggest that when activation spreads across a network, it leaves a “tag” at each node 
(or concept). These tags increase the likelihood that these concepts will be activated 
in the future (Collins & Loftus, 1975). These ideas seem to be further confirmed by 
neuroscience. For instance, scholars find that low frequency theta-burst stimulation 
(TBS) can function as a “primer.” It leaves activation tags in neurons by partly 
depolarizing them. Being partly depolarized, they are more likely to fire than other 
neurons (Larson & Munkácsy, 2015; Vertes, 2005). The model of associative memory 
and TBS explain how the accessibility effect works. By repeating certain information 
in the news, the media leave activation tags in respective neural networks. Therefore, 
when people encounter news, they rely on previously “tagged” networks of 
associations which are more accessible to be used in making sense of political 
information.  
Unlike accessibility-based associative models, applicability-based schematic 
models of memory and information processing can be traced back to Kant’s 
transcendental a priori categories (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Kant, 1781). Influential 
models of schematic processing are developed by Bartlett (1932), Bransford & Franks 
(1971), Minsky (1974), and Anderson & Pichert (1978). Fiske and Taylor (1991) define 
schema as “a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type 
of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes (…) 
schemas are ways of talking about expectations and their effects.” Schemas “allow us 
the comforting sense that we understand our world” (p. 97-98). Schemas are 
categories used in social life. These categories are organized hierarchically – with 
more inclusive categories on the top and less inclusive categories at the bottom.   
Like associative models, schematic models were tested through psychological 
experimentation and simulation and further supported by evidence from neuroscience. 
For instance, in one of the first studies of schema, Bartlett (1932) asked people to 
memorize a folktale. As time passed, subjects remembered only the general structure 
of the story, omitting and twisting details. These findings suggest that the schema has 
a holistic and active nature. People remember general impressions rather than details 
and apply schemas to construct, rather than reproduce, memories. Bransford and 
Franks (1971) and Anderson and Pichert (1978) tested schema theory in more 
rigorous experimental settings. After asking subjects to memorize information, they 
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found that people remember holistic and semantic representations of events rather 
than specific details, words, or information. Another influential implementation of 
schema theory is Shank and Abelson’s (1977) script theory which simulates schematic 
memory. They simulate memory structures which condense complex situations with 
many causal connections into coherent scripts. For instance, a simple restaurant script 
– going to a restaurant, ordering food, paying and leaving – includes dozens of implicit 
details and causal connections which are not explicated. When activated, the machine 
can reconstruct specific details and connections based on the script. Schematic 
memory seems to involve two main areas of the brain: the hippocampus and the 
prefrontal cortex. While HPC forms associative connections, PFC integrates these 
associative connections, identifies commonalities across particular situations, and 
forms abstract schematic knowledge based on information first acquired via the 
hippocampus (McClelland et al., 1995; Moscovitc, 1997; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; 
Yassa & Reagh, 2013). Specifically, the ventromedial area of the prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) seems to be responsible for activation and deployment of schema. For 
instance, deploying a schema leads to activation in vmPFC (van Kesteren et al., 2010). 
People with damage to the vmPFC show reduced schematic memory as opposed to 
people with intact vmPFC (Spalding et al., 2015) and cannot detach themselves from 
concrete experience (Bertossi et al., 2016).  
There are several important aspects of schema theory which make it important 
for news processing. First, schemas represent coherent abstract knowledge 
structures. When a schema is triggered, one can reconstruct particular details based 
on this knowledge. For instance, Minsky (1974) calls the key elements of schema 
“terminals.” Top terminals (essential elements of schema) are fixed, while bottom 
terminals (specific details) are flexible and filled with “default assignments.” Activating 
a schema of a social event (e.g., a street protest), on can infer specific details by filling 
bottom terminals with default assignments (e.g., crowds, speeches, chanting, police) 
without the need to actually perceive and encode this information (p. 1). Second, 
schemas develop with experience. Encountering similar situations, people extract 
essential abstract features of these situations to form schemas (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 
p. 148). Finally, schemas allow schema-consistent information to be processed 
efficiently and resist schema-inconsistent information. As Fiske and Taylor (1991) 
argue, “encoding inconsistent information requires creating a compatible niche for it, 
whereas for consistent information the schema provides ready-made niche” (p. 129). 
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As a result, established schema “resist change and can even persist in the face of 
disconfirming evidence (…) when people with strong prior beliefs encounter mixed or 
inconclusive evidence, they may reinterpret the evidence as if it were firm support fit 
their schema” (p. 150).  
The model of schematic memory explain how applicability effect works. While 
with the accessibility effect, people use the most easily retrievable mental constructs 
to process news media messages, the applicability effect relies on mobilization of 
coherent abstract schema rather than specific bits of knowledge and experience. Of 
course, schema should be accessible (it is not possible to use it otherwise). However, 
the message goes through a more rigorous matching procedure. If this matching 
procedure succeeds, the schema resonates with the message. If this matching 
procedure fails and the message contains schema-inconsistent information, the inertia 
and resilience of the schema encourages the individual to twist and reinterpret the 
message to make it consistent with the schema or reject disconfirming evidence 
altogether. While the models of associative and schematic memory explain the nature 
of news processing and the basic cognitive media effects, this distinction begs the 
question: why do some media messages result in accessibility effects, while others 
result in applicability effects? The next subsection reviews the research in cognitive 
and political psychology explaining the factors which lead to one or another type of 
media reception.  
2.2.3. The Role of Political Engagement 
Although associative and schematic models of memory explain two different 
modes of information processing and dealing with the news, they are not necessarily 
competing theories. Rather, they can be thought of as two branches of theories 
explaining different phenomena. What factors determine whether a person relies on 
accessibility and associative connections or on applicability and a schema to make 
sense of media and political information? The main factor which determines whether 
the individual relies on accessibility or applicability is thought to be the degree of 
sophistication in each respective area.  
Cognitive psychologists argue that the difference between an associative 
network and a schema is in its coherence and richness. As Smith and Queller argue, 
“A schema can be conceptualized in associative terms as a set of units that are so 
strongly interlinked that activating any one of them necessarily activates them all” 
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(Smith & Queller, 2004, p. 21). Similarly, Carlston and Smith concur: “A schema can 
be viewed as a small chunk of associative network within which the nodes are 
particularly strongly linked, so that action of one tends to activate all the rest” (Carlston 
& Smith, 1996, p. 196). When one engages associative memory to process media 
information, the human mind scans the memory for helpful hints to makes sense of 
this information. Those pieces of information which are associatively linked to a target 
stimulus appear “at the top of the head” and are used in information processing tasks. 
This mode of processing of information implies low engagement and familiarity with 
material. Otherwise, in addition to the most accessible ideas, memory would bring 
much more rich and detailed knowledge. When one engages schematic memory to 
process media information, human mind scans memory for schemas. Schemas 
represent much richer and more detailed knowledge. Since this knowledge is rich and 
detailed, the human mind is able to perform a matching procedure and see whether a 
stimulus matches a schema. In a nutshell, associative processing / schematic 
processing and accessibility /applicability effects represent a continuum from low 
engagement and knowledge of the issue to high engagement and rich knowledge of 
the issue.  
The connection between the degree of sophistication of knowledge and 
accessibility / applicability distinction is mirrored in a wider debate on the structure of 
political attitudes and the role of knowledge in political information processing. This 
debate can be represented as a continuum which lies between two opposite views. 
The controversy was set off by Converse’s landmark study which showed that most 
people’s attitudes can be better characterized as “non-attitudes” rather than 
meaningful political attitudes. As a result of little interest in politics, their attitudes show 
no correspondence in time, and people seem to respond to survey questions at 
random (Converse, 1964). Re-evaluating Converse’s data, Achen (1975) proposed an 
opposite view. He offered a statistical model which showed that these fluctuations are 
a result of low reliability of surveys rather than “non-attitudes.” Most citizens have “true 
attitudes” - stable political attitudes - but they struggle to map them onto the vague 
language of survey questions. Within this continuum, there are two respective 
accessibility-based or applicability-based models theorising how knolwedge affects 
political information processing.  
 Zaller (Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992) offers an accessibility-based 
model of media and political information processing in order to integrate “non-
 75 
attitudes” and “true opinions” theories and build one of the most systematic models of 
media and political information processing. According to this view, citizens’ memory 
contains pools of internally conflicting considerations instead of “non attitudes” or “true 
opinions.” When they process political information, they sample the most accessible 
considerations in memory and use them to formulate opinions. When asked a 
question,  
they call to mind as many of these ideas as are immediately accessible in 
memory and use them to make choices among the options offered to them. But 
they make these choices in great haste - typically on the basis of the one or 
perhaps two considerations that happen to be at the "top of the head" (Zaller, 
1992, p. 36).  
Engendered through an associative process, the networks of associations do 
not result in consistent opinions. People do not go through the complex work of 
integrating various considerations into consistent analytical schemes. As a result, their 
considerations are “typically rather poorly integrated” (p. 59). In addition, this model 
allows to connect political sophistication, accessibility effects, and political bias. While 
all people rely on the most accessible ideas to formulate opinions, with increased 
political engagement and awareness, their opinion pools become larger, more stable 
and crystallized. In addition, political sophisticates demonstrate significant political 
bias. They will have more considerations which favor their side rather than opposite 
side in their memory which results in politically biased opinion (Zaller, 1992). 
Scholars leaning toward cognitive psychology borrow insights from schema 
theory and suggest an applicability-based model of media and political information 
processing. According to this view, accessibility is not enough to explain the effects of 
an increase in political knowledge. In addition, politically knowledgeable citizens form 
abstract political schemas based on political experience. These schemas are applied 
to incoming information resulting in a more efficient processing of schema-consistent 
information and rejection or reinterpretation of schema-inconsistent information. 
Based on psychological experiments, Fiske and colleagues (1990) found that a 
political schema crucially affects political information processing. People with higher 
political knowledge comprehend political information faster, better, and make 
decisions faster. Hamil and colleagues (1985) found that Americans use different 
schemas to process political information, such as the class schema, the partisan 
schema, and the ideological schema. These schemas have different levels of 
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efficiency in processing different types of political information, such as information 
about economic issues or complex abstract issues. In addition, they are strongly 
associated with interest in politics and political participation. As predicted by schema 
theory in cognitive psychology, political schemas are associated with bias. For 
instance, Lodge and Hamill (1986) show that partisan schematics (high level of 
political knowledge and interest) are able to classify public policies and recall them 
better than partisan aschematics (low level of political knowledge and interest). 
However, “they show clear evidence of stereotyping by remembering significantly 
more of the schematically consistent than inconsistent policy statements” (Lodge & 
Hamill, 1986, p. 518). In other words, what distinguishes political sophisticates is not 
only the size and consistency of their pools of considerations. These considerations 
also constitute abstract political schemas which make processing schema-consistent 
information more efficient and schema-inconsistent information difficult.  
Taken together, these theories and findings suggest that political expertise 
affects media and political information processing. Political novices have little political 
knowledge and rely on the more accessible considerations to make sense of 
information. In other words, the memory of the political novice asks the question “how 
easily retrievable is a particular memory?” Since there are no overarching schemas 
which would integrate these considerations into a coherent whole and banish 
inconsistencies, their opinions are often contradictory and poorly integrated. Political 
sophisticates have more political knowledge and apply abstract political schemas to 
make sense of political information. In other words, when the memory of the political 
novice answers only the accessibility question “how easily retrievable is a particular 
memory?,” the memory of the political sophisticate answers the applicability question 
“does a particular memory fit encountered information?” Since there are overarching 
schemas which integrate their considerations into a coherent whole and banish 
inconsistencies, their opinions exhibit the opposite tendency: they tend to process 
information in a consistent and biased way.  
While the degree of political sophistication determines whether interaction with 
the media results in associative or schematic processing, media and political 
information processing is not a purely intrinsic characteristic of the human mind. The 
way citizens acquire political information depends on the political environment. 
Different political and media systems can give citizens more or fewer incentives to 
engage with politics. Differences in political engagement across different institutional 
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designs can be identified according to the measures of political knowledge and voter 
turnout. Scholars find that less entertainment-dominated public broadcasting systems 
increase political knowledge by devoting more attention to public affairs and reaching 
disadvantaged groups more successfully due to the requirements of public findings. 
For instance, Curran et al. (2009) find that citizens in countries with public 
broadcasting systems (e.g., Denmark or Finland) are more politically informed than 
citizens of countries with dual systems (e.g., the UK) and much more politically 
informed than citizens of countries with market-based systems (e.g., the US). 
Essentially, public broadcasting systems decrease the cost of obtaining political 
information by paying more attention to public affairs and making news more 
accessible. Similarly, freer media systems increase political knowledge by providing 
easy access to diverse political information. For instance, Leeson (2008) found that 
citizens of countries where the government controls a larger share of media outlets 
and regulates media more are less politically knowledgeable than citizens of countries 
with freer media systems.  
While it is inherently difficult to analyze differences in political knowledge 
meaningfully due to country-specific political contexts (Elff, 2009), differences in voter 
turnout present a less meaningful but more robust way to estimate political 
engagement across different institutional designs because it correlates with political 
knowledge (Delli Karpini & Keeter, 1996; Prior, 2005) and other types of civic 
engagement (Oser 2017; Werfel, 2017). Initially, differences in voter turnout across 
countries were primarily thought to result from differences in political attitudes which, 
in turn, are determined by different national political cultures (e.g., Almond & Verba, 
1963). However, in recent decades, scholars have generated an extensive list of 
factors affecting voter turnout which fall under three categories: a) institutional factors; 
b) socio-demographic factors; and c) political or contextual factors (Eichhorn & Linhart, 
2020; Geys, 2006). Seminal studies by Powell and Jackman show that institutional 
design is the most crucial factor which affects whether citizens perceive voting as 
meaningful. Powell (1986) finds that compulsory voting, less restrictive registration 
laws, competitiveness (the frequency of change of control over the national executive 
by a party or a coalition), proportionally of election system which increases influence 
of voters on policies, and the linkage between parties and social groups positively 
affect voter turnout. Jackman (1987) shows that in addition to the aforementioned 
factors unicameralism fosters turnout because it makes the impact of voters on 
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policies more direct, and multipartyism decreases turnout because elections in 
multiparty systems play a less decisive role in government formation. Conversely, 
violations of electoral integrity and corruption lead to distrust in the political system, 
make voting seem like a less meaningful act, and decrease incentives for voter turnout 
(Martinez i Coma & Trinh, 2016; Stockemer et al., 2012). Later on, the model of voter 
turnout was expanded to incorporate socio-demographic factors. For instance, Blais 
and Dobrzynska (1998) and Geys (2006) find that voter turnout is positively affected 
by GNP per capita, average life expectancy, degree of literacy, size, density, and 
homogeneity of the population as well as past turnout. Finally, Geys (2006) shows that 
contextual factors such as closeness of elections and campaign spending make voting 
seem to be a more meaningful act and foster turnout.  
Overall, this list of factors can be reduced to the following mechanisms: 1) 
incentives which make voting easier and non-voting difficult as physical acts 
(compulsory voting, registration laws); 2) incentives which make voting seem more 
meaningful by increasing the perceived influence of an individual voter on policies and 
government formation (competitiveness, small number of parties, unicameralism, 
proportionality); 3) socio-demographic factors which satisfy citizens’ basic needs and  
predispose them to voting (literacy, GNP, life expectancy, past turnout). As a result, 
citizens in economically and socially developed countries with more democratic 
institutional designs are more politically engaged which, turn, affect how they process 
political information.  
2.3. News Processing and Cognitive Tools 
2.3.1. Heuristics and Cues 
In addition to media effects, the research on cues and heuristics is an important 
area in political communication. These concepts are based on the idea of “cognitive 
miser” in cognitive psychology which presupposes that people engage in the analysis 
of the messages only given sufficient motivation and resources (Todorov et al., 2002). 
In most cases, they rely on peripheral cues and heuristics to interpret information. 
Peripheral cues are any external cues which are not directly related to the content of 
the message but used as criteria for interpretation or evaluating credibility. Heuristics 
are rules-of-thumb triggered by cues which allow a conclusion to be arrived at, at no 
cost. Heuristics are based on prior experience, observations, and logic and constitute 
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simple logical rules, such as “experts can be trusted” and “if others think that the 
message is correct, it is likely to be correct” (Chaiken, 1987).  
Scholars identify many peripheral cues which are used by individuals as 
triggers for heuristics. Reputation is one of the more important cues: individuals tend 
to trust reputable sources more regardless of the content of the message (Hovland & 
Weiss, 1951). Character traits is another important cue: many character traits, such 
as safety, qualification, dynamism, are used as cues to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of the message (Berlo et al., 1969). Gender and age are also commonly used cues: 
older age and male gender are typically used by audiences as source cues to establish 
the credibility of the message (Armstrong & McAdams, 2009; Wood, 1979). Political 
cues are extremely important type of cues. Political cues are used both to challenge 
the credibility of information if the source belongs to another part of the political 
spectrum (“hostile media phenomenon,” Baum & Gussin, 2008; Dalton et al., 1998; 
Vallone et al., 1985;) and to establish credibility if the source’s political alignment 
matches the perceivers’ ideologies (Nelson & Garst, 2005; Rahn, 1993;). Social cues 
are an important type of cue which guides message reception: people rely on the 
opinions of their friends and colleagues (Katz et al., 1955; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and 
even the mere presence of the reaction of others to the message allows individuals to 
arrive at a conclusion about the message (Axsom et al., 1987). Finally, visual cues are 
an important type of cue. For instance, individuals interpret good-looking design of 
websites as a sign of their credibility. This heuristic becomes especially relevant in the 
online environment where individuals encounter tremendous amount of information. 
Relying on visual cues, users can reduce the number of websites they deal with and 
procced with more content-oriented strategies of analysis focusing on a selected 
section of websites (Fogg et al., 2002). The heuristics triggered by these cues are all 
simple logical rules. For instance, the “professional look” of a website implies that it 
was made by professionals. Professionals are also good at providing high-quality 
information (Fogg et al., 2002, p. 25-26). 
The individuals’ tendency to economize on effort invested in analyzing 
information and to rely on cues and heuristics is a part of more general psychological 
structure of human cognition. This structure is theorized by dual-process models of 
cognition. Various dual-process models of cognition differ in their detail (e.g., Chaiken, 
1980, 1987; Cacioppo et al., 1986; Kahneman, 2003; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
However, they all have the same core idea. They all assume the existence of two 
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different routes of information processing. The operations of the first are “fast, 
automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged; they are also 
governed by habit” (Kahneman, 2003:1451). This system uses peripheral cues as 
information shortcuts and relies on heuristics to arrive at a conclusion, without 
investing many resources. By contrast, the operations of the second are “slower, 
serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled” (p. 1451). This system seeks accuracy, 
regardless of how time- and resource-intensive this may be. Smith and DeCoster 
(2000) provide an explanation for this differentiation. They argue that the foundation 
of this division is the existence of two distinct memory systems – the slow-learning and 
the fast-learning ones. This twofold structure is a response to a practical dilemma. 
Human beings have to be able to predict changes in the environment based on “the 
average, typical properties” and to acquire new information rapidly “so that a novel 
experience can be remembered after a single occurrence” (p. 109). These demands 
contradict each other. The knowledge of typical properties is abstract knowledge 
which emerges when the mind retrieves typical essential features from multiple 
encounters with unique specific situations. This process requires discarding memories 
about unique particular situations in favor of typical properties. At the same time, 
human beings have to remember novel unique experiences which contradicts the 
need to form abstract knowledge. As a result, cognition is divided into two systems 
which handle these tasks separately. The fast-learning systems acquire new 
memories about a unique situation. After similar situations are encountered many 
times, the mind retrieves typical features characterizing these situations and moves 
them to the slow-learning system.  
The reliance on heuristics is a characteristic of the slow-learning system. The 
knowledge in the slow-learning system is the result of multiple encounters with some 
experience. For instance,  
someone may have built up, over years of experience with persuasive 
messages, an association between statistical charts and graphs and validity of 
the message. If the person is now confronted with a message having these 
features, the message characteristics may automatically activate this long-term 
association, yielding an intuitive impression that the message is probably valid 
(p. 111).  
The same rule explains heuristics and cues identified in pollical communication. If an 
individual encounters high-quality information from a source multiple times, the 
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reputation of this sources becomes a cue, and the association between reputation and 
quality becomes a heuristic which can be applied later. If high-quality visual design 
appears with high-quality information, one can scan websites for visual cues to infer 
credibility in the future.  
2.3.2. The Role of Political and Media Institutions 
The logic of economizing cognitive effort and relying on heuristics translates 
into the political world. In the contemporary world, people encounter more information 
than they can possibly use. Television, news, books, friends, websites, the 
surrounding environment and many other sources create an endless information flow. 
Due to the limits of human psychology, people are unlikely to consider all relevant 
information and perform complex analysis. As a result, they rely on heuristics. 
Essentially, heuristics are guesses which allow us to infer the quality of information 
based on certain external characteristics. These external characteristics may or may 
not be representative of quality of information which leads to mistakes and biases. To 
compensate for the superficial nature of these approximations, individuals rely on the 
structure of the environment (Gigerenzer & Todd, 2000). In shaping individual 
cognitive heuristics, they make use of political, media, and social institutions. 
In political psychology, this intersection of institutions and individual heuristics 
is known as low-information rationality or “a method of combining, in an economical 
way, learning and information from past experiences, daily life, the media, and political 
campaigns” (Popkin 1994, p. 7). To compensate for the cognitive economy of 
judgment, individuals use various cues in the political environment as information 
shortcuts to achieve a sufficient level of accuracy and complexity of judgment. For 
instance, citizens can develop political identifications and use opinions of favorite 
parties and politicians as heuristics. If parties and politicians are seen as representing 
citizens’ interests, a party identification becomes an heuristic or “a substitute for more 
complete information about parties and candidates” (Popkin, 1994, p. 14). Once such 
identification is established, it eliminates the need to acquire more political information. 
One can use it to infer information about candidates’ positions and the content of 
policies (Popkin, 1994). There is no need for time-intensive investment in political 
learning when one can use a favorite party as a proxy to infer information about 
policies and issues. Similarly, reputation of media organizations also plays the role of 
such heuristics. If one trusts a media organization, the reputation of this organization 
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can be used as a proxy or a shortcut to evaluate credibility of news without investing 
much effort (Hovland & Weiss, 1954). In contemporary digital environments, 
endorsements and opinions on social media can serve as cues for heuristics. Relying 
on opinions of others and recommendations, users can evaluate the quality of 
information (Messing & Westwood, 2014; Metzger et al., 2010). As Landemore 
argues, “the average voter need not be that smart or informed if part of his direct 
environment—the media, political institutions, social norms – is smart for him” 
(Landemore, 2007, p. 23, 25). 
Media systems and political systems can vary giving citizens more or less 
useful instruments to use as information shortcuts. For instance, market-based media 
systems, such as the ones in the U.S., France, Italy, are dominated by entertainment 
(Thussu, 2007) and prone to more polarized reporting (Stroud, 2011). The populations 
of countries with market-based media systems are characterized by lower level of 
political knowledge and more political polarization than the populations of countries 
with public broadcasting systems (Bos et al., 2016; Curan et al., 2009; Kobayashi, 
2016). Polarization makes it harder to use reputation as a useful information shortcut. 
In polarized environments, individuals tend to use reputations of media sources as 
cues to see political bias even in balanced media coverage (Baum & Gussin, 2008). 
Similarly, political systems can vary giving citizens more or less useful instruments to 
use as heuristics. Even if competitive party systems are present in all democracies, 
those with more variety of parties provide more opportunities to find a party which 
better first one’s political preferences (Downs, 1957) increasing the chances of using 
political identification and party agendas as heuristics to infer information about politics 
(Popkin, 1994). However, while media and political systems form a continuum from 
more favorable conditions (public broadcasting system, diversity of parties) to less 
favorable conditions (market-based systems, two-party system) for low-information 
rationality, they still provide useful cues to navigate political information in varying 
degrees.  
2.4. The High-Choice Media Environment and Polarization 
2.4.1. Three Types of Polarization 
In addition to media effects, cues and heuristics, high-choice media 
environments and polarization is another key area of research in political 
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communication. Similar to media effects, cues and heuristics, the issue of high-choice 
media environments and polarization is relatively unexplored in the contexts outside 
of Western democracies. At the same time, most other electoral authoritarian regimes 
are highly digitalized and have transitioned to high-choice media environments making 
the analysis of polarization related to digital media an important task. While “taming 
information tide” (Graber, 1988) has always been a central challenge to political 
information processing, the advent of high-choice media environments revitalized this 
problem. Since the number of information channels available has raised dramatically, 
today people have more opportunities to tailor their media diets to fit their political 
preferences. Specifically, scholars have been interested in three types of polarization: 
the growing divide between politically interested citizens and those who prefer 
entertainment (Prior, 2007), the formation of the homogeneous “echo chambers” in 
which one’s views are reinforced by the views of likeminded individuals (Sunstein, 
2001), and the formation of personalized “filter bubbles” which are underlined by the 
algorithmic filtering of counter-attitudinal information (Pariser, 2011). While high-
choice media environments are thought to polarize audiences through providing 
endless opportunities to customize media diets to fit one’s entertainment or political 
preferences, the very inclination to seek attitude-consistent information is a natural 
psychological tendency. The main mechanism which explains this tendency is the 
human mind striving for cognitive consistency. However, scholars have identified two 
distinct elements of this mechanism: the tendency to seek consistent information to 
avoid psychological discomfort and the tendency to economize cognitive effort 
(Stroud, 2017). While both elements seem similar (striving for consistency), they are 
related to different aspects of human cognition: emotion and cognition.  
Known as selective exposure, the tendency to seek consistent information to 
avoid psychological discomfort has been studied since the early research at the 
Bureau of Social Applied Research (Columbia School). During 1940 U.S. electoral 
campaign, Lazarsfeld and colleagues discovered that 2/3 of voters consumed mostly 
propaganda from their own side, and only few voters had more balanced media diets. 
They concluded that this continuous flow of attitude-consistent information allowed a 
partisan to “reinterpret otherwise unsettling events and counter-arguments so that they 
do not leave him in an uncomfortable state of mental indecision and inconsistency” 
(Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, p. 87). Reevaluating earlier work by the Columbia School, 
Klapper divided this tendency into three parts: selective exposure (individuals choose 
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information which supports their opinions), selective perception (individuals interpret 
information in a manner consistent with their political beliefs), and selective retention 
(individuals remember information which matches their political beliefs) (Klapper, 
1960). The psychological root of this process is cognitive dissonance first 
conceptualized by Festinger. In early experiments, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
discovered that when there is an inconsistency between one’s behavior and opinion, 
an individual tends to change opinion to eliminate this inconsistency. As Festinger 
argues,  
The individual strives towards consistency within himself. His opinions and 
attitudes, for example, tend to exist in clusters that are internally consistent (…) 
The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will 
motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance 
(Festinger, 1957, p. 1,3).  
The tendency to economize cognitive effort has been discovered later as a part 
of research on schema in cognitive psychology. Unlike striving for consistency to avoid 
psychological discomfort, this tendency has purely cognitive rather than emotional 
nature. Developing schema is a long and effortful process which is based on 
encountering multiple similar situations and extracting essential features from them 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 148). As a result, the schema is a resilient structure which 
resists schema-inconsistent information. As Fiske and Taylor (1991) argue, “when 
people with strong prior beliefs encounter mixed or inconclusive evidence, they may 
reinterpret the evidence as if it were firm support for their schema” (p. 150). In short, 
people with developed schemas tend to understand some information better or ignore 
and misinterpret other information just because their prior knowledge makes it easier 
to process schema-consistent information rather than schema-inconsistent 
information (Lodge & Hamill, 1986).  
2.4.2. The Role of Media Diversity 
While the very inclination to seek attitude-consistent information is a natural 
psychological tendency, the advent of high-choice media environments providing 
endless opportunities to customize media diets to fit one’s entertainment or political 
preferences aggravated this tendency leading to increased polarization. Increased 
polarization associated with the advent of new media, specifically cable channels, 
online news, social media, and news aggregators, has been at the center of scholarly 
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attention in recent decades. There are three types of polarization related to high-
choice media environments: the growing divide between politically interested citizens 
and those who prefer entertainment (Prior, 2007), the formation of the homogeneous 
“echo chambers” where one’s views are reinforced by the views of likeminded 
individuals (Sunstein, 2001), and the formation of personalized “filter bubbles” which 
are underlined by the algorithmic filtering of counter-attitudinal information (Pariser, 
2011).  
Prior’s original research on the role of preference in a high-choice media 
environment is a landmark study which documented the growing divide between 
politically interested people and those who prefer entertainment which results from the 
increased availability of sources and varieties of information and entertainment. Based 
on extensive survey data, Prior demonstrates that access to cable television and the 
Internet widens the gaps in both political knowledge and political participation. The 
increased proliferation of sources of information makes preference, rather than 
access, a key predictor of political knowledge. As a result, the gap in political 
knowledge widens and deepens. Those who prefer entertainment completely 
disconnect from politics; those who prefer politics become even more politically 
knowledgeable and active (Prior, 2005, 2007). Overall, these results have been 
corroborated by many other studies. For instance, scholars have found that almost 
half of the U.S. population are “news-avoiders” (Edgerly, 2015; Ksiazek et al., 2010). 
Due to the development of new media, entertainment vs news polarization is growing 
across time. For instance, Strömbäck and colleagues have found that the proportion 
of both news-avoiders and news-seekers and the effect of political interest as a 
predictor of news consumption have increased for the past 25 years (Strömbäck et al., 
2013). In addition, scholars find that the preference for entertainment content 
significantly decreases political knowledge (Yang & Lee, 2014), and preference for 
news increases political interest, political efficacy (Wolfsfeld et al., 2016) and political 
participation (Mosca & Quaranta, 2016; Strömbäck et al., 2018).   
While high-choice media environments polarized the public across 
politics/entertainment lines, some scholars expected similar polarization across 
political lines. The idea of the increased political polarization resulting from the 
opportunity to tailor one’s media diet to individual political preferences was popularized 
as the concept of “echo chamber” introduced by the U.S. legal scholar Cass Sunstein 
(Sunstein, 2001) in the early 2000s. Echo chamber refers to a closure of a 
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communicative system when one’s views are reinforced by views of likeminded 
individuals which potentially leads to the confirmation bias and political polarization. 
Sunstein argues that new media “are dramatically increasing people’s ability to hear 
echoes of their own voices and wall themselves off from others.” Enclosed in new 
media-fueled echo chambers, “diverse groups will tend to polarize in a way that can 
breed extremism, and even hatred and violence” (Sunstein, 2017, p. 59). Since the 
early 2000s, the idea of an echo chamber has become a popular concept valorized by 
journalists and presented as one of the fundamental threats to democracy. However, 
the research shows that this polarization is far from the closed communicative spaces 
reinforcing beliefs predicted by Sunstain.  
Overall, scholars in political communication agree that high-choice media 
environments increase polarization, but this increase is moderate. Ideological 
segregation in consuming online news is slightly higher than in consuming offline 
news, but it is low in absolute terms and many times lower than face-to-face 
interactions with friends, family, and co-workers (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). There 
are several reasons why political polarization related to high-choice media 
environments is not as strong as theorized by Sunstain. First, although laboratory 
studies demonstrate that people choose channels according to their political 
preferences (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009), this tendency is much less pronounced in real 
news consumption. For instance, scholars find that the audiences of different partisan 
cable channels significantly overlap. TV viewers consume politically diverse 
information (Stroud, 2011), and most Internet users share the same non-partisan 
channels and local newspapers in the U.S. (Weeks et al., 2016). In addition, some 
media systems, such as the public broadcasting system, significantly mitigate 
selective exposure and polarization exposing people to politically diverse information 
(Bos et al., 2016). Only small subsets of people with the most conservative diets are 
caught in ideologically homogeneous communicative spaces (Guess et al., 2018). 
Second, scholars find that earlier analysis of selective exposure overestimated the 
tendency to seek attitude-consistent information. Partisans are more likely to read 
news which is expected to be opinion-reinforcing. However, they do not try to avoid 
news which are expected to be opinion-challenging (Garrett, 2009). Third, there are 
many factors counter-balancing the tendency of individuals to seek opinion-reinforcing 
information in high-choice media environments. For instance, Dubois and Blanck find 
that political interest and diverse media diets protect people from being caught in “echo 
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chambers” in the U.K. (Dubois & Blank, 2018). Similarly, Messing and Westwood find 
that social endorsements on social media in the U.S. reduce the effect of partisan cues 
to the levels indistinguishable from chance. Partisans tend to read ideologically-
consistent sources based on partisan cues. However, when news stories from the 
other part of the political spectrum are recommended by others, partisan cues have 
no effect (Messing & Westwood, 2014). In short, while high-choice media 
environments increase political polarization, this tendency is far from the formation of 
a set of closed “echo chambers.”  
The further continuation of the idea of increased political polarization in high-
choice media environment resulted in the concept of a personalized “filter bubble.” As 
an echo chamber, the filter bubble refers to the closure of communicative system when 
one’s views are reinforced by attitudinal information. However, the filter bubble is 
underlined by algorithms rather than by preference. Based on past search and clicking 
behavior, algorithms embedded in websites and social media guess what information 
a user would like to see and suggest it. In doing so, they filter other, potentially new or 
counter-attitudinal, information. The results are undermined creativity (filter bubbles 
prevent new information which is not related to previous web behavior from being 
found) and confirmation and reinforcement of political and cultural beliefs (filter 
bubbles prevent from encountering opinion-challenging information) (Pariser, 2011). 
The concept of the filter bubble has become extremely popular among journalists in 
the early 2010s.  
Like the research on “echo chambers,” the existing evidence suggests that 
fears associated with the contribution of algorithmic personalization to the formation 
of close communities of like-minded individuals are mostly exaggerated. There are 
several reasons for the meager impact of algorithmic personalization on polarization. 
First, the effect of algorithmic personalization is often too weak to form a “filter bubble.” 
For instance, Haim and colleagues find that neither explicit (set by the consumer) nor 
implicit (based on algorithms’ observation of online behavior) personalization in 
Google News significantly affects source diversity (Haim et al., 2018). Second, 
scholars find that the vast majority of online news consumption mimics traditional news 
consumption. For instance, Flaxman and colleagues find that in the U.S., people keep 
visiting the websites of their favorite, typically mainstream, news sources negating the 
role of social media as intermediaries (Flaxman et al., 2016). Finally, algorithm-based 
media, such as social media and news aggregators, actually expose people to 
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oppositional perspectives. For instance, Fletcher and Nielsen find that the use of social 
media diversifies news repertoires of users in Italy, Australia, and the U.K. They call 
this phenomenon “automated serendipity.” Since users’ news repertoires are often 
quite narrow, algorithms regulating automated news selection increase the likelihood 
of incidental exposure to different news sources and prevent the formation of filter 
bubbles (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018).  
Overall, the existing evidence suggests that diversification of media sources 
restructured media environment and created new opportunities for selective exposure 
and political polarization. However, high-choice media environments are far from 
complete fragmentation: both preference-based echo chamber and algorithm-based 
personalized filter bubble are too simplistic concepts. If a media system itself is 
diverse, this diversity counterbalances polarization, making the statements about 
“echo chambers” and “filter bubbles” into alarmist claims rather than accurate 
descriptions of reality. As Guess and colleagues argue, it is the public debate about 
the threat of polarization itself rather than most news consumers that “has become 
trapped in an echo chamber about echo chambers that resists corrections from more 
rigorous evidence” (Guess et al. 2018, p. 15).  
2.5. News Processing and Political Regimes  
News processing depends on political contexts. Political engagement varies 
across the population in every society. Only small minorities of citizens who lean 
towards politics due to motivation which originates in individual political socialization 
are ready to invest energy in searching for and analyzing political information (Prior, 
2007). These people are less dependent on easily available information in mainstream 
media and political cues in the environment to analyze political information in the news. 
However, there is always a larger middle group which traditionally constitutes the main 
object of analysis of political psychology (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). This group is 
especially dependent on the political environment in dealing with the news and politics. 
These citizens are interested in politics, but this interest is not enough to make them 
active information seekers without proper incentives and environment conductive for 
political learning. The way they make sense of news depends on whether they have 
proper incentives, or the perception that their involvement in politics can have tangible 
effects (Downs, 1957); cognitive tools or shortcuts to make sense of political 
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information without investing too much effort (Popkin, 1994); and opportunities or 
easy-to-use channels by which to acquire diverse political information without 
investing too much effort (Kobayashi, 2016; Leeson, 2008). Since political regimes 
vary in terms of incentives, heuristics, and opportunities for political learning, in order 
to fully understand the process of media and political information processing in 
authoritarian contexts, one has consider the structure of political regimes.   
This subsection presents a review of the literature on the structure of electoral 
authoritarian political regimes and news processing in authoritarian contexts. I use the 
connection between news processing and the political environment as a lens to look 
at the research on news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes. Specifically, 
I look at how three connections described in the previous sections – the connection 
between media effects and political engagement, heuristics and media and political 
institutions, and increased polarization related to the advent of high-choice media 
environments – work in authoritarian environments. The subsection is structured as 
follows. First, I review the literature on authoritarian and electoral authoritarian 
regimes. Then I review the literature in three areas: 1) news processing, public opinion, 
and political engagement under electoral authoritarian regimes; 2) news processing, 
credibility, heuristics, and institutions under electoral authoritarian regimes; 3) the 
effect of high-choice media environments on political communication under electoral 
authoritarian regimes.  
2.5.1. The Nature of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes 
Scholars identify numerous criteria which distinguish democratic regimes from 
nondemocratic ones. Polity IV classified regimes as autocracies (Polity IV scores -10 
to -6), anocracies (Polity IV scores -5 to 5) or democracies (Polity IV scores +6 to + 
10) based on competitiveness and openness of elections, constraints imposed on the 
executive branch of government, and the nature of political participation. Similarly, 
Freedom House classifies countries as “free” (Freedom House scores 1.0-2.5), “partly 
free” (Freedom House scores 3.0-5.0) or and “not free” (Freedom House scores 5.5-
7.0) based on political rights (the quality of electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, transparent and functioning government) and civil liberties (freedom of 
expression, associational rights, rule of law, individual rights). All these criteria can be 
reduced to the “procedural minimum” for democracy which includes: 1) free and fair 
competitive elections; 2) universal suffrage and 3) political and civil rights, such as 
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freedom of the press and associations, which insure effective and inclusive political 
participation; 4) elected officials’ real authority to govern independently (Levitsky & 
Way, 2002).  
While totalitarian or full-fledged authoritarian regimes like those existing in the 
20th century are a rare commodity in contemporary politics, the regimes within this 
continuum which tend to violate one or more of these criteria are increasingly common 
today (Guriev & Treisman, 2019; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Since they can vary widely 
from a relatively closed hegemonic authoritarian regimes to more democratic-
competitive forms which include significant elite pluralism, scholars have produced a 
wide variety of classifications to capture this variety of mixed regime types which 
combine democratic and authoritarian elements, such as “hybrid regimes” (Karl, 1995; 
Hale, 2010), “competitive authoritarianisms” (Levitskiy & Way, 2010), “electoral 
authoritarianisms” (Diamond, 2002), “informational autocracies” (Guriev & Treisman, 
2019), and so on. A useful heuristic to meaningfully organize these “shades of gray” 
is the degree of competitiveness (Diamond, 2002). To capture this difference, Levitsky 
and Way (2010) distinguish between full authoritarianisms and competitive electoral 
authoritarianisms. In full authoritarianisms, the real channels for opposition to legally 
challenge the incumbent either do not exist or exist only on paper (e.g., China or Saudi 
Arabia). In contrast, such channels exist in competitive electoral authoritarianisms, but 
the incumbent manipulates media, judicial, and electoral process to create “an uneven 
playing field” which severely restricts an opposition’s chances to win in elections (e.g., 
Ukraine or Georgia). Furthermore, a relatively competitive authoritarian regime can 
slide into a more consolidated electoral authoritarian regime (e.g., Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan) which manipulates political participation, media freedom, and elections 
to the extent “that deprives elections of their primary functions of political choice and 
elite circulation, and reduces them to a mere tool of legitimisation and mobilisation of 
support” (Golosov, 2011, p. 623). 
The attempts to manipulate elections and political participation are a logical 
result of the dilemma of electoral authoritarian regimes. On one hand, since there are 
no democratic institutions which guarantee that political actors can win an election in 
the future even if they lose it now, autocrats cannot afford to loosen their grip on power 
(Przeworski, 1991). On the other hand, electoral authoritarian regimes are unlikely to 
move towards fully-fledged totalitarianism for a variety of factors, such as the absence 
of cohesion within the members of the elite, weak repressive capacity (Linz, 2000), 
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and pressures mounted by other countries and international institutions (Levitsky & 
Way, 2010; Guriev & Treisman, 2019). As a result, electoral authoritarian regimes are 
caught in a deadlock of low-level equilibrium. The autocrats are fearful of violating the 
fragile low-level equilibrium more than they are of being in a coalition with potentially 
hostile competitors or choosing insufficient strategies of behavior (Gel’man, 2015). 
Being caught in this state, the members of elite deploy different strategies to balance 
multiple threats, such as the threat of disobedience of citizens and members of elite 
(Gel’man, 2015) as well as pressures mounted by the international community 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010).  
First, electoral authoritarian regimes deploy a variety of strategies to undermine 
and change the function of elections with varying success. Elections in electoral 
authoritarian regimes are characterized by the uneven playing field which includes 
unequal access to media and financial resources (Letvitsky & Way, 2010) as well as 
manipulation over judicial and electoral processes (Schedler, 2002). Instead of 
abandoning elections, autocrats tweak them to perform a number of useful functions. 
Elections are used to legitimize regimes; to monitor the attitudes of elites, members of 
state apparatus, and citizens (Gel’man, 2015); to reshuffle elite coalitions and 
redistribute resources; to demonstrate other elites that the regime possess massive 
resources and convince them to cooperate with it (Hale, 2015); to create democratic 
facades for the international community (Levitsky & Way, 2010).  
Second, electoral authoritarian regimes attempt to constrain uncontrolled 
political participation except for minimal participation in elections which is needed to 
generate legitimacy, monitor elites and citizens’ preferences, and perform other 
functions mentioned above. In the seminal work, Linz (2000) introduced the distinction 
between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. While totalitarian regimes encourage 
pro-regime mobilization through involvement of citizens in state-aligned political 
organizations, propaganda, and agitation (e.g., totalitarian or post-totalitarian Soviet 
Union, China or Cuba), authoritarian regimes rely on demobilization rather than 
mobilization. As Przeworski argues, the pace of (de)mobilization in authoritarian 
regimes depends on whether authoritarian equilibrium rests on “lies, fear, or economic 
prosperity” (Przeworski 1991, p. 58). While there can be mobilizational phases in the 
development of such regimes, tolerating or enforcing mobilizations is an exception 
rather than the rule for them because it can undermine the fragile authoritarian 
equilibrium (Linz, 2000). While autocracies vary in terms of political engagement of 
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citizens (Reutter, 2020), scholars demonstrate that mobilizing citizens outside of state-
controlled elections is a risky strategy for autocrats. Mass mobilization can engage 
players with different political preferences in political process, generate instability, and 
supply citizens with collective action experience which can be used for further 
independent action. Thus, this strategy is more often used by the elites who lack 
resources for intra-elite bargaining rather than well-integrated members of the regime 
(Robertson, 2011).  
Third, electoral authoritarian regimes constrain media freedom (Schedler, 
2002). While authoritarian regimes can tolerate critical attitudes, they cannot afford 
the perception that there are alternatives to the regime (Przeworski, 1991). Since 
international linkages and integration into global markets significantly increase the cost 
of violence for electoral authoritarian regimes, they are reliant on control over the 
circulation of political information even more than the dictatorships of the past (Guriev 
& Treisman, 2019). However, due to limited resources, such regimes tend to capture 
only “commanding heights” - major national television networks - allowing for other 
forms of media (Egorov et al., 2009). 
Finally, electoral authoritarian regimes tend to downplay ideologies. Since 
articulating ideological differences can be perceived as a threat by some members of 
the heterogeneous elites, autocrats often replace ideological differences with one-
size-fits-all abstract ideas, such as human rights or nationalism (Linz, 2000). Unlike 
the totalitarian or post-totalitarian regimes of the 20th century which used 
comprehensive ideological doctrines to justify themselves and repression, most 
electoral authoritarian regimes tend to eschew ideology and imitate the rhetoric of 
democratic leaders by focusing on economic performance and provision of public 
goods (Guriev & Treisman, 2019).  
Putin’s regime in Russia is a representative example of an electoral 
authoritarian regime. According to Polity IV, Russia is classified as anocracy (Polity IV 
score 4), while Freedom House classifies Russia as “not free” and “consolidated 
authoritarian regime” (Freedom House democracy score 1.39). Specifically, Putin’s 
regime embodies all these characteristics. First, it constrains elections and political 
participation. The regime relies on the excessive usage of patron-client networks and 
manipulation over judicial and electoral process to create “the uneven playing field, 
aimed at keeping incumbents in power regardless of voters’ preferences” (Gel’man, 
2013, p. 4). While Russia regularly holds national elections at all levels, the regime 
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sets high entry barriers for participation in elections, monopolizes financial and media 
resources, and abuses bureaucratic apparatus to maximize votes (Gel’man, 2013). 
Electoral manipulation, such as direct falsification (Kalinin, 2017) and voter 
intimidation (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2018), are well-documented strategies of the regime. 
In addition, Putin’s regime constraints political participation. The regime’s attempt to 
mobilize citizens outside tightly controlled electoral participation are rare and tend “to 
be disproportionately exercised by elites who lack other forms of leverage in the 
struggle for resources” (Robertson, 2011, p. 34). The regime tends to stick to 
demobilization even in the relatively safe area of tightly controlled electoral 
participation. For instance, the 2016 Duma election was characterized by relatively 
little national and local campaigning and mean turnout of around 50% with historically 
low 32.7% in St. Petersburg. As McAllister and White (2017) show, the regime 
deliberately demobilized voters in key regions where electoral observers have easy 
access to polling stations and can document fraud (McAllister & White, 2017). The real 
turnout is probably even lower due to high rates of turnout falsification (Kalinin, 2017).  
Second, the regime attempts to manipulate media to keep the incumbent in 
power and downplays ideology. For instance, according to Freedom House, Russia’s 
rating for Internet freedom in 2020 is 30 (“not free”) which places Russia on par with a 
number of authoritarian regimes, such as Kazakhstan (32), Saudi Arabia (26), Sudan 
(30), and the UAE (29). While originally Putin’s regime tended to control only major 
television channels or “commanding heights” while allowing for other forms of media 
(Gehlbach, 2010), in the recent decade, the regime invested considerable resources 
in both restricting online freedom and shaping online discussions pro-actively (Oates, 
2013). In addition, while some scholars claim that Russia recently undergone a 
conservative ideological transformation (e.g., Kolesnikov, 2015), this ideology is far 
from coherent political ideology. Rather, it resembles what Linz (2000) defined as 
mentality – a vague and amorphous system of attitudes which indiscriminately 
incorporates very general and internally inconsistent claims. As Guriev and Treisman 
(2019) show, Russia is like other “informational autocracies,” such as Orban’s 
Hungary and Chavez’s Venezuela, who largely construct ideological frameworks by 
mimicking democratic leaders and appealing to economic performance, citizens’ well-
being, and public service provision.  
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2.5.2. News Processing Under Electoral Authoritarian Regimes  
One of the features of electoral authoritarian regimes is restricted uncontrolled 
political participation. Restricted political participation has tangible effects on political 
psychology. Even in democracies people have no strong incentives to get political 
information. Strictly speaking, acquiring political information from a purely rational 
choice perspective is largely irrational because citizens understand that the effect of 
individual political decisions on the course of political life is very meager (Downs, 
1957). However, different political systems can give citizens more or fewer incentives 
to engage with politics and acquire political information as the perception of the effect 
of individual influence on politics varies with different institutional designs. It is hard to 
compare how citizens acquire political information across countries directly due to 
differences in contexts. Political knowledge questions, such as those included in the 
surveys of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, have very low discrimination 
because particular items depend on country-specific political contexts and tap into 
different cognitive domains (Elff, 2009). Being a much less robust and indirect 
measure, voter turnout can still be tentatively used as a proxy to compare acquiring 
political information across countries because it correlates with both acquiring political 
information and political knowledge (Delli Karpini & Keeter, 1996; Prior, 2005) as well 
as other types of civic engagement (Oser 2017; Werfel 2017). 
 While voter turnout in democracies is dependent on a wide variety of individual 
factors, such political attitudes, socio-economic status, and education, scholars 
identify institutional design as a crucial factor which affects whether citizens perceive 
voting as meaningful. Many institutional factors can make voting to be seen as more 
meaningful act. For instance, the competitive nature of electoral districts increases 
voter turnout because a closer victory margin makes individual votes seem more 
important. Similarly, proportional systems provide more incentives to vote than 
majoritarian systems because citizens know that their votes translate directly into 
legislative seats and are not “wasted.” Likewise, unicameralism increases turnout by 
making perceived link between elections and legislation clearer thus communicating 
that each vote has more decisive impact on policy (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Blais, 
2006; Cancela & Geys, 2016; Eichhorn & Linhart, 2020; Geys, 2006; Jackman, 1987; 
Powell, 1986). Conversely, violations of electoral integrity and corruption lead to 
distrust in political system, make voting seem like a less meaningful act, and decrease 
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incentives for voter turnout (Martinez i Coma & Trinh, 2016; Stockemer et al., 2012). 
However, while political systems form a continuum from more favorable conditions to 
less favorable conditions in terms of incentives for political engagement, electoral 
authoritarian regimes are characterized by even less favorable conditions. Knowing 
that elections are tightly controlled, and the opportunities to affect the decisions of 
elites are strongly constrained, citizens have no incentives to increase the political 
information they have, or to vote.  
The research on political engagement in electoral authoritarian regimes has 
yielded results which are in line with the tendency of such regimes to discourage 
political participation. Scholars find that some of the same institutional factors hold in 
electoral authoritarian regimes. For instance, both proportionality and closeness of 
election increase voter turnout in East European countries, democracies and 
nondemocracies alike (Kostadinova, 2003). However, voter turnout in electoral 
authoritarian regimes is generally lower than in democracies (Reuter, 2020), even 
though autocrats rely on coercion and material incentives, such as vote buying, 
intimidation, and threats, to mobilize voters for elections (Frye et al., 2019). For 
instance, since the low quality of governance which characterizes such regimes often 
results in ineffective reforms, a deteriorating economy disappoints voters, leading to 
reduced turnout (Kostadinova, 2003). In addition, scholars identify political corruption 
which underpins electoral authoritarian regimes as one of the major factors which 
negatively affect voter turnout.  
Kostadionva (2009) found that initially political corruption in East European 
countries mobilizes citizens to vote to punish corrupt politicians in the short-term 
perspective, but eventually it makes them lose faith in the democratic process and 
decreases voter turnout. Simpser (2012) found that electoral manipulation significantly 
decreased voter turnout in Mexico, while electoral reform in the 1990s which made 
elections fairer significantly boosted turnout. Similarly, McAllister and White (2008) find 
that a significant share of the population voted “against all” (the option was removed 
in 2006) because of the absence of effective legal framework and meaningful 
alternatives in the State Duma election in 2003 in Russia. As demonstrated by 
McAllister (2017), electoral authoritarian regimes can deliberately demobilize voters in 
the areas where electoral observers have access to voting stations and can document 
falsifications. Finally, scholars identify the degree of political and electoral competition 
as a major factor affecting voter turnout. For instance, Turovsky and Korneeva (2018) 
 96 
find that differences in turnout in the State Duma elections in 2011 and 2016 in Russia 
largely depended on the level of competition. Comparing competitive and 
uncompetitive elections in an electoral authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe, Croke et al. 
(2015) demonstrate that the absence of competition decreases voter turnout because 
citizens do not find elections meaningful and “choose to withdraw from the political 
sphere under electoral authoritarianism” (p. 3). Similarly, in a comparative analysis of 
61 autocracies, Frantz (2018) found that the absence of opposition decreases voter 
turnout because those who oppose the regime are likely to abstain from voting.  
While measurements of how citizens acquire political information and political 
knowledge across countries are problematic (Elff, 2009), some studies still suggest 
that citizens in electoral and closed authoritarian regimes are less politically 
knowledgeable and more politically apathetic. For instance, Leeson investigated the 
relationships between political participation, political knowledge, and media freedom 
across Central and Eastern European countries ranging from democracies (e.g., 
Slovenia) to electoral authoritarian regimes (e.g., Turkey). He found that low media 
freedom in less democratic countries makes citizens less politically knowledgeable 
and more politically apathetic (Leeson, 2008). Similarly, Zhang compares a 
democratic regime in Taiwan and an electoral authoritarian regime in Singapore. He 
found that despite very similar cultural profiles, citizens in democratic Taiwan have 
higher political interest, political efficacy, political participation, and more political 
discussions rather than citizens in authoritarian Singapore (Zhang, 2012). In a similar 
vein, Meyen and Schwer find that citizens gave little though to political coverage in 
authoritarian GDR as media did little to reflect the problems of the country and did not 
touch upon their personal lives (Meyen & Schwer, 2007).  
How do low political knowledge and engagement translate into processing 
news and political information under electoral authoritarian regimes? While existing 
studies have yielded rich results regarding the effects of state-controlled media on 
citizens under authoritarian regimes, scholars have been mostly focusing on how, 
why, and under what conditions citizens trust or distrust news and political information. 
For instance, scholars find that citizens in authoritarian regimes are often aware of 
media bias in television news (Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014). They can distrust state-
aligned news media because they are perceived as biased due to a totalitarian past 
(Pjesivac et al., 2016), prior interactions with biased media (Truex, 2016), and bad 
quality of government which is associated with news media trust (Ursin, 2017). On the 
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other hand, scholars argue that a variety of factors contribute to high trust in news 
media under authoritarian regimes, such as weak democratic attitudes and 
identification with parties in power (Moehler & Singh, 2011) and the reliance on state-
aligned media (Geddes and Zaller, 1989). In addition, authoritarian regimes can 
counteract citizens’ distrust by employing intricate strategies, such as sophisticated 
messages which satisfy citizens’ interest in real-life problems (Stockmann and 
Gallagher, 2011), pre-emptive coverage of significant social problems (Zhu et al., 
2013), creative formats (Esarey et al., 2017), or allowing the media to criticize local 
authorities to let citizens ‘blow off’ steam (Chen, 2014).  
Similar concerns have been guiding scholars of the Russian media. While 
regular public opinion polls show a close relationship between exposure to state-
aligned media and susceptibility to regime narratives (e.g., Volkov, 2015), scholars 
report more ambivalent findings and diverge in their estimations of how much capacity 
and inclination Russian citizens have to interpret news critically under an electoral 
authoritarian regime. Some scholars show that the use of state-aligned sources, such 
as TV, increases the agreement with the official narrative of the state and vote for the 
party in power (Enikopolov et al., 2011; Szostek, 2017a; Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 
2020; Shirikov, 2021; White & Oates, 2003). Other scholars report that citizens are 
able to perform critical analysis of political information and identify political bias in news 
in Russia. While watching news which highlights only the benefits of particular policies, 
they can easily infer the costs of these policies based on their experience and 
education and see the attempt of the government to manipulate them (Mickiewicz, 
2005; 2008). In addition, some scholars hypothesize that these contradicting reactions 
to the media can co-exist and propose explanations for this ambivalence. Citizens can 
be aware of manipulation but accept it as part of a state-building enterprise weary of 
economic and political turbulences (Oates, 2006); propaganda may both tap into 
citizens’ patriotic feelings and simultaneously be countered by specific cultural 
legacies which make citizens critical toward media (Hutchings & Ryulova, 2009).  
In essence, the findings of research on news processing in Russia can be put 
into three categories: 1) some scholars report that citizens trust news media, 2) some 
scholars report that citizens distrust news media, and 3) other scholars report that 
citizens have ambivalent attitudes to news media for a range of reasons. What is the 
reason for this divergence in estimations, and how capacity and inclination Russian 
citizens have to interpret news critically? While there are vast differences between 
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different studies in terms of methodology, research questions, research subjects, and 
time periods, some studies suggest that this variation can be partly attributed to the 
instability and contradictions which are inherent to the audience itself and caused by 
little interest in politics. While Mickiewicz (2005; 2008) shows that by and large 
Russian TV viewers are extremely efficient in processing news critically by mobilizing 
their experience, one of her findings stands out and suggests that this capacity 
depends on the nature of the issues covered. When dealing with issues which are 
relevant to viewers, such as economy, environment, corruption, or crime, TV viewers 
are highly efficient in approaching news critically. However, if asked to evaluate 
directly political issues such as elections, they cannot build bridges between issues 
and their experience. TV viewers report confusion and lack of trust and “talk about 
election stories only in terms of other election stories” because elections are “isolated 
from the richness of the experiences that figure so prominently in daily information 
processing” (Mickiewicz, 2008, p. 71, 78). Similar findings are acquired by several 
other scholars who tackle the connection between news processing, political 
engagement, and personal relevance in Russia. For instance, Toepfl (2013) 
conducted interviews with Russian students and found that citizens with low political 
knowledge and interest produce affirmative readings of both state-aligned TV 
broadcasts and oppositional blogs. Thus, they agree alternately with pro-regime and 
anti-regime narratives which are in contradiction with each other. Similarly, Savin et 
al. (2018) experimentally expose Russian citizens to positive and negative framing of 
Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election which was extensively covered 
by Russian state-aligned TV channels. They found that TV viewers are susceptible to 
counter framing and change their views of the Russian-American relations depending 
on the framing, and the effect is paradoxically stronger among those who watch news 
on state-owned TV-channels. They conclude that “the ‘inadvertent audience’ is not 
interested in politics enough to defend and reinforce pre-existing opinions, but is 
informed enough to be vulnerable to counterframing. Therefore, the counter-attitude 
treatment stimulates critical thinking and leads to an overcoming of the initial positive 
bias” (p. 5).  
Taken together, these findings pose several questions which merit investigation 
vis-à-vis news reception among audiences. How do citizens process news under an 
electoral authoritarian regime? How do different degrees of political engagement 
translate into news processing under an electoral authoritarian regime? How does 
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news processing affect political opinions and perception of political issues under an 
electoral authoritarian regime? Chapter IV addresses these questions, using data from 
focus group discussions.  
2.5.3. Heuristics and Cues Under Electoral Authoritarian Regimes 
Another feature of electoral authoritarian regimes is the less independent status 
of media and political institutions. Just as political systems can give individuals more 
or fewer incentives to understand political information, media systems and political 
systems can vary by giving citizens useful instruments to use as cognitive heuristics. 
For instance, individuals tend to rely heavily on reputation as a cue to decide whether 
to trust a message regardless the content of the message (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). 
However, some characteristics of a media environment may prevent individuals from 
using such heuristics. Since market-based systems are dominated by entertainment 
(Stroud, 2011; Thussu, 2007), the populations of countries with market-based media 
systems are characterized by a lower level of political knowledge than the populations 
of countries with public broadcasting systems (Bos et al., 2016; Curan et al., 2009; 
Kobayashi, 2016). As a result, citizens may not encounter political information in the 
first place. In addition, market-based systems tend to be highly polarized. In polarized 
environments, individuals tend to use reputations of media sources as heuristics to 
see political bias even in balanced media coverage (Baum & Gussin, 2008). Similarly, 
political systems can vary giving citizens useful instruments to use as heuristics. Even 
if competitive party systems are present in all democracies, those with multiparty 
systems provide more opportunities to find a party which better first one’s political 
preferences (Downs, 1957) increasing the chances of using political identification and 
party agendas as heuristics to infer information about politics (Popkin, 1994).  
However, while political and media systems form a continuum from more 
favorable conditions to less favorable conditions for using the elements of the 
information environment as the basis for various heuristics for navigating political 
information, electoral authoritarian regimes are characterized by even less favorable 
conditions. Media in democracies are still exposed to a variety of political and 
economic pressures (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), but these pressures affect 
journalists through indirect mechanisms. For instance, media professionals can 
acquire political biases indirectly through socialization in media organizations (Breed, 
1955). Similarly, news and political information in media can be biased because 
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journalists rely primarily on governmental sources as it is the easiest way to acquire 
pertinent information (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). They index sources and viewpoints 
according to the structure of the elite debate because elite debates and disagreements 
make good stories and, according to journalistic values, represent “important conflicts 
and struggles within the centers of power” (Bennet, 1990). As a result, the news in 
market-based democracies is often skewed in favor of powerful economic groups 
(Binderkratz et al., 2016) and presidential administrations, while networks of elites 
define news media agenda and frames (Entman, 2010). In authoritarian regimes, the 
direct control of the government over media is much more common. Governments 
often pressure media directly and make use of intricated persuasion strategies to 
manipulate public opinion (King et al., 2013; Sanovich et al., 2018; Yablokov, 2015). 
Since citizens can often identify media bias, they tend to distrust any news and political 
information. Persuasive skepticism towards news and political information is present 
in many authoritarian regimes, be it non-competitive authoritarian China (Truex, 2016), 
more competitive electoral authoritarianism in Russia (Mickiewicz, 2005; 2008) or 
competitive electoral authoritarianism in Ukraine (Szostek, 2018). Since reputation 
and other cognitive heuristics which are used to evaluate political information require 
some level of trust in media organizations, this profound distrust makes their usage 
less likely in authoritarian contexts.  
Similarly, while political systems in democracies vary from less to more useful 
in terms of the usefulness of information shortcuts they provide, they still include a 
significant element of political competition and trust in electoral fairness. A competitive 
party system, the diversity of political forces, and trust in the electoral system are 
essential in aligning oneself with a party, an ideology, or a politician and using them 
as information shortcuts. In electoral authoritarian regimes, party systems are much 
more constrained, accompanied by a high degree of political corruption, and often 
reduced to a mere façade. Both low competitiveness (Croke et al., 2015; Frantz, 2018; 
Turovsky & Korneeva, 2018) and electoral fairness (Kostadionva, 2009; Martinez i 
Coma & Trinh, 2016; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 2012) reduce political 
engagement and parties seem untrustworthy so that citizens are less likely to consider 
them as institutional vehicles representing their interests or views. As a result, 
ideological and party identifications rarely work as meaningful heuristics for citizens 
under electoral authoritarian regimes. Instead, the struggle for or against a particular 
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regime or some other important identities often replace traditional left-right political 
identifications (Frye, 2019; Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020; Wojcieszak et al., 2019). 
Research on news processing, heuristics, and institutions under electoral 
authoritarian regimes is scarce. However, several studies have indirectly suggested 
that this distrust in the media and the political system affects cognitive heuristics used 
by citizens to process political information. Instead of the heuristics based on the 
political environment, such as opinions of parties and politicians or the reputation of 
media sources, citizens under authoritarian regimes are more prone to rely on 
alternative non-political sources of cognitive shortcuts. Several sources of cognitive 
shortcuts can be deduced from the existing literature.  
1) Source cues appear to affect information processing under electoral 
authoritarian regimes. However, as parties and ideologies rarely represent real 
political cleavages in authoritarian contexts, the distinction between government 
supporters and government critics rather than between different party and ideological 
identifications is what affects political information processing. For instance, based on 
survey experiments, Shirikov found that source cues play an important role in 
processing news in Russia. People trust or distrust government-controlled and 
independent channels depending on whether they are supportive or critical of the 
government. However, the influence of source cues is mediated by education, political 
sophistication, and Internet use. In the case of people with less education, less political 
knowledge, or less frequent Internet access, source cues do not affect processing 
news at all (Shirikov, 2021).  
2) Personal experience plays an important role in processing political 
information under electoral authoritarian regimes. Personal experience is a crucial 
factor which always mediates the processing of political information: people engage 
with information more intensively if they find it personally relevant and can build 
bridges between this information and their own cognitive schemata (Campbell et al., 
1969; Graber, 1984). However, as political processes are often complex and unlikely 
to be experienced directly, political systems supply citizens with heuristics which can 
make up for the absence of direct experience with politics (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). As 
political systems under electoral authoritarian regimes are rarely perceived as 
credible, the relative importance of personal experience as a source of heuristics for 
processing political information increases. For instance, scholars have found that 
citizens in China, Russia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia prefer to rely on their own 
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experience, rather than the trustworthiness of media or political institutions, to make 
sense of news (Mickiewicz, 2005; Pjesivac et al., 2016; Truex, 2016). Although these 
three contexts are very different, they all share one feature. Media institutions in these 
countries are not perceived as being independent and objective due to the distrust left 
behind by oppressive institutions. In China, citizens know that the media represent the 
party line and rely on their own experience to “back out” political bias or discern truthful 
information even in slanted coverage (Truex, 2016). Similarly, scholars report that 
personal experience of interaction with phenomena such as ecology, crime, or 
economy, serves as a source of cues for evaluating overtly positive images of 
governmental policies in Russia, while the reputation of media sources or partisanship 
do little to help citizens make sense of political information (Mickiewicz, 2005).  
3) Abstract reasoning acquired via socialization and education plays an 
important role in processing political information in electoral authoritarian regimes. 
Just as personal experience it is a crucial factor which always mediates the processing 
of political information: it increases the number and richness of schemata which are 
then used to encode new information (Hamil et al. 1985; Lodge & Hamil, 1986). 
However, it is especially important in the contexts in which the environment does not 
provide enough information and incentives to learn about politics. For instance, 
Grönlund and Milner (2006) found that processing political information is less 
contingent on education in proportional systems which provide more incentives to 
acquire more political information. In line with this logic, Mickiewicz found that citizens 
in Russia rely more on abstract reasoning rather than familiarity or experience with 
politics to identify bias and construct a more realistic understanding of policies 
(Mickiewicz, 2005). Similarly, Toepfl found that the cognitive maps Russians develop 
to understand, navigate, and critically evaluate political news play a more important 
role in the context of de-institutionalized politics and vague ideology (Toepfl, 2013).  
4) Communication with other people plays an important role in processing 
political information in electoral authoritarian regimes. Communication with other 
people is an important source of heuristics and knowledge used to process political 
information (e.g., Huckfeldt, 2001). However, this source of heuristics is more 
important in authoritarian contexts due to distrust of media and political institutions. 
For instance, trying to adjust a low-information rationality model to authoritarian 
regimes, Kobayashi argues that “in countries where ideological dimensions are vague 
and the party system is too unstable to be used as heuristics, one’s interpersonal 
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network functions as an effective heuristic to fill political knowledge gaps” (Kobayashi, 
2016, p. 5). Similarly, Oates and Smith suggest that “a wide range of evidence 
suggests that Russians continue to value personal sources of political information to 
complement the cacophony generated by the post-Soviet media environment and 
subsequent crackdown” (Smyth & Oates, 2015, p. 292 - 293).  
As the functioning of low-information rationality in authoritarian contexts is 
largely an unaddressed issue in the scholarly debate, these findings pose several 
questions which merit investigation. How do citizens evaluate the credibility of political 
information under an electoral authoritarian regime? Do they rely on external cues, 
such as the reputation of media sources, party cues, and political affiliations, in the 
context of low trust in political and media institutions? If political and media institutions 
enjoy little trust, what are the alternative sources of cognitive heuristics which are used 
in processing political information? Chapter V addresses these questions by using 
data from focus group discussions.  
2.5.4. High-Choice Media Environments Under Electoral Authoritarian 
Regimes 
Just as different degrees of independence of media organizations and 
perceived integrity of political systems can affect citizens’ heuristics by offering them 
useful cues to navigate political information, the varying diversity of media content can 
affect citizens’ polarization. The abundance of media content increases polarization 
because citizens have opportunities to tailor their media diets to fit their preferences 
(Prior, 2007). However, the diversity of media content can counter-balance 
polarization because most people are not extreme partisans. They routinely consume 
media without a clear political agenda (Weeks et al., 2016), watch channels with 
different political agendas (Stroud, 2011), and consume diverse political information 
on social media (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018). This diversity which prevents extreme 
polarization can vary across countries. True political diversity in polarized market-
based systems, such as the U.S., is something of a myth. Market-based media 
systems are driven by profit more than other systems and tend to favor entertainment 
over politics, disregard local news and important social issues, and offer less diversity 
in news offerings. As a result, scholars are increasingly concerned with the control of 
corporations which can bias news and homogeneity of media content in general in 
market-based systems (Graber, 2015; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In addition, as 
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there are no regulations to ensure political diversity, market-based systems are often 
highly polarized (Stroud, 2011; Thussu, 2007). On the contrary, public service media 
systems mitigate political polarization because they do not directly reflect partisan 
orientations and favor more neutral and diverse media content (Bos et al., 2016).  
Under electoral authoritarian regimes, the diversity of media content heavily 
depends on the regime’s resources and policies rather than market and corporate 
control. All authoritarian regimes attempt to control the circulation of political 
information (Guriev & Treisman, 2019). However, the media in some electoral 
authoritarian contexts can be more diverse than polarized market-based systems due 
to the absence of liberal-democratic consensus. For instance, Becker (2004) and 
Toepfl (2013) found that an important feature of “the media in hybrid regimes—and 
less so in more authoritarian states—may be that the ideological diversity of news 
content, somewhat paradoxically, exceeds that in most developed democratic 
societies” (Toepfl, 2013, p. 249). The degree of this diversity depends on different 
techniques of control which, in turn, depend on regimes’ policies and available 
resources. For instance, Egorov et al. (2009) showed that resource-poor authoritarian 
regimes tend to accept the risk of public discontent and allow freer media because 
they need to monitor the performance of bureaucrats to detect policy failures. On the 
contrary, resource-rich authoritarian regimes tend to counter public discontent by 
censoring and restricting the media because they can draw on rich natural resources 
to compensate for policy failures. Due to similar resource limitations, electoral 
authoritarian regimes tend to invest in controlling the most important media selectively. 
As Gehlbah and Sonin argue, they tend to control “commanding heights” – major 
television networks – making allowances for other forms of media (Gehlbach, 2010; 
Gehlbach & Sonin, 2014).  
Similarly, authoritarian regimes can choose very different approaches in 
dealing with digital media (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Since digital media can challenge 
authoritarian rule by providing access to alternative sources of information, 
authoritarian regimes have been experimenting with the tools to control the online 
sphere (Greitens, 2013). Governments can simply limit citizens’ access to information 
by blocking specific websites or even shutting down the Internet completely (Boas, 
2006). In addition, they can target the online sphere rather than specific websites by 
enacting repressive legislation and establishing control over the Internet infrastructure 
(MacKinnon, 2011). However, in recent decades, resource-rich autocrats such as 
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Russia and China have invested considerable resources in more advance techniques 
of control. For instance, the Chinese government continuously invests resources in 
censoring online content through paid ‘Internet police’ and legislation which force 
Internet companies to moderate online content (King et al., 2013; MacKinnon, 2011). 
Similarly, the Russian government has been experimenting with more advanced 
approaches to the Internet in order to shape public opinion (Deibert & Rohozinski, 
2010; Gunitsky, 2015). Putin’s regime has been using digital media to propagate its 
narratives (Suslov, 2014; Yablokov, 2015), leak information to shape perceptions of 
politics (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015), and discredit opponents (Oates, 2016). The use 
of paid commentators and bots has also become a popular strategy across resource-
rich authoritarian regimes (King et al., 2013; Stukal et al., 2017). 
Being a resource-rich electoral authoritarian regime, the Putin’s regime has 
recently attempted to achieve full dominance over both broadcast television and digital 
media. While the regime captured “commanding heights” – major television networks 
– back in the early 2000s (Gehlbach, 2010; Lipman, 2009), recently it has been trying 
to use and co-opt a variety of new media to complement its “strategic narrative” 
(Miskimmon et al., 2013). To theorize how governments and political actors deal with 
war coverage during the era of new media, Hoskins and O’Loughlin introduced the 
concept of “the arrested war.” Instead of simply constraining new media, in the era of 
new media, the elites actively embrace the power of new media and mobilize different 
types of media to achieve their ends. While this phenomenon is common in 
democracies, Hoskins and O’Loughlin consider Putin’s regime strategy in managing 
media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a prime and illustrative example of 
the arrested war (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). The regime has been trying to shape 
perceptions of the conflict by offering its own versions of events in online news, such 
as Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, which propagate conspiracy theories and give 
voice to the far-right (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014; Yablokov, 2015). The regime 
engages grassroots sentiment via social media. For instance, Suslov found that after 
annexation of Crimea, social media facilitated access of official discourses to the 
popular imagination in Russia (Suslov, 2014, p. 604). Authentic public discussions in 
social media are complemented by paid “trolls” and automated bots. For instance, 
Linvill and Warren find about 1,300 accounts and about 2,000,000 tweets linked to the 
government-sponsored Internet Research Agency based in St. Petersburg which were 
used to attempt to influence public discussions on a variety political issues in the U.S. 
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in 2015-2017 (Linvill & Warren, 2020). Similarly, Stukal and colleagues found that in 
2014 and 2015, between 40% and 80% of accounts tweeting about politics in the 
Russian Tweetersphere were automated bots which were used mainly to “promote 
specific news stories and news media in the rankings of search engines” (Stukal et al., 
2017, p. 319).  
In addition, the Russian government has been attempting to deploy more 
indirect forms of algorithmic control over media intermediaries, such as search 
engines and news aggregators. For instance, Sivetc shows that the regime 
collaborates with Russian search engines Yandex, Mail.ru, and Rambler to label 
oppositional media and move them down in search (Sivetc, 2018). Similarly, the 
government attempts to implement state control over content providers by making 
news aggregators bear legal responsibility for their content. According to a 2016 law, 
news aggregators are legally responsible for the incorrect information if sources they 
include in the news lists are not officially registered with Roskomnadzor. Although this 
law does not filter news aggregators’ content directly, it encourages them to include 
only news published by the media loyal to the regime (Daucé, 2017; Wijermars, 2018) 
similar to the “intermediary liability” exercised by the Chinese government which 
makes Internet companies responsible for censoring online content thus outsourcing 
the task of censorship (MacKinnon, 2011). 
The Russian media sphere is far from complete homogenization. However, the 
degree of diversity in many state-aligned media decreases proportionally to the 
political nature of the covered issues. As Schimpfossl and Yablokov (2014) show, even 
journalists working on the state-controlled television channels exercise relative 
freedom in covering social and political issues unless they touch on sensitive issues, 
such as the criticism of Putin. As Oates argues, “There are three key points necessary 
to understand about the Russian media: There is a large amount of media diversity 
except on key political topics; the vast majority of the media do not challenge the state 
on these key political topics; and Russian audience members are enthusiastic 
consumers of media content. Thus, there is an appearance of media diversity, but little 
meaningful challenge to the regime” (Oates, 2016, p. 402). New media in the countries 
with electoral authoritarian regimes are as developed as in democracies, but electoral 
authoritarian regimes, especially in such resource-rich countries as Russia or China, 
implement stringent political control over both broadcasting television and new media. 
As the literature on media diversity, selective exposure, and political polarization in the 
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context of digital media in authoritarian contexts is scarce, these findings pose several 
questions which merit investigation. How do citizens make sense of the news under 
an electoral authoritarian regime which attempts to control different media sources 
simultaneously? Does this artificial homogeneity lead to political polarization? Is this 
polarization different from polarization in democracies which is based on the 
abundance of media choice (Prior, 2007), political preferences of citizens (Bennet & 
Iyengar, 2008), and the interaction between citizens’ preferences and algorithms 
personalizing content to fit these preferences (Pariser, 2011)? Chapter VI addresses 
these questions by using data from focus group discussions.  
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CHAPTER III. RESEARCH DESIGN: THE ANALYSIS OF 
FOCUS GROUP DATA  
This chapter calibrates the methodology to investigate the research questions and 
news processing in Russia. The chapter has the following structure. First, I discuss 
the focus group as a method and its advantages and shortcomings with special focus 
on political communication research. Second, I explain how focus groups were 
organized. Specifically, I briefly summarize news stories watched during focus group 
sessions, justify the choice, describe scenario and questionnaire used in the study, 
and explain how participants were recruited. Third, I describe participants’ social 
profiles including socio-demographic characteristics, media diets, and political 
knowledge. Finally, I reflect on ethical issues in order to make sure that the study 
conforms to the ethical standards in social science research. 
3.1. A Note on Method 
To address the issue of news processing, I used focus group interviews as a method. 
Since the 1970s, the research in political communication has been underpinned by a 
methodological consensus treating quantitative methods, such as content analysis, 
survey, and experiment, as the only legitimate methodology. More recently, scholars 
have been arguing for the return to the mixed-method tradition and the approaches 
used by the founding fathers of political communication, such as Paul Lazarsfeld 
(Lazarsfeld et. al., 1944) and Kurt and Gladys Lang (Lang & Lang, 1968), and putting 
qualitative methodology back at the core of political communication research. As Karpf 
and colleagues argue, qualitative methodology is necessary to explore “how citizens, 
journalists, and political elites interact, experience, and engage in political 
communication” and “often excels at answering empirical questions that are a 
precondition for developing new theoretical understandings” (Karpf et al., 2015, p. 
1890). As a part of this methodological shift, the focus group method has been widely 
used in the study of voting behavior (Kern & Just, 1995), political cognition and opinion 
formation (Andreouli & Nicholson, 2018; Gamson, 1992), news processing 
(Mickiewicz, 2008; Morley, 1980; Oates, 2006; Smoller, 1990), internet research 
(Metzger et al., 2010), and other research areas. The focus group method has a 
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number of strengths and limitations (Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994; Lunt & Livingstone, 
1996). 
On one hand, the focus group method has several methodological limitations 
which do not allow confident generalizations to be developed. Delli Carpini and 
Williams identified several problems typically occurring in the research based on focus 
groups: 1) the artificial setting makes participants behave differently than in natural 
settings; 2) focus groups include many participants, but the time for discussion is 
limited which does not allow for acquiring many details about single individuals; 3) it is 
possible that participants will conform to peer pressure; 4) focus groups do not allow 
researchers to identify causal relationships because they offer less control over 
variables and lack statistical procedures in contrast to experimental designs; 5) 
heterogenous data opens a wide space for interpretations and researcher’s bias (Delli 
Carpini & Williams, 1994). In addition, although pollsters attempt to provide a 
representative sample, their samples are limited by place of study, availability of 
participants, and participants’ involvement in previous studies, and so are not fully 
representative6.  
On the other hand, the focus group as a method also has strengths important 
for social science research. 1) The focus group method can provide enough depth in 
uncovering individuals’ opinions. 2) Since the number of participants is usually up to 
twelve, the method allows the sample size to be increased significantly as compared 
to qualitative methods (Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994; Lunt & Livingstone 1996). In 
addition, the focus group is an especially valuable method for political communication 
research. Three features make it a useful tool for scholars of media reception: it allows 
the form, language, and meaning structures of participants to be considered; it reveals 
the social nature of opinion formation; and it allows us to see how opinions are 
constructed on the fly.  
Like interviews, the focus group method allows for consideration of the 
language and meaning structures of respondents. In the seminal study of news 
reception, Morley articulates methodological difference between focus group and 
quantitative methods typically used in media reception research:  
 
6 According to pollsters’ rules, a person who participated in a study cannot participate in the next one 
for some period of time. 
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The separation of the content (a ‘Yes’) from the form in which it is expressed 
(the actual words used by the respondent to formulate his/her answer) is a 
crucial mistake: for it is not simply the ‘substance’ of the answer which is 
important, it is also the form of its expression which constitutes its meaning; not 
simply the number of ‘yesses’ or ‘noes’ to particular questions (Morley, 1980, 
p. 152-153).  
A confident “yes” will be very different from an unsure or sarcastic “yes.” “Yesses” and 
“noes” can have different meanings. A “yes” can be a “no” under certain 
circumstances. The focus group method can allow scholars to investigate these 
“degrees of ‘fit’ between respondents’ vocabularies and forms of speech and those of 
the media” (Morley, 1999, p. 154). As Morgan puts it, “[Focus groups] are useful when 
it comes to investigating what participants think, but they excel at uncovering why 
participants think as they do” (Morgan, 1988, p. 25).  
Unlike interview and other individual methods, the focus group method 
considers the socially constructed nature of opinions. Researchers often ignore this 
social foundation of opinion formation. As Barber argues, what survey and 
experimental research treats as “public opinion” should be better termed “private 
opinion” (Barber, 1984; as cited in Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994). However, starting 
from the pivotal contribution of the Columbia School to communication research (e.g., 
Lazarsfeld, 1944), it is clear that people do not consume information and form opinions 
individually. Rather, the very process of opinion formation is social in nature.  
As Morley demonstrates, individuals construct opinions and readings of news 
“through talk and the interchange” instead of being “the autonomous repositories of a 
fixed set of individual ‘opinions’ isolated from their social context” (Morley, 1980, p. 
155). Similarly, Popkin shows that communication with other individuals is constitutive 
of the very process of opinion formation. People “triangulate and validate their opinions 
in conversations with people they trust and according to the opinions of national figures 
whose judgments and positions they have come to know” (Popkin, 1994, p. 7). Instead 
of silencing participants through peer pressure, as some critics assert, focus groups 
“can reveal inchoate attitudes that people are usually reluctant to express unless they 
are validated or reinforced by others” (p. 45)7 and “encourage participants to feel free 
 
7 While peer pressure still remains an important limitation, participants’ interest is a litmus test for 
distinguishing between forced and freely expressed opinions (Lunt & Livingstone 1996, p. 91). 
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from the constraints typical of one-to-one interviews” (Khan & Manderson, 1992, p. 
57).  
Finally, the focus group method can give access to the process of opinion 
formation. Political psychology demonstrates that people hold multiple opposing 
considerations in their memory, construct opinions “on the fly” (Zaller 1992, p. 1), and 
constantly update their attitudes when encountering new information (McGraw et al., 
1990). While a survey would reduce these networks of conflicting considerations to 
one opinion, focus groups reveal “the process of opinion formation” and provide 
“glimpses of usually latent aspects of this process” (Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994). 
An opinion registered by a survey is most often an ad hoc product. It is created from 
the materials at hand at a given moment. Revealing available materials and 
procedures which are used to create the opinion is often no less valuable than 
understanding the opinion itself.  
3.2. Focus Group Design, Materials, Recruitment 
To take into account language and meaning structures and reveal social and 
processual nature of the formation of opinions, focus groups are often structured as 
collective quasi-experiments. Scholars expose participants to a set of stimuli, such as 
video, visual or audial materials, and initiate collective discussions regarding these 
stimuli (e.g., Kern & Just, 1995). Following this logic, focus groups were structured 
around the news episodes. Focus groups were organized around the watching of three 
news episodes from Channel One.  
Channel One is the most popular TV channel in Russia. According to 
Mediascope, Channel One broadcasts consistently attract the biggest national 
audiences (Mediascope, 2020). Although its popularity has significantly decreased 
compared to the previous years, 47% of Russians still watch Channel One. All other 
channels lag far behind (Levada Center, 2019b). It can be assumed that this channel 
and its news broadcasts are the most influential agents in shaping TV viewers’ 
understanding of politics. Although Channel One has a wide range of content, the most 
widespread and authoritative source of information for Russian citizens remains prime 
time news. Based on the research, I chose the news about three important events 
which were intensively covered by Russian TV news.  
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Specifically, Maidan protests in Kiev in November 2013 – February 2014, 
referenda in Donbass in May 2014, and military conflict in Donbass which started in 
March 2014 were the main issues on the agenda of Russian TV channels in 2014 
(Lankina & Watanabe, 2017). After watching all the stories about these three events 
on Channel One prime time news in November – December 2013, May 2014 and June 
2014, I selected three news broadcasts which represented the major tenets of the 
Kremlin’s framing of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russian media framed the protests 
as provoked and orchestrated by the West, described the conflict as a war and rebels 
as a defense against the punishers from Kiev who were identified as a fascist threat 
spreading in Ukraine (Cottiero et al., 2015; Nygren et al., 2018). All news reports were 
accessed via the Channel One website.  
1. A news report about the Maidan protests in Kiev (4 minutes 38 seconds, 
aired on November 30, 2013). The video covers violent clashes between 
protesters and police on Maidan square, framing the event as unrest 
triggered by paid provocateurs and orchestrated by the West (the news 
story is presented as an example in Appendix A).  
2. A news report about a referendum on the status of Donetsk Oblast (1 minute 
10 seconds, aired on May 5, 2014). The video covers the peaceful 
referendum in Donetsk and features people expressing discontent with the 
Kyiv administration ruining the region’s economy.  
3. A news report about the military confrontation in Donetsk Oblast (12 minutes 
57 seconds, aired on June 1, 2014). The video depicts the attack of the 
Ukrainian National Guard on Donetsk. It shows the Ukrainian military’s use 
of artillery, aerial warfare, and indiscriminate fire, causing the death of 
civilians. Russia is depicted as providing humanitarian aid and asylum for 
the refugees.  
The focus group scenario included several blocks of questions. After each 
video, questions were asked about the first impressions, emotions, and credibility of a 
screened news report. Then, questions about practices of watching TV and Internet 
usage in general were asked. The moderator was followed the scenario loosely and 
was encouraging participants to deviate and comment on others’ experience. The 
duration of each focus group was 1.5 – 2 hours. The scenario can be found in 
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Appendix B. The focus group discussions were recorded on video camera and 
transcribed. The transcripts were coded via Atlas.TI. Repeating ideas and reaction to 
news reports were identified and united into more general topics (Auerbach & 
Silverstein, 2003).  
Several recruiters from Russian mass pollster Public Opinion Foundation 
recruited participants based on the sample used in representative surveys8. Both 
recruiters and participants were provided with a payment. The author also moderated 
focus groups. Four focus groups were conducted in St. Petersburg in 2016, and four 
in Moscow in 2017. Each focus group was diverse in terms of participants’ economic 
status, education, and Internet use. Fifty-six people participated in the study. The list 
of participants with socio-demographic characteristics and information about media 
diets can be found in Appendix C. Participants were pre-screened to make sure they 
pay attention to TV news. Also, questions about political knowledge were asked. 
However, since it is not a quantitative study, they were designed to get additional 
contextual information about participants’ attention to politics rather than to measure 
political knowledge. Hence, the questions were few. The questionnaire and results can 
be found in Appendix D.  
3.3. Socio-demographic Profiles, Media Consumption, Political 
Knowledge 
The socio-demographic data, watching habits, and Internet usage are summarized in 
the charts below. The full list of participants can be found in Appendix C. Participants 
are quite diverse in terms of age, gender, education, profession. Most of the 
participants are 35-50 years old, but other age groups are also present. Half of the 
participants are women, and half are man, but the sample is less balanced in terms of 
education. Most participants have a higher education degree, and some participants 
have a vocational education qualification or are college students, and only few are 
vocational school students. 
 
8 The website of the organization is available at: https://fom.ru 
 114 
Figure 14 Gender, Age, Education 
 
There are two reasons for this imbalance. On one hand, I included participants 
with completed and uncompleted higher education (university “dropouts”) in the same 
category. The number of schemas and abstract reasoning, rather than degrees, are 
important for the study of news processing and opinion formation. What makes people 
with higher education different is the advantage they have “in integrative reasoning, in 
abstract reasoning, and the ability to place observations within a society-wide context” 
(Mickiewicz, 2008, p. 197). Whether education is finished or unfinished is not important 
here. Even one year of college education increases dramatically the number of 
abstract schemas people can mobilize. On the other hand, the number of participants 
with higher education is also determined by the high number of Russians with higher 
education in general and in Moscow and St. Petersburg in particular. For instance, 
according to the OECD, 54% of 25-64-year-olds have higher education in Russia 
(OECD, 2015). 
Most participants are employed, some are not employed for a range of reasons 
(unemployed, maternal leave, housewives, etc.) or retired. While people with quite 
diverse professions are present in the study (finance, real estate, healthcare, culture 
and education, industry), most participants work in services industries.  
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Figure 15 Employment and Profession 
 
The overrepresentation of people employed in service industries is also a result of the 
structure of employment in Russia in general. 63% of Russians are employed in 
service industries (Plotnikov & Volkova, 2014). 
Most participants watch television and TV news. Their preference for television 
may be not representative of the general population: they were pre-screened to make 
sure that they pay at least some attention to TV news. The preference for TV news is 
higher among females than males. As is clear from the discussions, many women 
watch TV while cooking, taking care of children or doing housework - these activities 
are usually accompanied by a turned-on TV. In addition, some female participants are 
on maternity leave or are housewives, which increases their exposure to television 
and TV news. The most popular news broadcast among participants is Vremia 
(Channel One) followed by Vesti (Rossiia 1) and Segodnia Vecherom (NTV). 
However, these preferences are not exclusive – participants switch between different 
news broadcasts while watching TV. 
Figure 16 Preference for TV News 
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Even older focus group participants are quite digitalized. Only two participants 
do not use the Internet at all. Most participants use the Internet for news, 
entertainment, communication, and information search.  
Figure 17 Internet Consumption 
 
 
However, there are differences in the Internet usage related to age. Young and middle-
aged participants use the Internet for entertainment more often. Practical information 
search and communication (mostly via social media) prevail in the middle-aged and 
older cohorts. This pattern seems to reflect the digital divide. Digital natives use the 
Internet for many purposes from childhood, while non-digital natives’ use of the 
Internet is limited due to knowledge and skills. Half of the participants claim using the 
Internet for watching and reading news. However, when asked specifically about 
particular sources, most cannot remember particular sources or recall only few. Being 
less politically sophisticated, they rely on news aggregators and occasionally found 
news in their newsfeeds in social media. 
The study also includes a political awareness test. However, since it is not a 
quantitative study, they were designed to get additional contextual information about 
participants’ attention to politics rather than to measure political knowledge. Hence, 
the questions were few. 
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Figure 18 Political Knowledge 
 
Participants are quite diverse in terms of their political awareness. As advised 
by political communication scholars (e.g., Deilli Carpini & Keeter, 1995), I used simple 
factual questions to specify their political awareness. Questions were dealing with 
three areas – the knowledge of domestic politics, the knowledge of foreign politics, 
and the ability to remember correctly political facts currently being discussed in the 
media (see Appendix D for details). The test shows that participants are mostly poorly 
informed about domestic politics. Since the Russian media agenda is mostly 
dominated by international politics, participants perform much better in the area of 
international politics. They are able to answer questions about NATO, the EU and 
other international political affairs.  
3.3. Ethical Issues  
Any study involving human subjects presents many ethical dilemmas. Since this study 
does not include experimentation on animal or human subjects, it cannot pose direct 
physical harm to participants. However, it touches on other ethical issues, such as 
participants’ right to confidentiality and full understanding of the nature of the study. 
This study follows research ethics guidelines (European Commission, 2010) and 
conforms to the ethical standards outlined by the Finnish National Board on Research 
Integrity (TENK, 2012). In all focus groups, participants were informed about the 
nature of the study. They were told that they take part in the dissertation research 
focused on selective perception of news and agreed to participate in the study. They 
were informed that focus groups would be video- and audio-recorded, and recordings 
would be transcribed. They were informed that quotations from focus groups could be 
used in academic publications. The researcher guaranteed that all data would be 
anonymized and no information which could allow participants to be identified or would 
be available to any other people.  
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Studying perceptions of politics in an authoritarian context is associated with 
additional risks. Expressing political views can be risky in Russia. If these views are 
dissenting, touch on sensitive issues, such as criticism of the government or the 
annexation of Crimea, and attract the attention of the government, participants’ well-
being could be put at risk. Alas, there is no way to counter this risk except for full 
anonymity. To protect anonymity, participants were asked not to use their last names 
so that even the researcher would not have identifying information. In addition, all 
names in this dissertation and other articles have been changed. The data used in this 
dissertation and articles includes only quotations from participants’ discussions and 
their choices in surveys focused on socio-demographic profiles, news consumption, 
and political knowledge. Video and audio recordings were transcribed and stored on 
a password-protected encrypted hard drive. No one except for the researcher has 
access to this data. 
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CHAPTER IV. TELEVISION AND POLITICAL OPINION 
UNDER AN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
4.1. Introduction  
In this chapter I have sought to address the first sub-question of this dissertation: How 
do citizens form opinions based on information from TV news under an electoral 
authoritarian regime? It presents the analysis of how Russian audiences make sense 
of TV news and articulate opinions about the Russia-Ukraine conflict, politics, media, 
and the governments, with a special focus on political engagement. In doing so, the 
chapter provides a better understanding of news processing in Russia in particular 
and some insight about the nature of news processing which is relevant for other 
electoral authoritarian regimes.  
The research investigating news processing in both Russia and other electoral 
authoritarian regimes has yielded rich findings regarding the effects of state-controlled 
media on citizens. Scholars have mostly focused on how, why, and under what 
conditions citizens trust or distrust news under authoritarian regimes. For instance, 
citizens under authoritarian regimes can distrust news media because of poor quality 
of government (Ursin, 2017), previous experience with biased news (Truex, 2016) and 
oppressive institutions (Pjesivac et al. 2016), and crude forms of manipulation (Huang, 
2018). On the other hand, the absence of democratic attitudes (Moehler & Singh, 
2011) and the regimes’ successful attempts to counteract criticism (Chen 2014; 
Esarey et al., 2017; Zhu et al. 2013) can make citizens trust state-aligned news media. 
Similar concerns have been guiding scholars of the Russian media. Some scholars 
report that the reliance on state-aligned media increases the agreement with the 
regime’s narrative (e.g., Enikolopov et al., 2011; Szostek, 2017a; Sirotkina & 
Zavadskaya, 2020; White & Oates, 2003). Some scholars say that citizens are able to 
perform critical analysis of political information and identify political bias in news in 
Russia based on their personal experience or experience with politics (Mickiewicz, 
2005; 2008; Toepfl, 2013; 2014). Other scholars report the ambiguity of attitudes to 
the media and politics: citizens can be aware of manipulation but accept it as part of a 
state-building enterprise weary of economic and political turbulence (Oates, 2006); 
propaganda may both tap into citizens’ patriotic feelings and simultaneously be 
countered by specific cultural legacies which make citizens critical of the media 
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(Hutchings & Ryulova, 2009). However, the influence of political engagement on news 
processing has largely been outside the scope of analysis. This is a factor which 
crucially determines how citizens make sense of news in democracies (Lodge & Hamil, 
1986; Zaller, 1992) and in authoritarian regimes alike (Leeson, 2008; Meyen & 
Schwer, 2007; Mickiewicz, 2008; Savin et al., 2018; Toepfl, 2013; Zhang, 2012;).  
I have focused on the interplay between news processing, embedded 
psychological mechanisms underlying news processing, and TV viewers’ motivation 
to obtain political information to address the issue of news processing under an 
electoral authoritarian regime. Drawing on the connections between accessibility and 
applicability as mechanisms for processing political information processing and TV 
viewers’ motivation to obtain political information discussed in the theoretical chapter, 
this chapter presents the empirical analysis of TV viewers’ reception of the Russia-
Ukraine crisis. This analysis advances the first central argument of this dissertation. I 
rely on the assumption that citizens under an electoral authoritarian regime do not 
have proper incentives to obtain political information. At the same time, they live in an 
information-rich environment and are being bombarded with an astonishing amount of 
information. I argue that these processes result in a specific type of news processing. 
Dealing with large amounts of political information the best they can, TV viewers 
process the news by mobilizing the most accessible considerations. Lacking 
incentives to acquire political information, citizens cannot integrate critical and 
supportive reactions into coherent opinions. While citizens might be dissatisfied with 
life under an electoral authoritarian regime, they do not have incentives to 
substantively process political information and do not challenge authoritarian 
equilibrium due to being unable to articulate consistent opinions. 
This chapter is structured as follows. I first present data from the focus group 
participants who did not have consistent political views. I reflect on their motivation to 
obtain political information and analyze seven contradictory thematic opinions they 
produced after watching news broadcasts. By tracing the origins of these opinions and 
demonstrating the contradictions between them, I show that they are underlined by an 
accessibility mechanism. The analysis of participants without consistent political views 
is followed by the analysis of participants with consistent political views. I reflect on 
their motivation to obtain political information and analyze the way they apply 
consistent schemas to process TV news and argue with other participants. By tracing 
how they deploy schemas to argue, reject, and reinterpret information, I show that the 
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way they make sense of TV news is based on applicability mechanism. Based on the 
analysis of this data, I have drawn more general conclusions: I reflect on limitations of 
data and explain how it contributes to the research on news processing in Russia and 
under other electoral authoritarian regimes.  
4.2. Data from Focus Group Participants  
The opinions of politically disengaged participants without consistent political views 
are coded as seven separate thematic categories. These opinions represent TV 
viewers’ reactions to Russian politics and particular Kremlin policies. First comes the 
Kremlin’s official narrative. When provided with cues from the Kremlin’s official 
narrative or asked direct political questions, the participants essentially reproduced 
the Kremlin’s official position. However, when the discussion is framed through their 
personal experience, the participants mention six diverse and critical sets of opinions. 
However, these groups are not exclusive and overlap. I analyzed each opinion to 
identify cues and contexts which directed discussion in a particular way and were likely 
to trigger particular opinions. I compared opinions of the same people to demonstrate 
that one person can hold poorly integrated considerations governed by accessibility. 
To demonstrate that the opinions of participants with consistent political views do not 
change across contexts, the analysis of the majority’s shifting opinions is followed by 
an analysis of the opinions of the politically engaged minority with consistent political 
views who rely on applicability, in contrast to accessibility, to reinterpret information to 
fit their political schemas. 
4.2.1. Politically Disengaged: Accessibility Effects  
Most of the focus group participants have little motivation to learn about politics, 
despite discussing public matters with interest. Participants in this group do not use 
much energy looking for information. Except for television, participants of this group 
cannot remember particular sources, or at best, they can recall only a few. At the same 
time, they express negative attitudes to politics. Many of the participants in this group 
consider politics to be “the dirtiest business in the world” (Yurii). The theme of 
powerlessness often surfaces in the rhetoric of participants in this group. As Irina 
argues, “it does not make sense to try to figure out [the details of the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict] […] what we see is the tip of the iceberg […] To talk about it is to waste time.” 
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Participants question their own abilities to understand the arrangements of post-Soviet 
politics and doubt their ability to influence the course of political life. In addition, the 
participants in this group scored poorly on the political knowledge test. Although the 
political awareness test included in this study gives only rough and superficial 
estimate, it brings some added contextual evidence. It shows that most participants 
are poorly aware of the current government and pay only scant attention to recent 
important events covered by both state-aligned and oppositional media. As a result, 
as described in the theoretical chapter of the dissertation, they relied on accessibility 
as a mechanism, used the most accessible ideas to make sense of the news, and 
expressed different opinions when new cues are introduced.  
The Kremlin’s Official Narrative on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Viewers’ Reaction 
In the context of superficial engagement with politics, it is logical that most participants 
rely on the most accessible ideas to process news and consequently have 
contradictory opinions. My data indicate that the same people can make contradictory 
statements at different moments during a focus group, depending on the cues used in 
the discussion. The first set of opinions is a reproduction of the Russian state’s official 
narrative about the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It usually surfaces as a reaction to the 
news broadcasts themselves or through cues related to the official narratives that are 
introduced by the moderator or other participants. The statements below are a reaction 
to general questions about President Putin, the Russian/Ukrainian governments, the 
actions of the West, or to situations that some participants bring in as cues themselves. 
The official narrative on the conflict in Ukraine is a “strategic narrative”: “a sequence 
of events and identities […] through which political elites attempt to give determined 
meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives” and a 
“justification of policy objectives” (Miskimmon et al., 2013). There are three main 
rhetorical cornerstones of the Kremlin’s official narrative: 1) U.S. policies to weaker 
countries generate instability; 2) these policies are illegitimate because other countries 
are not included in the decision-making process; 3) the EU is portrayed as a political 
formation that follows a course defined by the U.S. (Hutchings & Szostek, 2015, 
p.188). This discourse rests on the idea that Western states are hostile, and their self-
interest lies behind the regime change in Kiev (Cottiero et al., 2015). 
Most of the participants express opinions in line with this narrative. When cues 
from the official narrative are introduced into the discussion, TV viewers consider 
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Russia to be a peaceful and nonaggressive power. As Tatiana puts it, “I think that 
Russia has a very peaceful character.” Russia is constantly threatened by Western 
policies that are conducted through indirect channels, such as “orange revolutions.” 
“These technologies,” Sofia suggests, “led to [regime change in] the Middle East [and] 
Ukraine.” These revolutions threaten Russia’s integrity and control over the post-
Soviet region. To prevent the loss of integrity, they should be countered. As Fedor 
puts it, “if we show weakness now, we will be beaten […] Everybody [other countries] 
is waiting [for this]. That is why our army and fleet are our best friends.” On one hand, 
considering that the “real” problems of Russia are concentrated within the country, 
some TV viewers think that the media does not have a reason to lie about international 
developments, and only falsifies information about domestic developments. As Mikhail 
puts it, “we do not need to falsify information about what is going on abroad. Here [in 
Russia] they [journalists] can falsify. But Russia is not doing bad things in international 
relations.” On the other hand, other viewers think that manipulation is “appropriate” in 
a hostile environment. The media attempts to elicit “a rejection [of the Ukrainian 
regime] […] We are right. They are villains—they kill our people” (Fedor). These 
actions are deemed to be “justified” because it is important to foster patriotism in a 
hostile environment. As Tatiana argues, “news has raised the spirit of patriotism” 
(Tatiana). These reactions generally mirror the Kremlin’s interpretation of Russia-
Ukraine conflict which is widely distributed over television, state-aligned online media, 
and among government supporters.  
Emotional Burnout 
When not relying on cues from the official narrative that help them to make sense of 
the news, participants often referred to the topic of emotional burnout. Half of the 
participants referred to the topic of emotional burnout. This theme is triggered by 
personal questions, such as queries about their emotional reactions to TV news about 
Ukraine and changes in their practices of watching the news since the beginning of 
the conflict. This reference to their experience of watching functions as a cue that 
helps them to interpret the TV news as an attempt to manipulate them. 
Most viewers indicate that during the conflict they significantly decreased their 
watching of the news. Coverage of Ukraine typically includes a lot of violent scenes 
and broadly portrays human suffering. The most emphatic reactions to the extreme 
character of the coverage often involved bodily metaphors, such as “our eyes are 
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bleeding” (Alexandr), “my body cannot handle it” (Galina), “my brain just got tired of it 
[such news] every day” (Vasilii), “my nerves cannot stand it […] my blood pressure 
rises when I watch the news” (Galina), “I have a headache” (Alexander). Viewers 
responded to such coverage by watching less news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
As Diana states, “I just turn it off. Can’t watch it.” In addition to very emotionally 
charged discourse expressing conflicted emotions, viewers tend to turn from 
emotional reactions to a more general criticism of the way the media operates. As 
Nina puts it, “for what purpose do they have all these negative emotions? You turn it 
on, and you get sick. Why? Deliberate propaganda.” As a result, viewers feel openly 
manipulated. When speaking of manipulation, viewers turn to a discussion of the one-
sided character of the coverage. As Leonid puts it, “no two-sided analysis.” Boris 
proceeds: “[You] trust it less […so as] not to fool yourself,” because it is “not objective.” 
When not provided with cues from the official narrative and not asked to reflect 
on more general political issues, TV viewers discuss the news differently. In the 
absence of the official “passwords” to decipher TV news, they use the emotionality as 
a cue to interpret TV news. This emotionality immediately activates a defensive 
mechanism or “persuasive intent” heuristic – the rule of thumb which dictates that 
information which includes some ulterior motive cannot be trusted and is used for 
manipulation (Metzger et al., 2010). As a result, they shift from discussion emotions to 
discussing the biased character of the news, drawing the conclusion that the news is 
being used to manipulate them.  
Reading Between the Lines 
Reading Between the Lines is one of the common explanations of the critical attitude 
of the Soviet and post-Soviet TV viewers. This explanation suggests that adapting to 
a steady flow of unrealistically positive images of the country’s prosperity and criticism 
of the Western countries, Soviet viewers acquired a critical skill to identify the bits of 
truth in propagandistic narratives. Focus group participants adopt this common view 
to interpret the discrepancy between bright TV reality and the harsh conditions of 
everyday life. A quarter of participants referred to this idea during focus group 
discussions. This idea often appears when the moderator asks participants about the 
discussions they have with friends and family.  
When the moderator asked participants if they discuss news with family, the 
question reminded participants of their quotidian discussions, which often include 
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complaints about harsh living conditions. Memories of these serve as a cue that 
triggers these opinions. Following the question, Vladimir responds “Healthcare is 
getting better, education is getting better, and the roads in front of your window are 
being repaired” making a reference to Stalin’s famous line “Life has improved, 
comrades. Life has become more joyous.” This statement provoked a humorous 
reaction: Yekaterina asks “do you have new asphalt in front of a new window?” 
Vladimir replies sarcastically: “sure, how else does it happen? Sobyanin [Moscow’s 
mayor] installs new asphalt in front of my window every year.” Mixing Soviet clichés 
and everyday life problems, this dialogue points to the inadequacy of the 
administration in dealing with the city’s problems and mocks the difference between 
what participants see on TV and experiences from real life. Criticizing this discrepancy, 
viewers keep referring to the Soviet experience. As Galina argues, “Channel One 
reminds me of Soviet times – everything is so good here […] but when you see it in 
life […] it is not like this.” This positive TV image of life in Russia clashes with viewers’ 
experiences of economic deprivation. As Victor puts it, “they talk about unemployment. 
They say that we have two to three percent unemployment in Russia. What? Twenty-
five, even thirty percent is more likely.” Participants believe that the government 
applies censorship to the news and installs “the Iron Curtain as previously [in the 
USSR]” (Larisa). The motive behind this censorship is an attempt to shift viewers’ 
attention away from domestic problems. As Victor states, “[they are] just shifting focus 
so as not to show the problems that exist in Russia.” The only way to decipher these 
unrealistic images is to use “our own heads” (Veronika) or read between the lines.  
When not framed through the lens of the official narrative, participants see TV 
news differently. They consider the news to be an inadequate representation of the 
real economic situation. They hold the state responsible for distracting the population 
from domestic problems by shifting the focus to an international agenda. Relying on 
the cultural images of the Soviet Union, they refer to the common idea that Soviet 
citizens had a skill to “read between the lines.” However, while this cultural in-built skill 
is one of the explanations of the critical attitude of the post-Soviet viewer (e.g., 
Hutchings & Ryulova, 2009), it is not a sufficient explanation. As Mickiewicz argues, it 
“is of little use in looking at what conclusions viewers come to, and via what 
mechanism” (Mickiewicz, 2008, p. 5). My findings expand this argument. Since 
Reading Between the Lines is just one situational opinion among seven others, it 
appears to be a culturally-defined cognitive heuristic which allows TV viewers to make 
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sense of news rather than a skill which allows them to become critical viewers. My 
findings also clarify the mechanism which mobilizes this opinion. Discussions about 
harsh living conditions makes this opinion more accessible than other heuristics. As a 
result, it is used to make sense of TV news.  
The Business of War 
Another way to look at the Russia-Ukraine conflict among participants is to infer what 
causes it. Specifically, many participants hypothesized that it could be the result of the 
private business interests of particular elite groups. A significant group of participants 
used this thematic lens throughout focus group discussions. Discussing the war, 
viewers raise the topic of private interests very often. War as a cue triggers the 
experience of living under the permanent economic crisis of the 1990s.  
For instance, discussing the future of Ukraine, one participant sympathizes with 
the Ukrainian people, both in government-controlled and rebel-controlled territories. 
He compares the current conditions in Eastern Ukraine with the 1990s in Russia: “We 
survived this once in the 1990s. However, they survived it in the 1990s, and now it is 
even worse. The same situation, but there is also war [on top of it].” Besides the crisis, 
this period is also associated with oligarchic rule. It triggers a chain of associations 
linking private business interests to war in which the Russian-Ukraine conflict is seen 
as a continuation of the intra-elite struggle of the 1990s. Ivan summarizes this 
approach using a Russian proverb: “For some people war is war, for others it is a dear 
mother” (Komu voina, a komu matʹ rodna). He thinks that what lies behind this war is 
mostly property interests of particular groups: “it is just a reformatting of property. They 
earn money.” 
In contrast to the official narrative, in which all actors held responsible for the 
conflict are either Western or Ukrainian, in the case of this opinion, TV viewers blame 
both Russian and Ukrainian elites. As Roman says, “this instability in Ukraine is 
beneficial for certain circles [of people]. On their side, as on our side.” War is a mess, 
and any traces of financial interest will be erased as a result of this mess. “War will 
write off everything,” continues Roman. Even humanitarian aid, which is often 
considered to be an important act of compassion from the official narrative 
perspective, is built into this hypocritical policy. As Roman says, “A little bit here, a little 
bit there, and then boom! We provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine. We are good […] 
This instability is exploited.” At first directed toward the elite interests that lie behind 
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the war, this criticism extends further to the hypocritical policies of the Russian state. 
A nexus of vested interests is what makes the war continue. Accordingly, the end to 
this war will be possible only when the state will change, not only in Ukraine, but also 
in Russia. As Ksenia puts it, “soon it [the war] will end.” Galina adds: “And power [in 
Russia] will change.” 
 When not framed through the lens of the official narrative, participants see TV 
news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict differently. Reminiscing on the turbulent 
economic and political situation of the 1990s, they draw on this alternative layer of 
knowledge as a source of cues to make sense of TV news. Predictably, this layer 
provides them with the alternative framework of interpretation and shifts blame 
attribution. Instead of attributing responsibility for the war to the West and Ukraine, as 
the Kremlin’s official narrative does, they assign it to the Russian and Ukrainian 
oligarchic elite.  
Obsession with Ukraine 
The next set of opinions about TV news is about the saturation of information about 
Ukraine. While the term “obsession” sounds clinical, it is borrowed from the 
participants’ descriptions. They use it to emphasize the abnormal and excessive 
attention paid by Russian television to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A minority of 
participants referred to this theme. Like emotional burnout, it is typically triggered when 
the moderator referred to practices of watching. When asked about practices of 
watching, participants are reminded about the experiential dimension of watching TV 
which triggers negative emotions which have been accumulated during the years of 
the conflict.  
For instance, the moderator asks: “Did you become more interested [in politics 
after the beginning of the conflict]?” The experience of watching reminds participants 
of traumatic experiences. It triggers a particular opinion that consists of a 
dissatisfaction with the fact that Ukraine has dominated the Russian media for many 
years. As Viktor eloquently puts it, “Every day (…) [they discuss] Ukraine. (…) I feel 
that I do not understand where I am living in – in Russia or Ukraine.” Viewers feel that 
too much attention is paid to the conflict. Though Ukraine shares history with Russia, 
it is no longer “the Soviet Union, which was united” (Kristina). TV viewers thus feel that 
too much attention is paid to the conflict. As Roman puts it, “It is a completely 
independent state—it is their business, their problems […] I do not care who is in 
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Ukraine, nor do I care who is in Mozambique.” This perceived obsession with 
Ukrainian politics makes viewers critical towards both Russian TV and the 
government. They reiterate that the Ukraine-dominated media agenda is an attempt 
to distract the population from domestic problems. As Galina argues, “we too have 
many problems […] We need to pay attention to them.” This predominance of Ukraine-
related news is considered to be a way of manipulating public opinion. As Larisa puts 
it, “it [TV] brainwashes us all the time […] Ukraine, Ukraine (…), do not forget.” 
Scholars argue that the repetitive and formulaic nature of contemporary 
journalism is one of the reasons for declining interest in matters of public concern. Due 
to the nature of contemporary journalism, journalists rely on simplistic categories to 
structure their material, such as “importance, interest, controversy, the unusual, 
timeliness, and proximity” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, p. 106). On one hand, these 
clichés are necessary for both producing media content fast and presenting news in a 
simplified way so that the audience is already familiar with basic formats and can easily 
comprehend it. On the other hand, these repetitive and formulaic structures lead to 
the indifference of the public and compassion fatigue (Moeller, 1999). Obsession with 
Ukraine is a specific political, rather than purely psychological, version of compassion 
fatigue. Encountering an enormous amount of content focusing on the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, TV viewers get tired of it. However, in addition to getting tired, they also 
consider it as a sign of manipulation and question TV news and the government’s 
policies. Reflecting on the repetitive nature of TV news on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, 
TV viewers draw on another alternative layer of knowledge to make sense of TV news. 
Concern for Others 
The following opinion mainly focuses on concerns for vulnerable social groups that 
may be exposed to violent reporting. Several participants referred to it during the focus 
group interviews. Directly watching traumatic news reports featuring human suffering 
typically triggers this narrative. This traumatic experience serves as a cue that 
activates concern for the well-being of other viewers. In viewers’ opinions, 
contemporary Russian news coverage is too violent. As Galina puts it, “they broadcast 
killings live.” They are especially concerned that children and youth are exposed to 
traumatic images. As Fedor argues, “we cannot show such things to children.” This 
coverage, viewers suggest, undermines citizens’ psychological well-being and can 
provoke dangerous consequences. As Fedor continues, “people are […] in prostration, 
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get nervous and jump out of balconies.” This concern is also based on references to 
the Soviet experience. As Sofia puts it, “Russia can be united, [just as] in the Soviet 
Union, through showing more peaceful things. Let’s show movies like before—how 
people visit each other […] Violence does not unite. It creates fear.”  
Like the previous reactions, Concern for Others stands out as a critical narrative 
which does not match the Kremlin’s Official Narrative. While watching TV news about 
the conflict, participants tend to react emotionally and criticize TV news for the 
excessive use of graphical images of violence and human suffering. Apparently, yet 
one more domain-specific layer of knowledge is activated during the watching 
process. With another cue comes a new alternative framework for the critical 
evaluation of TV news. However, Concern for Others might be underlined by a deeper 
psychological process. While thinking about the influence of the media, people are 
prone to the third person effect. They tend to underestimate the effects of media on 
themselves and overestimate the effect of media on other people. This effect is well-
documented in the literature and seems to be grounded in self-esteem. In short, 
“people reinforce their self-esteem by estimating themselves to be smart enough to 
disbelieve media messages whereas others believe the messages” (Paul et al., 2007, 
p. 61). This effect seems to be especially pronounced in the context of exposure to 
sensitive content, such as sex and violence. For instance, Gunther and Hwa find that 
people are more likely to support governmental censorship of media content partly 
because they think that sensitive content will negatively influence others (Gunther & 
Hwa, 1996). While people think that media affect others to a greater degree than 
themselves, violent content could intensify this tendency even more by adding 
additional emotional intensity to the Concern for Others opinion.  
Lies & the Law  
Finally, some viewers approached TV news through the framework of legality. Only 
seven participants expressed this opinion in one or another fashion. There was a 
moment in the video about military conflict in which the journalist referred to two 
controversial pieces of information. One was the correspondence between the head 
of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior, Arsen Avakov, and the head of a Ukrainian 
voluntary regiment, Semen Semenchnko, allegedly retrieved from a hacked Facebook 
account. Another was an allegedly intercepted communication between two Ukrainian 
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pilots during the attack in Donetsk. No proof is provided that the information is real and 
its leakage is unlikely.  
In the case of this opinion, the moderator typically asked whether the evidence 
seems reliable or it does not. For instance, in one focus group, the moderator asked: 
“does it seem credible?” The participants immediately used the cue. For instance, 
Svetlana asks: “Do they really communicate on Facebook? […] I just think that they 
are military people. They will not communicate there [via the platform].” Pilots’ 
communication also seems doubtful; as Maria says: “Can they really put the flight 
recorder’s recording in the news? This is bullshit.” Viewers frame these anomalous 
elements of a news report using a legal framework. According to Alexander, “If they 
show it, they show a hacked account. […] This is a fraudulent, criminal action.” In other 
words, viewers classified the information shown in the news report as a crime. 
Activating another layer of knowledge and using legality as the cues, the participants 
challenge the official narrative yet again.  
The findings show that viewers form diverse opinions about what they see in 
the news. When provided with cues embedded in the official narrative, they essentially 
reproduce the Kremlin’s official position. However, when the discussion is framed 
through their personal experience, they bring up six diverse sets of opinions. 
Surprisingly, even a single participant can hold contradictory ideas in his or her 
memory which are situationally activated depending on the particular layers of memory 
at work. The most striking examples are Fedor and Mikhail. When the discussion is 
framed in terms of the Official Narrative, Fedor thinks that violent reports are used to 
elicit “a rejection [of the Ukrainian regime] […] We are right; they are villains.” Such 
news reports are appropriate because they unite people in order to defend the country 
in the face of an external threat. However, when TV is discussed in terms of his 
personal experience, Fedor quickly turns to another set of opinions: Concern for 
Others. Relying on another layer of knowledge, he expresses an opposite opinion: 
“People […] get nervous and jump off balconies.” This response is based on another 
cue: his experience of living in the Soviet Union. Drawing on this experience Fedor 
says, “there was less of such dreadful news [in the USSR…] People were calm.” In 
the context of his Soviet-era memories, violent reporting is seen as dangerous. 
Mikhail’s response is also illustrative here. When the discussion is framed through the 
Official Narrative, he is convinced that Russian TV news about Ukraine is objective 
and impartial. As he says, “we do not need to falsify information about what is going 
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on abroad.” However, when discussing a particular news report about events in 
Ukraine, he says that there are falsifications in the reporting and uses legal language 
to classify them as a crime. He says that “this is just unethical,” “it is a crime,” and 
even refers to a specific article of the law pertaining to crimes of “slander and 
falsehood” (Mikhail). Apparently activating another layer of knowledge, he relies on 
another lens which leads to the opposite and critical interpretation. All the opinions 
and triggering cues are summarized in the table below.  
Opinion Cues 
Official Narrative News episodes themselves, or media discourse in general 
Emotional Burnout The experience of watching traumatic news episodes in everyday life 
Reading Between the 
Lines 
TV viewers’ discussions about politics with friends and family 
The Business of War Memories of the 1990s 
Obsession with Ukraine The experience of watching traumatic news episodes in everyday life 
Concern for Others Direct watching of traumatic news coverage featuring the war during 
focus groups 
Lies & the Law The moderator bringing up the topic of credibility in specific news 
episodes 
Table 5. TV Viewers’ Opinions 
4.2.2. Politically Engaged: Applicability Effects  
A few focus group participants had a better understanding of politics as well as 
expressing more interest in politics. These participants were eager to actively seek 
information. Unlike the previous group, they recall particular news media: independent 
sources such as Meduza, RBK, Vedomosti, and Echo of Moscow as well as directly 
or indirectly state controlled sources like LifeNews, RIA Novosti, Lenta.ru. In addition, 
they scored better on the political knowledge test. Unlike the previous groups who 
relied on accessibility as a mechanism, they used the most accessible ideas to make 
sense of news, and expressed different opinions when new cues are introduced, the 
participants in this group had consistent political views. As described in the theoretical 
chapter of the dissertation, they relied on applicability as a mechanism and deployed 
their political schemas to process TV news in consistent manner, and their opinion did 
not fluctuate from context to context. They also see connections between different 
ideas and maintain a consistent opinion in different contexts regardless of cues 
introduced by the moderator. A few of the participants held consistent political views. 
Anton and Alexander are illustrative examples, representing pro-government and anti-
government views respectively.  
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TV viewers with stable and consistent political views do not change their 
opinions from context to context. They see connections between different ideas, and 
their opinion is the same in different contexts, regardless of the new cues. As 
mentioned, Anton is supportive of the Russian government. His central ideas resemble 
the official narrative. He blames the Ukrainian government for the war in Eastern 
Ukraine and supports the annexation of Crimea. Anton thinks that Russia deserves 
better treatment from the West and that Western actions toward Russia are 
hypocritical. During the focus group, he tried to interpret any questions and statements 
through this lens. For instance, Irina questioned the credibility of a TV report during 
the focus group. Anton responds: “[Russian news] is more credible than the news in 
Ukraine and the United States.” When Irina criticized Russian TV’s coverage of the 
Ukrainian Church for calling it “schismatic,” Anton defended this label: “It is really a 
schismatic church, it goes against the grain of our opinion, the government’s opinion.” 
When Nina discusses Russia’s problems and says that “our state is a corrupt thing,” 
Anton responds consistently: “Bribes are everywhere […] the United States, any other 
branded companies, they all take bribes, they all promote their interests.” Anton tries 
to reinterpret what Nina has said and builds it into his geopolitical schema.  
Alexander has different views. Unlike Anton, he is very skeptical of the Russian 
and Ukrainian governments alike. Alexander thinks that politics is about getting 
money. Media sources, according to Alexander, express the private interests of their 
owners and cannot be trusted. The only way to get credible information is to ask 
personal acquaintances who have witnessed the events themselves. When Larisa 
says that Russian camera operators have “incredible professionalism,” Alexander 
responds that they “they do not lie less [because of their professionalism].” When 
Sonia expresses sympathies toward the Russian oppositional radio station Echo of 
Moscow, Alexander objects: “It is owned by Gazprom-media, in-cre-di-ble!” Even the 
oppositional Echo of Moscow cannot be trusted, since a government-affiliated 
business owns it. Unlike the majority of participants, Anton and Alexander have 
consistent frameworks for their interpretations. When they face opposing views, they 
try to interpret them through a preexisting political lens. While most of the respondents 
shift their opinions depending on the new cues and accessible ideas which may have 
in mind at a given moment, the minority have more consistent political worldviews, 
apply them to TV news, and do not shift opinions so fast. 
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4.3. Conclusion 
In what follows, I briefly summarize the findings of this chapter and reflect on 
their implications. While these implications can only be formulated as provisional 
suggestions due to methodological limitations, these findings still generate some 
interesting insights into the principles of news reception under an electoral 
authoritarian regime.  
Most of the focus group participants were politically disengaged. They scored 
poorly on the political knowledge test and had a quite superficial understanding of 
politics as well little political interest. As a result, they did not have consistent opinions 
and fluctuated between partially contradicting considerations which contained both 
criticism and approval of the Russian government and media. When being asked 
general questions about President Putin, the Russian/Ukrainian governments, the 
actions of the West, they tended to repeat the Kremlin’s official narrative. When being 
asked particular questions about the daily practices of watching TV news, 
conversations with friends and relatives while watching TV news, and reactions to 
particular broadcasts watched during focus group discussions, participants expressed 
six critical opinions. These reactions were critical opinions accusing the government 
of manipulating the media, using aggressive emotional persuasive techniques, and 
other forms of malpractice. In extreme cases, some participants could shift between 
contradictory considerations without noticing incoherence. These findings are in line 
with research in cognitive psychology and political science. Memory is domain 
specific: “knowledge in one domain may be organized according to principles different 
from knowledge in another” (Schank & Abelson, 1977, p. 3). In the case of people who 
are not engaged in politics, the domain-specific nature of political reasoning and 
incoherence is a norm rather than an exception (Zaller, 1992). In other words, the 
incoherence in TV viewers’ opinions can be interpreted because of their political 
disengagement. To minimize the efforts needed for the analysis of news and political 
information, they rely on the most accessible ideas in memory to makes sense of the 
news. Since these ideas are located in various disconnected layers of memory, these 
individuals come up with different, partly incoherent, and contradictory opinions.  
The minority of focus group participants scored better on political knowledge 
test and judging by focus group discussions, had a better understanding of politics as 
well as more political interest. As a result, they did not shift their opinions. Rather, they 
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had more coherent political schemas which were applied to process political 
information in a uniformed way across different contexts. Predictably, they also tended 
to reject or reinterpret information to fit these schemas. This process is likely to result 
from reliance on applicability as a mechanism. Unlike most participants, these 
politically engaged participants had more consistent political schemas which they then 
apply to process the news (e.g., Fiske et al., 1990). As a result, incoherencies in their 
judgments were significantly reduced. However, applicability-based schematic 
processing is typically characterized by consistency bias. Subjects tried to interpret all 
information in a uniform manner in order to make it fit their schemas. Information 
inconsistent with their schemas, including the opinions of others and information from 
the news they do not agree with, was reinterpreted or rejected. 
These mechanisms as such are not specific for Russia or electoral 
authoritarianism. The difference between mobilizing the most accessible 
considerations and applying coherent schemas is influenced by political interest and 
sophistication which vary across the population in every society. However, while there 
are always those who have little interest in politics and those who are interested in 
politics, there is also always a larger middle group which traditionally constitutes the 
main object of analysis of political psychology (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). This 
group is especially dependent on the political environment in dealing with news and 
politics, and that is where the influence of authoritarian institutional design comes in. 
These citizens are interested in politics, but this interest is not enough to make them 
active information seekers. For them to be interested in learning political information, 
there should be proper incentives or the perception that their involvement in politics 
can have tangible effects (Downs, 1957). As is clear from the data, they do not 
consider learning political information worth investing effort. Most participants in my 
research are politically apathetic. They do not feel that acquiring political knowledge 
can have tangible effects. Left without the incentives to learn about politics, they deal 
with political information the best they can: by retrieving the most accessible ideas and 
using them for interpretation. These findings allow one to better understand media, 
politics, and authoritarian survival in Russia and emphasize the role of political 
engagement in news processing which can be relevant for other similar electoral 
authoritarian regimes with some reservations.  
My findings show that Russian television definitely affects TV viewers’ opinions 
about politics. By borrowing the most accessible ideas to form opinions about politics, 
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they rely on interpretations of events provided by TV news. However, this effect is 
short-lived. As they are not engaged in public affairs on a routine basis, they do not 
have enough cognitive resources to fully assimilate ideas provided by state-owned 
TV. If this model applies equally to other Russian TV viewers, the power of television, 
which is considered to be an important pillar of Putin’s regime, is not as formidable as 
it seems. Most probably, the enormously high ratings of presidential approval in Russia 
may also partly result from accessibility effects. Russian mass surveys consistently 
report high popular approval of Putin’s policies. Since the annexation of Crimea in 
2014, Putin’s popularity has been consistently between 70% and 85% (Levada Center, 
2019a). However, pollsters often ask general political questions—such as questions 
about the country’s leaders and international politics—which my research suggests 
are likely to trigger accessibility effects. Russian media have been paying 
disproportionate attention to international politics for years. As a result, questions 
about Putin or Crimea asked by pollsters can make participants reproduce the content 
of the recent news made rather than express their opinions.  
These findings are can also be corroborated by more robust survey- and 
experiment-based research. Scholars find that priming significantly affects Russian’s 
evaluations of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. For instance, Stoycheff and Nisbet (2017) 
found that priming hawkish constructs in memory increases support for the militarized 
conflict, while priming economic, military, and diplomatic costs of the conflict 
decreases for the militarized conflict. Similarly, Sirotkina and Zavadskaya (2020) find 
that priming constructs related to the annexation of Crimea increases support for 
political leadership, while priming constructs related to economic crisis decreases 
support for political leadership. As demonstrated in the theoretical chapter, priming is 
an effect resulting from short and unstable accessibility mechanism rather than deeply 
held convictions and is thus similar to the incoherence experienced by the politically 
disengaged focus group participants explored in this chapter. The instability of views 
regarding abstract political agenda and the primacy of personal experience in news 
processing demonstrated in this chapter are also consistent with the findings of Savin 
et al. (2018) who found that Russian TV viewers are susceptible to counterframing 
and change their views of the Russian-American relations depending on the framing. 
Just as in the case of my focus group participants, this change results from the 
absence of interest in politics. Unlike distant Russian-American relations, issues such 
as poor economic performance are highly personally relevant for Russian citizens and 
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are accessible via personal experience rather than media. For instance, Rosenfeld 
(2018) found that changes in regional economy affect citizens’ evaluations of 
performance of regional authorities regardless of media coverage because citizens 
extract economic information from their experience and local conditions rather than 
media. These findings are consistent with my findings: focus group participants forcibly 
challenge the official narrative of the regime when the discussion touches upon the 
issues which are relevant and familiar from personal experience, such as economy or 
emotional well-being.  
In addition, these findings allow me to emphasize the connection between 
political engagement, news processing, and authoritarian survival under an electoral 
authoritarian regime. As noted above, the research on news processing under 
electoral authoritarian regimes has been focusing on how, why, and under what 
conditions citizens trust or distrust news (e.g., Mickiewicz, 2008; Stockmann & 
Gallagher, 2011). However, the influence of political engagement on news processing 
has largely been outside the scope of analysis. This is a factor which crucially 
determines how citizens make sense of news (Lodge & Hamil, 1986; Zaller, 1992). My 
findings show that political engagement crucially predetermines the way citizens 
process the news. As politically disengaged citizens, most focus group participants 
had no coherent political schemas and consequently processed political information 
by building bridges between news and whatever knowledge they had at hand. Without 
being able to articulate coherent opinions, they did not challenge, rather than support, 
the authoritarian equilibrium. This is in line with scholars who argue that unlike 
totalitarian regimes, authoritarian regimes are structurally inclined to rely on the 
demobilization of citizens (Linz, 2000). While political science provides well-grounded 
analysis of this strategy at the level of political actors, it is not yet clear enough how it 
affects news processing and the individual psychology of citizens. This study allows 
me to clarify some of the psychological correlates of this situation. The findings 
demonstrate that this demobilization may work by preventing citizens from articulating 
consistent opinions which are necessary to challenge (or support) this fragile 
equilibrium.  
These findings may be relevant for other electoral authoritarian regimes, but 
with some reservations. Since low political engagement is a crucial factor which 
determines how citizens process political information, these findings are mostly 
relevant for the regimes characterized by low political engagement. Not all electoral 
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authoritarian regimes are born alike: the level of mobilization in electoral 
authoritarianisms can vary between regimes and within regimes. Authoritarian 
regimes in Ukraine or Georgia are much more competitive than the authoritarian 
regime in Russia, and Putin’s regime itself had a period of demobilization (2000s) and 
a mobilizational period (2010s). However, on average electoral authoritarian regimes 
are characterized by lower voter turnout (Reuter, 2020) than democracies. Scholars 
have shown that electoral corruption (Kostadionva, 2009; Martinez i Coma & Trinh, 
2016; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 2012) and absence of competitiveness in 
elections (Croke et al., 2015; Frantz, 2018; McAllister & White, 2008; Turovsky & 
Korneeva, 2018) can negatively affect political engagement. In addition, more 
constrained media environments decrease political knowledge and engagement 
(Leeson, 2008). Finally, many electoral authoritarian regimes deliberately pursue 
demobilization of voters (Linz 2000; McAllister & White, 2017; Robertson, 2011). 
Hence, these findings should be more applicable to electoral authoritarian regimes 
which are characterized by one or several of the following conditions: less competitive 
nature, higher level of electoral corruption, and other factors making political 
engagement seem as a less meaningful activity which cannot change the conduct of 
politics; restricted media freedom which presents learning political information in an 
easy and accessible way; the deliberate reliance on demobilization as a strategy.  
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CHAPTER V. TELEVISION, HEURISTICS, AND MEDIA CREDIBILITY 
UNDER AN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIME  
5.1. Introduction 
While the previous chapter explored how political engagement can affect news 
processing, this chapter focuses on the second aspect of this process – the heuristics 
used to navigate political information. It seeks to address the second sub-question of 
this dissertation: How do citizens evaluate the credibility of TV news under an electoral 
authoritarian regime? The chapter analyses the heuristics used by Russian TV 
viewers to evaluate the credibility of TV news and places them within the context of 
the debates on low-information rationality. It investigates the role of political and media 
institutions in supplying TV viewers with heuristics used to process political information 
to provide a better understanding of news processing in Russia and some insight into 
the nature of news processing which is relevant for other electoral authoritarian 
regimes. 
Just like motivation to acquire political information and engage with politics, 
heuristics to deal with political information are essential for news processing. 
Individuals rely on a variety of cues to make sense of political information, such as 
reputation (Hovland & Weiss, 1951), character traits (Berlo et al., 1969), gender and 
age (Armstrong & McAdams, 2009; Wood, 1979;), ideological, political, and party cues 
(Baum & Gussin, 2008; Dalton et al., 1998; Nelson & Garst, 2005; Popkin, 1994; Rahn, 
1993; Vallone et al., 1985;), social cues (Axsom et al., 1987), visual cues (Fogg et al., 
2002), and endorsements and opinions on social media (Messing & Westwood, 2014; 
Metzger et al., 2010). These cues trigger heuristics – simple logical rules of thumb – 
which are used to evaluate news media messages. The complicated machinery of 
heuristics, cues, and institutions constitutes low-information rationality or “a method of 
combining, in an economical way, learning and information from past experiences, 
daily life, the media, and political campaigns” (Popkin, 1994, p. 7). Being incapable of 
nuanced and detailed analysis of information in both political (Campbell et al., 1960; 
Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997) and social spheres (e.g., Chaiken, 
1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), en masse citizens can still cast ballots intelligently and 
identify unreliable news by relying on the heuristics based on the political environment.  
Media systems can vary giving citizens more or less useful instruments to use 
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as heuristics. While media in democracies are exposed to a variety of political and 
economic pressures, these pressures affect journalists through indirect mechanisms, 
such as reliance on official sources as the easiest way to acquire pertinent information 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). In electoral authoritarian regimes, the direct control of 
the government over media (Egorov et al., 2009; Gelhbach, 2010; Gehlbach & Sonin, 
2004) and intricated persuasion strategies to manipulate public opinion (King et al., 
2013; Sanovich et al., 2018; Yablokov, 2015) are much more common. Since citizens 
can often identify political bias in media, persuasive skepticism about news is present 
in many both more and less competitive authoritarian regimes, such as China (Huang, 
2018; Truex, 2016), Russia (Mickiewicz, 2005; 2008) or Ukraine (Szostek, 2018). 
Since reputation and other cognitive heuristics which are used to evaluate political 
information require some level of trust in media organizations, this profound distrust 
makes their usage less likely in authoritarian contexts. Similarly, political systems can 
vary by giving citizens more or less useful instruments to use as heuristics, such as 
party cues in competitive party systems (Popkin, 1994). In electoral authoritarian 
regimes, party systems are much more constrained, accompanied by a high degree 
of political corruption, and often reduced to a mere façade. Both low competitiveness 
(Croke et al., 2015; Frantz, 2018; Turovsky & Korneeva, 2018) and electoral fairness 
(Kostadionva, 2009; Martinez i Coma & Trinh, 2016; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 
2012) reduce political engagement and make parties seem untrustworthy so that 
citizens are less likely to consider them as institutional vehicles representing their 
interests or views. As a result, ideological and party identifications rarely work as 
meaningful heuristics for citizens in electoral authoritarian regimes (Frye, 2019; 
Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020; Wojcieszak et al., 2019). 
These patterns are reflected in how citizens make use of heuristics for dealing 
with news and political information. A number of studies indirectly suggest that rather 
than heuristics drawn from political environment, such as opinions of parties and 
politicians or reputation of media sources, citizens under authoritarian regimes are 
more prone to rely on alternative non-political sources of heuristics, such as personal 
experience (Mickiewicz, 2005; Pjesivac et al., 2016), abstract reasoning (Mickiewicz, 
2005; Toepfl, 2013), and communication with other people (Kobayashi, 2016; Smyth 
& Oates, 2015). As the functioning of low-information rationality under electoral 
authoritarian regimes is a largely unaddressed issue in the scholarly debate, this 
chapter investigates the heuristics Russian TV viewers use to makes sense of TV 
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news. I argue that an electoral authoritarian regime makes it more difficult to entrust 
media and political institutions with the job of interpreting public affairs because they 
are not considered to be independent and authoritative. Citizens always rely on a mix 
of heuristics which originate from both daily life and the political environment. In an 
authoritarian context, the balance of this mix is shifted towards non-political heuristics 
which are borrowed from daily life and do not depend on the political environment. 
Adapting to an authoritarian environment in which political and media institutions enjoy 
little trust, TV viewers prefer to rely more on other tools, such as common-sense 
cultural stereotypes, which seem more reliable in the context of partly compromised 
institutions.  
The chapter is structured as follows. I first discuss TV viewers’ 
conceptualization of credibility. The discussion of their concept of credibility is followed 
by an analysis of the heuristics used by TV viewers to evaluate the credibility of news 
during the focus group discussions. I identify credibility heuristics, the sources of these 
heuristics, and triggering cues. The analysis of credibility heuristics is followed by the 
analysis of how political engagements changes credibility assessment for more 
politically engaged participants. I conclude with the discussion reflecting on low-
information rationality in Russian and authoritarian contexts.  
5.5. Data from Focus Group Participants 
5.5.1. Credibility Heuristics  
In what follows, I analyze Russian TV viewers’ response to the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict coverage from the information processing perspective. Specifically, I focus on 
TV viewers’ assessment of the credibility of TV messages. Following Hilligoss and 
Reich’s suggestion, I distinguish between participants’ conceptualizations of credibility 
and actual strategies of credibility assessment (Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008). This distinction 
is crucial because one’s conceptualization of credibility does not coincide with the 
actual strategies of inferring credibility. One may apply no verification strategies but 
report verifying information because of social desirability (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007). 
This discrepancy is even more crucial for Russia. All three major political epochs in 
Russia have been characterized by the excessive manipulation over media with 
different tools: manipulation through direct governmental control in the Soviet era, 
oligarchs’ manipulation of the media through the mix of ownership and direct political 
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control in the chaotic 1990s, and manipulation over media by the newly consolidated 
authoritarian regime through the mix of ownership and direct political control in the 
2000-2010s. As a result, the fact that media are being manipulated has become a part 
of the folk wisdom. If one is asked whether news can be trusted, the direct questions 
are likely to trigger this folk wisdom leading to a socially-desirable negative answer. 
Answering otherwise would be equal to acknowledging intellectual incompetence.  
To avoid confusing what people say they do and what they actually do, I 
employed two types of questions. First, I asked more general questions focused on 
how they define credibility and whether they pay attention to it. Second, I asked more 
specific questions about the credibility of particular elements of the news screened 
during focus groups. When focus group participants identified a specific element of a 
news message as credible or not credible, I asked them to explain the logical chains 
– or heuristics – which led them to their conclusions. I documented these levels 
separately. After making sure that the conceptualizations were separated from the 
actual strategies, I categorized credibility assessment strategies.  
Divide by Two: Conceptualizations of Credibility 
As expected, Russian TV viewers are skeptical about credibility of the news in 
the post-Soviet context. All three major political formations in Russia – the communist 
regime, unstable democracy with intensive intra-elite struggle in the 1990s, and 
authoritarian regime of the 2000s – 2010s – had a partly compromised media system, 
in which the values of objectivity and impartiality were put into question by political 
manipulation over media by elites. The experience of facing biased media coverage 
time and again became a part of persuasive common sense which questions the very 
possibility of existence of news which reflect objective picture of public affairs. 
Although independent media and political institutions can hardly be fully independent 
from economic and political pressures in any country, in authoritarian contexts they 
are perceived as even less independent. As a result, citizens in authoritarian contexts 
find that the likelihood of trustworthy news is questionable (e.g., Mickiewicz, 2005; 
Szostek, 2018).  
There are two forms of explicit conceptualization of credibility among TV 
viewers. One is the old adage “who pays the piper calls the tune.” In short, it dictates 
that news cannot be trusted because the owners, groups of interests, or politicians 
always transmit information which is beneficial to their own interests. As Anton puts it, 
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“Definitely, I do not trust news completely, it is even stupid […] if [the situation 
happens] in Ukraine, it is logical that Ukraine defends its people, Russia [defends] its 
people.” Alina essentially repeats the same idea: “You understand that television will 
never say the truth. Everything will be covered as they need it.” TV viewers see any 
news as “the propaganda of desired information to the people in order to make think 
in particular way” (Nina). Those who transmit this information are typically understood 
as any powerful elites, such as oligarchs, politicians, and the government. Another 
one is the doubt in a person being able to figure out the murky and shady 
arrangements of post-Soviet politics. Post-Soviet politics is structured around informal 
networks which prevent transparency. Therefore, even if one assumes that post-
Soviet media can be trustworthy, a lay person will not be able to makes sense of the 
complicated political system anyway. As Irina puts it,  
I think it does not make sense to try to figure out [the details of Russia-Ukraine 
conflict] […] what we see is the tip of the iceberg. Why, how, what happens, 
relationships between politicians, countries, and so on – it is a different level 
altogether. Speaking seriously, to talk about it is to waste time.  
A similar form of perceived powerlessness has been identified by Suslov in his 
analysis of the Russian blogosphere in the context of the annexation of Crimea. He 
finds that geopolitical narrative is one of the common rhetorical devices “in which 
people profess the impossibility of fully comprehending the complexity of forces acting 
on the international arena and, instead, delegate this knowledge to their political 
leaders” (Suslov, 2014, p. 598).  
The inevitable bias which is seen as an inseparable part of any news seems to 
produce double normative pressure which makes skepticism a desirable trait 
inseparable from intelligence. The intelligent people do not trust the news. Conversely, 
acknowledging trust in the news becomes a synonym for foolishness. Therefore, when 
being asked direct questions about trust and verification of information, TV viewers 
perceive them as a challenge to their personal integrity. Under this normative 
pressure, TV viewers overwhelmingly report that they use complex verification 
strategies. There are several elements of the reported verification. The first one is 
comparison. Logic dictates that if one source of information is biased, the best way to 
approximate the truth is to compare it with other sources of information. As Yegor 
argues,  
You watch some news broadcast on TV. Then you see the same news on the 
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Internet, but it is framed from different perspective. You read and compare – 
how it was covered there [on TV], how it is covered here [on the Internet].  
Another one is the Divide By Two (del’it’ popolam) rule. Participants refer to a simple 
mathematical operation of division and apply it metaphorically to news coverage. This 
simple rule dictates that if two sources report different versions of reality, the truth will 
be somewhere in between. As Oleg argues, “I am inclined to believe something in the 
middle. I cannot trust TV channels completely.” As Larisa puts it, “Typically, the truth 
is somewhere in between.” TV viewers see this idea of truth-in-the-middle as an 
ultimate logical rule which should be applied to any news rigorously and has no room 
for exceptions. As Ivan argues, “You see, it is not possible to say for sure what is 
credible there [in the news]. I approach all information skeptically. [I] divide 
[information] by two.” Finally, the last element of the reported verification is applying 
one’s own opinion. The idea that news should be subject to one’s independent 
analysis rather than consumed mindlessly is the motto dominating discussions on trust 
and credibility in the focus group discussions. As Yekaterina puts it,  
When you compare different opinions, you do not come unprepared. You also 
have an opinion […] [Based on the comparison and individual opinion] you build 
some picture – what is true, what is not true, and where it [Russia-Ukraine 
conflict] is going. 
In essence, the common formula of credibility assessment described by TV 
viewers can be divided into three stages. To see the difference, sources with a 
different bias have to be compared. To approximate the truth, one has to infer the 
objective picture by finding the middle ground between two different interpretations 
with different biases. The result has to be compared with individual opinions. The 
concept of objectivity depicted by TV viewers is well summarized by Mickiewicz as 
“commissioned objectivity.” Instead of defining objectivity as impartial reporting, 
Russian TV viewers define “objectivity as the presence of opposing views even if those 
views represent the clash of special interests” (Mickiewicz, 2005, p. 373). However, 
there are several conspicuous features characterizing this process. First, it is highly 
unlikely that TV viewers actually practice this complex procedure of verification. Given 
quite scant attention to public affairs of many participants and the resources such a 
laborious formula would require, it is reasonable to assume that these narratives are 
triggered by social norms which result from the specific post-Soviet ethos of distrust 
of the media. Second, although TV viewers present their understanding of objectivity 
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as resulting from experience and knowledge of public affairs, the mental rule they 
describe originates in daily life rather than political experience. This rule dictates that 
if interpretations of two media sources do not match, they are biased; those elements 
of information which match can be trusted; those elements of information which do not 
match require deduction; based on the mismatch, one can hypothesize how biases 
distorted information and deduce the objective information. This set of simplistic logical 
operations is likely to be acquired in the course of their socialization and daily life rather 
than knowledge of the media, politics, and the government. Understanding of the 
media and politics implies that the distance between covered event and TV coverage 
can vary widely - from few omitted details to the outright lie. However, TV viewers 
disregard the complexity of public affairs by reducing objectivity to the folk wisdom 
which dictates that truth can be approximated by simply finding common denominator 
between two accounts of events.  
Violence Does Not Lie: Violence and Fear as Heuristic Cues 
As compared to the conceptualizations of objectivity, more domain-specific 
questions about particular episodes and their credibility produce drastically different 
results. When asked to evaluate particular elements of news broadcasts, assess their 
credibility, and explain the logic behind their judgments, participants talk about a 
variety of heuristic strategies which were hidden by socially desirable normative 
conceptualizations of objectivity. One of the cues which triggers the credibility heuristic 
is the presence of graphic representation of violence, such as images of wounded 
bodies, suffering people, and damaged infrastructure. Images of violence perform 
three perceptive functions. First, they attract and focus attention. Responding to the 
question about attention, Yulia argues: “I did not have emotional stress but…scenes 
of clashes [attract attention].” TV viewers report that their attention is captured by 
“dead bodies” (Sergei), “wounded man” (Alexandra), “how a person was shot” 
(Andrei), “crying children and crying pensioners” (Nikolai), et cetera. Second, graphic 
images of violence and suffering have a disproportionately large effect on memory. 
They are memorized better and overshadow other elements of news reports. When 
asked about particular episodes in a 15-minutes broadcast on the military 
confrontation in Donbass, Kirill acknowledges that he has only scant memory of them 
because his attention was focused on the introductory scene featuring violence: “I did 
not even pay substantial attention [to these episodes]. I just read them and forgot 
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them.” Graphic images of violence and suffering are memorized immediately and 
remain in memory. As Alexey puts it, “it [images of violence] is recorded in your head 
whether or not you want it.” Finally, graphic images of violence and suffering build a 
connection between what is seen and TV viewers’ own emotional state. In essence, 
they make TV viewers imagine that they are in the shoes of the people covered in the 
news. Describing his reaction to the broadcast about the war, Andrey says: “I am 
scared of finding myself there [in Donbass].” Similarly, Anna refers to her own fears: 
“I am the mother of two. Therefore, it provokes intense emotions in me […] How can I 
let my children go anywhere [after this]?” Similarly, Elena builds the connection 
between her own situations and the war: “It [the war] will start here [in Russia], it will 
spread here if not suppressed.” In psychology, the images of violence are known for 
focusing attention, memorization, and appeal to personal experience. This specificity 
is explained by psychological mechanisms. Unlike emotionally neutral messages, 
fear-arousing messages are more likely to trigger peripheral route of processing which 
works fast, automatically, and uses the first and most salient cues for processing 
information (Hale & Mongeau, 1995; Nabi, 2002).  
However, emotional nature of images of violence does not fully explain why 
participants see graphic images of violence and suffering as credible. Images of 
violence also trigger a heuristic which is used to evaluate credibility. While asked about 
credibility of images of violence, Maria responds: “Yes, of course, it [violence] does 
[indicate credibility].” As Yekaterina explains, “In my opinion, it looked very credible 
when they were beating each other.” The deeper logic of this type of judgment is 
explained well by Irina. She argues that: 
This video confirms that there is a war [in Donbass]. There are victims. There 
are shots fired. There are people. It cannot be put into question […] these are 
facts […] terrible pictures of war […] cannot be put into question. 
The images of war are credible factual statements which are understood in 
opposition to fake information and manipulation. The images of war are credible 
because it is difficult to manipulate and fake these images. As Nadezhda puts it, 
“These scenes provoke negative [reaction] because you see that it happens in reality, 
it is not fabricated.” The heuristic at work here dictates that news can be fabricated; 
however, it is difficult to fabricate real violence and suffering; therefore, the images of 
violence and suffering are true. This heuristic seems to be based on the binary 
opposition between fabrication and truth and the set of logical premises and operations 
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originating in daily life rather than specific political and institutional context of Russia.  
Professionalism in Appearance 
The behavior and appearance of journalists appears to be an important cue for 
Russian TV viewers. They pay attention to how journalists look, talk, and behave to 
infer credibility of the messages they transmit. There is a variety of visual cues TV 
viewers react to. For Maria, “tidiness” and “handsome[ness]” are important visual 
cues. For Ilya, it is a “good haircut.” Public speaking skills is an especially important 
cue: Maria mentions “correct speech” as an important cue. For Tatiana, “diction” is 
specifically important. For Svetlana, “the way they speak” provokes trust. She opposes 
journalists “whose speech is correctly structured” to people whose speech contains 
junk words, such as “a, well, like.” For Mikhail, it is “intonations,” “expression,” 
“argumentation,” and “subtleness of explanation.” 
In essence, all these external visual and linguistic cues indicate that journalists 
are “masters of their professions” and “emit professionalism” (Svetlana). These 
external cues seem to have no relation to credibility of the news and yet they are used 
as cues to infer credibility. The rule underlying this logic resembles the logic 
underlining credibility assessment of websites based on the design. As Fogg et al. 
argue, the reason behind the connection between inferred credibility and website 
design is that “A Web design team demonstrates expertise to the users. Users may 
then assume this expertise extends to the quality of information on the site” (Fogg et 
al., 2002, p. 27). Similarly, by looking at visual and linguistic cues, TV viewers conclude 
that journalists are “professionals in what they are doing” (Svetlana). In turn, this 
professionalism extends to the information they convey and signal credibility. As in 
case of Violence Does Not Lie heuristic, this heuristic originates in daily life rather than 
specific political and institutional context of Russia. It is logical to assume that the skill 
in providing credible information results from professional training. With professional 
training journalists also acquire specific traits. Therefore, people with such traits are 
more likely to provide credible information.  
Two Heads Are Better Than One 
Social cues, such as opinions of friends or other people, can be an important 
factor in perceiving credibility. People rely on others to form opinions about politics 
(Katz et al., 2005; Lazarsfeld, 1944), decide whether they need to engage in deep 
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analysis of information or can rely on “hints” given by others which can allow for 
superficial processing without investing much effort (Axsom et al., 1987; Metzger et 
al., 2010). Social cues are important for Russian TV viewers as well. They rely on 
others, both trusted others and opinions of people found on the Internet, to infer 
credibility of the news about Russia-Ukraine conflict. There are two main categories 
of people who are identified as those who can influence their opinions.  
First, it is trusted others. As Galina explains, “I am typically too lazy [to analyze 
information]. My husband watches news and RBK [independent business online 
channel]. He analyzes this information and shares it with me.” Similarly, Yekaterina 
argues that she talks to friends who are more politically knowledgeable than her 
friends: “I communicate with people who know more than me. Then I am building my 
understanding – what is true there, what is false, and where it is going [in Donbass].” 
Maria argues that she relies on the opinion of her father-in-law because  
he is older and was born in Ukraine […] I trust him because he is a man 
of many talents […] he has good education, he worked abroad, he 
understands the old and the new, he can compare [the events with his 
diverse experience]. 
 Another one is particular journalists who are perceived as being authoritative 
and knowledgeable. For instance, complaining about the absence of credibility and 
general confusion related to the Donbass war, Veronika says that it is not clear “who 
started war there [in Donbass].” Responding to Veronica, Galina suggests watching 
films of a journalist who can provide explanations: “There is a journalist, Vera Kuzmina, 
[she can answer the question] why and who started it [the war]. She has films, she 
even was my favorite journalist at certain point, watch her films and broadcasts.” 
Finally, TV viewers rely on accounts of those who they perceive as witnesses of 
events. For instance, Kirill explains that if he gets interested in a certain event, he can 
look for information from the witnesses of this event found online: “If there was some 
event, you can visit Ukrainian forums and see what people write about it, talk to people 
[and ask] – ‘did it really happen’? He [online forum participant] will say: ‘yes, it 
happened.’” In this case, others are perceived as credible sources of information 
because of privileged access to events rather than superior knowledge.  
As in the case of the previous rules, this heuristic originates from common-
sense rather than specific political and institutional context of Russia. Trusted others 
are perceived as being experts because of their seemingly superior knowledge. 
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Witnesses’ accounts are perceived as credible because of witnesses’ privileged 
access to events. It is logical to assume that they have better understanding of the 
events and, therefore, can be relied on to infer credibility. 
Persuasive Intent  
While assessing credibility of the news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict, TV 
viewers often feel that media attempt to manipulate them. If particular features of 
coverage are recognized as persuasion techniques, the credibility of a broadcast 
becomes discredited in the eyes of TV viewers. There are three features of media 
coverage which demonstrate the persuasive nature of news to TV viewers: clichés, 
absence of alternative views, and excessive reliance on emotions.  
While material presented in the news about Ukraine can vary, the broadcasts 
themselves are often identical. As a result, TV viewers not only recognize their 
identical nature. They can even predict the structure of future news broadcast. As Irina 
argues, she was struck by the identical nature of all news reports on the Russia-
Ukraine conflict:  
The news about Ukraine is all like that. It is like I watched it ten times. 
What I watch on TV typically consist of several parts: it is a violent clash, 
then a reaction of some freaks from the government or from somewhere 
else. Then, some statements on Facebook or something else. And then 
further developments from the author of a broadcast. It is all the same 
all the time. 
The repetition of identical plots makes TV viewers suspect that someone is attempting 
to persuade them, leading to defensive reactions and mistrust. The absence of 
alternative views is another cue which points at the unreliable nature of particular news 
broadcasts. The presence of only one interpretation of events and narrow political 
views make TV viewers skeptical about the credibility of news. As Leonid argues, 
“there is no two-side analysis” in the news broadcast about war in Donbass. Alexey 
complains that this broadcast highlights negative aspects of life in Ukraine with “no 
light notes.” As Boris puts it, “the coverage is framed in a certain way… [it is] a black-
and-white representation of the situation [in Donbass].” This focus on negative aspects 
ignoring positive aspects and absence of alternative views are immediately read as 
an attempt to persuade and indoctrinate. Leonid recognizes the absence of alternative 
views as a strategic move: media attempt to “depress viewers.” The absence of 
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alternative viewers is used as a cue to infer forged and manufactured nature of the 
news. As Yegor explains,  
You trust it [one-sided coverage] less because you do not want to brainwash 
yourself […] Channel One [journalists] like to criticize one side and praise 
another one. That is, we are saints, they are…[not] […] It is strange. It is not 
like this in reality; therefore, you start to think that something is wrong here. 
Finally, the excessive reliance on emotions is also read as persuasive technique. 
Alexey points out that emotional nature of the news broadcast about Donbass: the 
characters “are very emotional […] [the broadcast features] concerns, mimics, 
trembling face.” As Nina explains, emotions and “constant negative” tone in news 
makes her think that news about Ukraine is “deliberate propaganda.”  
Identical and repeating nature of news broadcasts, absence of alternative 
news, and reliance on emotions are all used as cues to evaluate credibility. 
Specifically, these three elements are used to infer the nature of news as 
manufactured and unreliable. The heuristics at work here can be summarized as 
follows. Clichés: the logic dictates that realistic coverage will be diverse because it 
covers a diverse reality; therefore, identical coverage across time is likely to be an 
attempt to persuade, and the message is unreliable. Absence of alternative views: the 
logic dictates that there are different interpretations of such a contentious event as the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict; therefore, if only one interpretation is included in the news, 
others are excluded; the coverage is an attempt to persuade, and the message is 
unreliable. Reliance on emotions: emotional appeals is an attempt to persuade, and 
the message is unreliable. Social psychology demonstrates that if people are aware 
of being influenced, they are likely to resist influence. For instance, in a priming 
experiment, Strack and colleagues find that awareness of priming plays important role 
in processing information. If subjects are unaware of priming event, priming affects 
their judgment. If subjects are reminded of a priming event, no assimilation of 
information happens – subjects resist the priming effect (Strack et al., 1993). The logic 
underlying these three rules of thumb can be summarized as persuasive intent. As 
Metzger et al. argue, persuasive intent is the implication that there is “some sort of 
manipulation or ulterior motive on the part of the information provider, which negatively 
impacts credibility. This type of content seems to elicit an immediate defense 
mechanism that leads people to mistrust information without further scrutiny” (Metzger 
et al., 2010, p. 432). As it can be seen from TV viewers’ responses, the source of this 
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heuristic is daily life rather than specific institutional and political context of Russia. All 
three rules can be reduced to simplistic logic which is acquired through the course of 
socialization and education.  
Politics and Authenticity Heuristics 
Obviously, all news broadcasts watched by participants during focus group 
sessions involved politics. However, the same event framed as a part of political 
process or social process can lead to different interpretations by triggering different 
heuristics. In the framing of the events in Ukraine, Russian television often portrays 
protests in Kiev as a part of political process involving parties and politicians, while the 
referenda in Donbass are portrayed as non-political grassroots mobilization involving 
ordinary citizens not related to parties or politicians. These different frames have 
different impacts on viewers by triggering different heuristics. Non-political frames 
feature ordinary people, which increases credibility of broadcasts. As Yegor argues, 
“ordinary people” in news about Donbass look sincere: “I had a feeling that they just 
put an ordinary man in front of the camera… He does not talk smoothly, but he speaks 
clearly. It invokes trust.” They look sincere to participants because they seem to be 
similar to TV viewers in terms of their social position, concerns, and needs. As Yulia 
puts it, “You are at the same level with these people.” Since TV viewers recognize 
these citizens as relatable and similar to themselves, they think that they can 
understand the motives of the citizens presented in the news. As ordinary people, 
these citizens are unlikely to lie or manipulate information. As a result, this perceived 
similarity between TV viewers and ordinary citizens presented in news reports makes 
TV viewers conclude that news reports are credible.  
However, this identification with relatable people hides more complex dynamics 
peculiar to the post-Soviet society. In addition to the same concerns and social 
position, “ordinary people” also occupy a similar position in relation to politics. As TV 
viewers, they are not involved in the political process. When asked to clarify the 
meaning of the phrase about “the same level,” Yulia proceeds: “I mean that he is not 
a political figure, that he is a person like you.” This comparison is based on the 
perception of politics as based on special interest and manipulation. The concerns of 
“ordinary people” are fundamentally opposed to special interest and manipulation. 
Their motivations include happiness, money, safety and are intrinsic to human nature. 
As Yuriy puts it, “I am not a fan of political news. Politics is dirt. It is the dirtiest business 
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in the world.” Instead, the demands of miners featured in the news about Donbass are 
framed as the expression of non-political interests. As a result, they are perceived as 
“normal” and “adequate.” As Ivan explains, “It is the demand of everyone. I think we 
also - us, you, - we want to get more, to be paid well.” Viewers build the opposition 
between this authentic interest and the political demands of Maidan protesters. As 
compared to the protests in Donbass, Maidan seems “Too politicized. There are 
parties [involved].” This difference rests on the idea that “ordinary people” are far from 
politics: “These people…Do any of us have understanding of what European Union 
is? […] They [Maidan protesters] talk about the European Union as if they knew what 
they were going to join.” The political demands of Maidan are considered to be a result 
of political manipulation of elites because ordinary people are far from political agenda. 
Once seeing this opposition between political interest and authenticity, the moderator 
asks participants to conduct a mental experiment and imagine that Maidan protesters 
talk about their authentic social and economic interests instead of the abstract agenda 
of the European integration. The results are striking. As Kristina puts it, “It would be 
better, of course. It would be true […] We would believe him, of course.”  
The heuristic underlying these reactions can be formulated as follows: if the 
message involves political ideas, politicians, or parties, it probably advances special 
interests; therefore, it attempts to manipulate the viewer and should not be trusted; if 
the message involves ordinary people with non-political interests, it probably does not 
advance special interests; therefore, it does not attempt to manipulate the viewers and 
should be trusted. These two rules work together in concert. Politics as heuristic 
implies Authenticity as the opposite, and Authenticity as heuristic implies Politics as 
the opposite. Covering the protests in Maidan and Donbass, Russian TV plays on TV 
viewers’ disgust of politics by presenting the unwanted Maidan protests as political 
and desirable Donbass referenda as non-political. While the opposition between 
special interest and public interest is highly intuitive heuristic device acquired from 
daily life, the persistence and rigorous use of Politics and Authenticity heuristics by the 
participants points at its specific cultural nature. According to scholars of the post-
Soviet society, the discrediting of official politics in the late Soviet Union resulted in the 
escape of individuals into private life and political “ethic of non-participation.” After a 
short burst of political activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the dissatisfaction 
with the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union and reforms following perestroika 
led to a new escape from politics (Belokurova & Vorobyev, 2019; Howard, 2003; 
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Prozorov, 2008). These factors cemented a very specific attitude to politics in post-
Soviet Russia. Although short bursts of grassroots political activity happen from time 
to time in Russia, politics is mostly perceived as dangerous, dirty, manipulative, and 
unnecessary. Politics and Authenticity heuristics are being borrowed from this shared 
cultural repository.  
Ownership Heuristic 
The ownership of TV channels seems to be an important cue for inferring 
credibility of the news among participants, although it is used for both inferring 
credibility and putting it into question. For those who are more inclined to criticize 
Putin’s regime, state ownership is a sign of unreliable information. For instance, 
responding to the statements about credibility of state-owned channels, Larisa 
responds saying that “Our channels are heavily criticized [exactly] because they are 
state-aligned […] I would not say […] federal channels are one hundred percent 
truthful.” For TV viewers who are more inclined to support Putin’s regime, state 
ownership of Channel One is a cue which indicates the credibility of the information. 
As Oxana argues, “I do not think that Channel One lies – they check information.” 
Vasiliy provides more comprehensive explanation of why Channel One is perceived 
as credible: “You try to believe what TV says because it is state-owned channels. 
People [running them] are responsible [for information they disseminate] and occupy 
high positions.” In essence, governmental channels are trusted more because the 
government is expected to apply rigorous fact-checking procedures.  
The heuristics underlying these different uses of source ownership as cues can 
be formulated as follows: the state pursues its interests, therefore, information 
provided by the state is biased; the state ensures the quality of information, therefore, 
information provided by the state is credible. While the use of this heuristic seems 
obvious and logical, it is interesting to trace their source. The use of the state as a cue 
can be traced back to Hovland and Weiss’ distinction between low- and high-credibility 
sources which are represented by a scientific journal and a state organization 
(Hovland & Weiss, 1951). It seems to fall under a more general authority heuristic 
which dictates that official sources are more likely to be credible. As Sundar argues, 
“A common finding across the credibility literature is that one of the major criteria for 
assigning credibility to a site is whether the source is an official authority or not” 
(Sundar, 2008, p. 84). 
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However, unlike the simple authority heuristic which dictates that official 
sources should be treated as more credible than unofficial ones, the state ownership 
heuristic as used by focus group participants also encapsulates the unique post-Soviet 
historical and political context. For some TV viewers, credibility of the state-owned 
sources is underlined by the memories of the Soviet times. For instance, responding 
to a question about credibility and state ownership, Vasiliy confirms this connection: 
“In general, yes [there is a connection between state ownership and credibility]. I would 
wish so…At least, it was true in the Soviet times.” As Sofia argues, “In the Soviet 
Union, they broadcasted calmer and kinder things.” Having spent a significant part of 
their lives in the Soviet Union or sharing the popular imagery of the “authoritative” and 
“serious” Soviet television, TV viewers use this experience as a cue to assess 
credibility of the news today. At the same time, Soviet memories are compared to the 
style of commercial channels during the period of intense intra-elite struggle and 
market competition in the 1990s. As Sonya puts it, “I don’t watch NTV [a commercial 
channel] because it is commercial.” For Sonya, commercial ownership automatically 
implies that private interests undermine unbiased reporting. Commercial channels 
seek to earn money. They use “something hot – the hotter the better.” As a result, all 
information appears to be “false, there is no truth [on commercial TV].” The news on 
commercial channels is “bought, they have certain intention [to promote financial 
interest of the owner].” The memories of both elite manipulation over media in the 
struggle against each other and highly sensationalized reporting in the 1990s are 
compared to the memories of calmer and authoritative styles of Soviet television. 
For those who use state ownership as a cue to infer credibility, the reliance on 
this heuristic seems to be underlined by the contrasting of the Soviet Union and 
turbulent 1990s. They rely on memories and perception of the Soviet television as 
calm and authoritative, and the commercial channels of the 1990s as manipulative 
and sensationalist. Even though many focus group participants were born after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union or have a scant memory of the Soviet television, they 
seem to be sensitive to ownership cues. The perception of Soviet television as more 
authoritative and commercial channels of the 1990s as more sensationalist is also 
widely spread in the Russian post-Soviet culture and imagery.  
5.5.2. The Role of Political Sophistication  
When inquiring about heuristics, the moderator framed the questions in a way 
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that focused participants’ attention on messages. Asking questions such as “are there 
any elements in this broadcast which you find credible?” or “are there any elements in 
this broadcast which make you skeptical about its credibility?” allowed me to identify 
the heuristics which are located at the basic level of intuitive reactions. Therefore, even 
if political sophisticates employ more complex reasoning, they share the same 
heuristics at the level of perception and first intuitive reactions as political novices. 
While sharing many intuitive heuristics with political novices, political sophisticates 
seem to be more sensitive to ownership heuristic than people not interested in politics.  
The ownership heuristic is used differently by Putin supporters and participants 
who are openly critical of Putin’s regime. For the critics of the Putin’s regime, the 
ownership heuristic is used to draw a conclusion that television is a political tool which 
is used by elites to shape public opinion and keep the regime in power. In addition, 
they often use catchy political labels, such as propaganda or brainwashing, to 
challenge the reputation of Russian television. For instance, Alexander, a political 
sophisticate, claims that Channel One “exploits propaganda” and is used to “just 
stupefy people.” It “brainwashes us” to advance the regime’s agenda. In addition to 
confidence in the manipulative nature of Russian television, political sophisticates also 
link it to the agenda of the regime. For instance, Alexander jokingly says that “It 
[Channel One] is just DNR-TV.” DNR-TV is an ironic abbreviation for “Donetsk 
People’s Republic Television” he created. By saying so, he ironically reflects on the 
fact that Channel One pays too much attention to the Eastern Ukraine, the coverage 
of Channel One is overly sympathetic towards DNR, and the regime uses Channel 
One to manipulate public opinion and convince people in the legitimacy of the republic.  
Pro-Putin supporters instrumentalize the ownership heuristic differently. They 
generally agree with the critics of the Putin’s regime that Russian television in general 
and Channel One in particular are biased and manipulate information to advance the 
regime’s strategic goals. For instance, Anton argues that “it is even silly to believe the 
news fully.” The media are always biased by the political agendas of governments: 
“Ukraine protects its own [people], Russia protects its own [people].” However, unlike 
critics of the Putin’s regime, Putin supporters accept the bias in the news on Channel 
One. They think that bias and manipulation in Russian TV news are a perfectly 
legitimate political tool. Since Putin supporters’ political preferences align with the 
Russian government’s goal, they consider the manipulation used to advance these 
goals as legitimate. For instance, when being asked about the credibility of Channel 
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One, Eduard responds that he trusts it because “the government supports it [Channel 
One], and it supports the government (…) it is under protection of the president.” At 
first glance, this use of the ownership heuristic can look similar to the one of political 
novices. However, instead of arguing that the state-owned TV channels are credible 
because the state ensures the quality of information, they link their trust in state-owned 
TV to the government’s political agenda and policy objectives. As Asya argues, she 
trusts TV news because “We have a strong state. It has strength and weight in 
international relations. That is why Channel One [can be trusted].” Table 6 summarizes 
all cues, heuristics’ assumption and rules of application, and sources. 
Name Cues Assumption Source 
 
Divide by Two 
 
--- 
All media are biased. Politics is too complex to 
understand; biased sources have to be 
compared, the interpretation events should be 
















Both skills in providing credible information and 
professional appearance result from 
professional training;  
Daily Life 
Two Heads Are 




People with superior knowledge have greater 
understanding of events; witnesses have 















The diverse reality will be reflected in the 
diverse coverage; identical coverage across 
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coverage is an attempt to persuade; 
 











The state pursues its interests;  
 














Political parties and politicians advance special 
interests;  
 





Table 6 Heuristics, Cues, Sources 
5.6. Conclusion 
The analysis of credibility assessment strategies of participants presented 
above allows me to tap into the credibility assessment of Russian TV viewers. Based 
on the analysis of focus group discussions, I described TV viewers’ understanding of 
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objectivity as well as six heuristic strategies used to evaluate credibility of the news 
about the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The understanding of media credibility of 
participants is underlined by two beliefs. First, media credibility does not exist because 
media coverage is always biased and colored by special interests of owners. Second, 
it is impossible to understand the complicated hidden world of the post-Soviet elite 
politics. Given these difficulties, the only way to approximate the credibility of political 
news, at least relatively, is to compare sources with different biases, find a common 
denominator, and compare it to one’s individual opinion. However, completely different 
psychological machinery is at work when TV viewers are asked to evaluate specific 
elements of news broadcasts and describe their subjective impressions. Based on 
their subjective reactions, I identified six heuristics, each with its own unique triggering 
cues and source: violence does not lie, professionalism in appearance, two heads are 
better than one, persuasive intent, politics and authenticity, and the ownership 
heuristic. These heuristics represent folk or common-sense psychology of Russian TV 
viewers - a set of if-then-else conditions which are used to make inferences about 
credibility depending on the presence of particular cues in a fast and effortless manner.  
Given the qualitative nature of the research, these implications can only be 
formulated as provisional hints, due to methodological limitations. However, while not 
being strictly representative and lacking causal validity, my findings still afford some 
interesting insights into the inner workings of news reception and credibility 
assessment in Russia. Keeping these limitations in mind, these findings still allow me 
to draw several careful generalizations which are important both in terms of broader 
relevance, and more specifically for the post-Soviet society and the Russian context.  
First, my findings can contribute to the research on media credibility and news 
processing under an electoral authoritarian regime. People living in Russia are often 
portrayed as skillful and critical readers of media messages who do not trust news, 
are able to identify bias, and prefer to rely on themselves rather than the reputation of 
media or party messages to assess quality of political information (Mickiewicz, 2005, 
2008). While participants uniformly agree on the biased nature of the Russian media 
and the need to read them critically, in practice they rely on a very situational toolkit of 
heuristics which is used for both inferring the credibility of Channel One news and 
challenging it. While being asked whether news can be trusted, participants 
overwhelmingly answered “no.” While being asked whether this particular news 
broadcast looks trustworthy, they reported a variety of common-sense psychological 
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strategies which can be used both to establish credibility and to challenge it. The actual 
decision to trust or distrust it will be based on the presence, absence, and combination 
of such cues, as images of violence, appearance of journalists, opinions of others, 
ownership of a channel, clichés, alternative views, emotions, political or non-political 
framing. In short, as there is a gulf between reported and performed verification of 
information (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007). The general attitude to bias in the media and 
particular strategies of assessing credibility differ widely. People can think that the 
media are biased in general but trust particular messages or think that reliable 
information is reported in general, but distrust particular messages. This difference 
between the reported attitude to the media and actual strategies of establishing 
credibility should be considered in order to build a more detailed and plausible vision 
of credibility assessment under an electrical authoritarian regime.  
In addition, scholars find that awareness of bias in media often naturally co-
exists with support of an authoritarian regime in Russia. Citizens understand that the 
media are being manipulated but prefer or approve of manipulation for a variety of 
reasons. Specifically, they can be clearly aware and critical of manipulation in media 
but accept it as a part of the state-building enterprise (e.g., Hutchings & Rulyova, 2009; 
Oates, 2006). Among focus group participants, the combination of trust in state-
aligned channels and awareness of bias of state-owned channels is a characteristic 
of small groups of participants – political sophisticates who are supportive of Putin’s 
regime. These findings suggest that the image of the dual nature of citizens who 
combine trust with criticism in coherent attitudes can be limited and characterize only 
specific groups of people: political sophisticates who are more supportive of the 
regimes’ policies. These findings can also be partly corroborated by the research on 
source cues. Previous research found that politically aware rather than politically 
unaware citizens are sensitive to source cues. For instance, Zaller (1992) notes that 
politically aware people find it easier to process political messages because they can 
build connections between news or policy issues and political preferences using 
source cues. Similarly, Shirikov (2021) found that only politically informed Russians 
can use source cues to draw conclusions about the credibility of the state-owned 
Channel One and the independent Echo of Moscow.  
Second, these findings show how simple logical heuristics which are present 
across different political and cultural contexts are being reshaped by local contexts. 
ownership heuristic and politics and authenticity heuristic are of particular interest 
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here. On one hand, the ownership heuristic seems to be a version of the authority 
heuristic which dictates that official sources are more likely to be credible (Sundar, 
2008). On the other, while overlapping with more general psychological rule, it is 
infused with Russian post-Soviet culture and meanings. TV viewers consider the 
information provided by the state as more credible not because it is a simple authority 
heuristic which dictates that official sources are more credible than unofficial ones. 
Rather, they rely on specific memories and perception of Soviet television as calm and 
authoritative and the commercial channels of the 1990s as manipulative and 
sensationalist. Similarly, political cues work differently in Russia. In democracies, 
people utilize political cues included in messages to infer credibility of political 
messages and learn about positions of candidates (Popkin, 1994; Rahn, 1993). Under 
electoral authoritarian regimes, party systems and ideological forces do not function 
as cognitive vehicles which can represent meaningful variety of political preferences 
and interests. Any political cue regardless of particular ideological orientation triggers 
suspicion and becomes a universal shortcut used to label information as unreliable. 
While political cues still function as cognitive signals in Russian context, they have 
come to represent the experience of suspicion towards politics and the belief that any 
political message is a form of covert manipulation.  
Finally, these findings contribute to the understanding of how low-information 
rationality can work outside of democratic contexts. Media and political systems can 
be represented as a continuum with more or less useful conditions for utilizing low-
information rationality. More entertainment-dominated and polarized market-based 
media systems give citizens fewer useful instruments to use as heuristics; less 
entertainment-dominated and polarized public service systems give citizens more 
useful instruments to use as heuristics. Political systems with more diverse political 
forces can give citizens more opportunities to find a party which fits one’s political 
preferences (Downs, 1957) increasing the chances of using ideologies and party 
agendas as heuristics (Popkin, 1994) than less diverse political systems. Electoral 
authoritarian regimes are characterized by even less favorable conditions as political 
and media institutions are not perceived as independent and reliable. Conversely, 
citizens should rely the heuristics based on the political environment in authoritarian 
contexts even less.  
Since political communication research is done in democracies more often than 
not, it is not quite clear how low-information rationality functions in the context in which 
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political and media institutions are not perceived as being authoritative and credible. 
Russia presents an excellent opportunity to produce some hints about this process. 
The striking feature of all respondents’ strategies is that very few of them rely on the 
structure of contemporary political information environment, such as party structure, 
reputation of particular media sources, opinions of politicians and experts. Apparently, 
the heuristics drawn from the political environment are not very useful to make sense 
of political process. As Gigerenzer and Todd argue, heuristics constitute the mind’s 
“adaptive toolbox” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 2000, p. 30). They adjust to specific features 
of the informational environment which proved to be useful for predicting outcomes 
and making inferences. Adapting to the political information environment in an 
authoritarian context, Russian TV viewers rely more on heuristics growing out of daily 
life and rely on common sense and cultural stereotypes. Essentially, looking for useful 
cues to decipher public affairs in the context where political and media institutions are 
not perceived as credible, people turn to common sense and cultural stereotypes 
which proved to useful for understanding past events.  
These findings may be relevant for other electoral authoritarian regimes as well. 
Due to political corruption and electoral fraud political institutions under electoral 
authoritarian regimes are often associated with distrust (Kostadionva, 2009; Martinez 
i Coma & Trinh, 2016; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 2012). Similarly, news media 
in authoritarian contexts are often associated with profound distrust. For instance, 
Szostek (2017) found that citizens believe that the news can never be fully trusted in 
Ukraine. Pjesivac et al. (2016) found that citizens believe that news can never be fully 
trusted and rely on personal experience in Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. Although 
all three countries are relatively democratic (Freedom House scores 85 (free), 66 
(partly free), 63 (partly free)), media are still associated with the oppressive institutions 
of the totalitarian past and make citizens distrust news. Similarly, Truex (2016) found 
that Chinese citizens distrust news media and rely on personal experience to “back 
out bias” and discern truthful information even in slanted news. As my findings show, 
TV viewers prefer to rely on common sense and cultural experience exactly because 
of distrust in media and political institutions. Hence, these findings should be relevant 
for other electoral authoritarian regimes. 
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CHAPTER VI. HIGH-CHOICE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT AND FILTER 
BUBBLE EFFECT UNDER AN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIME  
6.1. Introduction 
While the previous chapter explored how the availability of various political cues 
in the media and political environment can affect the heuristics used by TV viewers to 
navigate political information, this chapter focuses on how the use of different sources 
of information, such as TV news and various online sources, affects news reception 
under an electoral authoritarian regime. It seeks to address the third sub-question of 
this dissertation: How does the combination of TV news and online news affect 
citizens’ opinions about politics under an electoral authoritarian regime? By analyzing 
cross-media diets of TV viewers and placing them within the context of the debate on 
high-choice media environments, I investigated how the government’s control over 
many media sources at the same time affects TV viewers’ political information 
processing to provide a better understanding of news processing in the high-choice 
media environment under an electoral authoritarian regime.   
One of the main effects of the advent of high-choice media environments 
identified in the scholarly literature is increased polarization. Three types of 
polarization in high-choice media environments have been identified by scholars – the 
growing divide between politically interested citizens and those who prefer 
entertainment (Prior, 2007), the formation of the homogeneous “echo chambers” in 
which one’s views are reinforced by the views of likeminded individuals (Sunstein, 
2001), and the formation of personalized “filter bubbles” which are underlined by the 
algorithmic filtering of counter-attitudinal information (Pariser, 2011). The existing 
evidence suggests that the earlier concerns associated with the increased 
fragmentation of high-choice media environments are not justified. While scholars 
document increased divisions between politically interested citizens and those who 
prefer entertainment (e.g., Edgerly, 2015; Ksiazek et al., 2010; Prior, 2005, 2007; 
Strömbäck et al., 2013), both preference-based political fragmentation (“echo 
chamber”) and algorithm-based personalized political fragmentation (“filter bubble”) 
are found to be exaggerated. If media and political systems are at least partly diverse, 
they counterbalance these two types of polarization. Most people routinely consume 
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media content without a clear political agenda (Weeks et al., 2016) or media content 
with different political agendas both on TV and on social media (Fletcher & Nielsen, 
2018; Stroud, 2011). However, the diversity of media and political systems which 
prevent extreme polarization can vary across countries. While market-media systems, 
such as in the U.S. media sphere, are highly polarized, public service media systems 
significantly decrease polarization (Bos et al., 2016).  
However, while some media and political systems in democracies can be quite 
polarized and characterized by less media diversity, electoral authoritarian regimes 
are characterized by even more strict control over media. While some media systems 
in authoritarian countries can be more diverse ideologically because of absence of 
liberal democratic consensus (Becker, 2004; Toepfl, 2013), generally authoritarian 
regimes tend to restrict media freedom more if they possess enough resources 
(Egorov et al., 2009; Gelhbach & Sonin, 2014). With the increased awareness of 
challenges and threats presented by digital media, many technology-savvy and 
resource-rich authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia, have been 
experimenting with various techniques of control, such as blocking, filtering, 
surveillance, manipulating online public discussions, and attempt to control many 
media at the same time in a coordinated fashion (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010; 
Greitens, 2013). For instance, the Russian government attempts to achieve full 
dominance over the informational space by controlling television (Lipman, 2009), 
online media (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014; Yablokov, 2015), social media and search 
engines (Linvill & Warren, 2020; Stukal et al., 2017; Suslov, 2014), and news 
aggregators (Daucé, 2017; Sivetc, 2018; Wijermars, 2018).  
This chapter investigates how this concerted pressure exercised over the 
different media in the high-choice media environment affects TV viewers’ media diets 
and interpretation of political information. I argue that this strategy has different effects 
on more and less politically engaged TV viewers. Politically engaged TV viewers are 
active information seekers. They find information which reinforces their views despite 
the government’s attempts to control the online sphere. For politically disengaged 
participants, this strategy produces the orchestrated filter bubble effect which verifies 
and reinforces the messages of the state-controlled television. While the tendency to 
algorithmic personalized filter bubbles in market-based media systems is underlined 
by the complex interaction between citizens’ preferences and algorithm-assisted 
filtering of media content, this tendency is partially alleviated by the diversity of other 
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content with different political agendas. In Russia, concerted and direct pressure over 
many media reduces diversity leading to the artificially created orchestrated filter 
bubble effect which is underlined by the state control rather than personalization. This 
filter bubble effect is imposed in top-down fashion by the state and used to reinforce 
the messages of the state-controlled television. 
The chapter is structured as follows. I first categorize TV viewers’ cross-media 
news repertoires. The categorization is followed by the analysis of three news 
repertoires. Participants with the broadcast repertoire rely on television exclusively. 
Participants with broadcast-oriented and digital-oriented news repertoires are both 
active TV viewers and active Internet users but have a different level of interest in 
politics. While participants in the digital-oriented news repertoire are active information 
seekers, participants with the broadcast-oriented news repertoire are ready to acquire 
political information only if political information is easily available. I analyzed how 
different motivation to acquire political information is reflected in their media diets and, 
subsequently, the ways they interpret the news. Finally, I conclude the chapter by 
discussing how the findings contribute to the research on high-choice media 
environments and better understanding of how the use of multiple sources of 
information, such as TV news, social media, and news aggregators, affects news 
processing in authoritarian contexts.  
6.3. Data from Focus Group Participants 
To analyze cross-media news consumption of participants, I used the concept 
of a news repertoire. The idea of news (or channel) repertoire was introduced by 
Heeter in the mid-1980s (Heeter, 1985). With the expansion of cable television, the 
first stage of the formation of high-choice environments, it appeared that viewers form 
an attachment to sets of preferred channels while ignoring others. As Taneja and 
colleagues put it, news repertoires are strategies used to “cope with the abundance of 
choice” (Taneja et al., 2012, p. 952). In modern high-choice media environments, news 
repertoires have become an even more crucial tool since the number of information 
channels available has increased dramatically (e.g., Edgerly, 2015; Hasebrink & 
Domeyer, 2012; Prior, 2007). Simply put, news repertoire is a combination of preferred 
sources that news participants rely on to receive news about public affairs. Based on 
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focus group data and a short survey, I inductively identified several news repertoires9.  
1) Broadcast Repertoire (28 participants; TV: primary, news and 
entertainment; Internet: secondary, entertainment only). This group is older 
than other participants and includes more women. This news repertoire 
includes TV which is used both for news and entertainment. Most 
participants watch television news daily. They prefer news over 
entertainment slightly more often than other participants. While these 
participants use the Internet daily for non-news purposes, only a few 
reported using the Internet and social media for news. Only one participant 
mentioned a specific news media outlet. No one mentioned news 
aggregators.  
2) Broadcast-oriented Repertoire (19 participants; TV: primary, news and 
entertainment; Internet: secondary, news and entertainment; news 
aggregators). This group is younger than the previous one and balanced in 
terms of gender. This news repertoire includes TV which is used both for 
news and entertainment. Most participants watch television news daily, 
although some participants watch it several times per week. Almost all 
participants in this group use the Internet and use it for news more often 
than the previous group: three-quarters report using the Internet for news 
and a half report using social media for news. However, only a quarter 
remember one specific online news outlet used. Instead, they occasionally 
use search engines to complement television news and rely on news 
aggregators which were mentioned by all participants in this group.  
3) Digital-oriented Repertoire (9 participants; Internet: primary, news and 
entertainment; TV: secondary, news and entertainment; specific online 
news media outlets and social media). This group is significantly younger 
than other participants and includes more college students. It is also 
exclusively male, due to the small sample size. This news repertoire 
includes the Internet which is used for both news and entertainment as a 
primary source of information. Almost all participants reported using the 
 
9 It is important to note that since the study was originally designed to understand how people process 
TV news, focus group participants were pre-screened to make sure that they pay at least some attention 
to TV news. People who avoid TV news completely were not included in the selection by definition.  
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Internet and social media for news. Unlike other participants, they can recall 
many online news outlets, such as Meduza, Lenta.ru, and Vedomosti 
among others. TV is also used for news and entertainment, but as a 
secondary source. Participants in this group watch television much less 
often than all other participants.   
News repertoires are summarized in Table 7. Additional information about particular 
news diets can be found in Appendix B.  














Secondary: news and entertainment.  








Primary: news and entertainment.  
Particular news media, social media 
 
9 participants 
Table 7 TV Viewers' Cross-Media Diets 
6.3.1. Broadcast Repertoire  
Participants in this group rely on television news and generally consider it to be 
credible. For instance, Vasiliy explains that state-owned television provokes trust 
because the government “is responsible for the credibility of information.” Relying on 
state-aligned television, participants with this repertoire are receptive to the main 
regime narratives propagated via television news, such as representation of protests 
in Kiev as disorder orchestrated by the West and referenda in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine as a protection of the Russian-speaking population (Lankina and Watanabe, 
2017). On one hand, participants understand the events that happended during the 
Maidan protests in Kiev as a “bedlam” (Nadezhda) with “provoked violence” 
(Yekaterina). They believe that these were “foreigners who […] provoked this in the 
previous days” (Valentina). Participants blame the Ukrainian government for allowing 
the U.S. government to control Ukraine and turn it into an “America’s gas station” 
(Valentina). On the other hand, referenda and separatism in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine are understood as a legitimate reaction of the Russian-speaking population 
to Ukraine’s agression. Participans believe that Russia-backed militias “defend their 
own way of life and the desire to live on their own land” against the Ukrainian army 
which has turned against them and “shoots at their [Russian-speaking population’s] 
children” (Galina). Not surpsisingly, participants with this repertoire generally support 
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the current Russian government. For instance, Yana would like to see “a leader as 
good as our Putin” in Ukraine who could stabilise the situation.  
While participants in this group use the Internet for non-news purposes, they 
are uncomfortable with online news. The complexity of the saturated online 
environment makes participants “trust television [rather than the Internet] in reporting 
what actually happens” (Natalia). Moreover, with little experience of consuming online 
news, participants also consider the Internet to be a danger. They believe that 
exposing Internet users with “too volatile personalities and too critical attitudes” 
(Sonya) to uncensored information can provoke “a wave of rallies” (Natalia) 
considered by participants as a threat to political stability. As a result, they believe that 
it is “right to filter information” on the Internet (Sonya). Nisbet et al. (2017) show that 
authoritarian regimes can use state-aligned TV channels to frame the Internet as a 
threat and increase support for online censorship among less experienced Internet 
users. State-aligned television news shapes not only participants’ perception of 
politics, but also their perception of the Internet.  
 6.3.2. Broadcast-oriented Repertoire  
The abundance of information provided by the Internet demands more time and 
effort from users to find, select, and assess information. As a result, users must 
develop a complicated set of tools to assess information without investing effort and 
time (Metzger et al., 2010). Participants in this group rely on two strategies of looking 
for news online and assessing information – news aggregators and the leading role of 
TV news. This group largely overlaps with politically disengaged participants who rely 
on accessibility as mechanism to make sense of the news described in the previous 
chapters.  
Many participants in this group emphasize the burden of information seeking in 
contrast to the less cognitively demanding television news. As Yulia explains, 
television news typically has “only one opinion,” while there are too “many diverse 
points of view” on the Internet. It is difficult to tame “a very large flow of information on 
the Internet” where “everything is changing very quickly.” This change in the 
information environment works in tandem with the natural tendency to economize on 
resources and time while engaging in complex tasks, such as information searching. 
Actively searching for information is too costly for participants in this group. As Ksenia 
argues, “I am too lazy for this [searching for information].” Participants with the 
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broadcast-oriented repertoire use two strategies for searching for and evaluating 
information: they rely on news aggregators and the scheduled programming of TV 
news. 
As a result, the users in this group tend to rely on news aggregators. As Szostek 
argues, “non-news affordances” often drive news selection (Szostek, 2017). News 
aggregators offer a very convenient opportunity to simplify information searches 
because they integrate newsfeeds with many other functions, such as search engines 
and e-mail. Participants from this group often emphasize the ease-of-access aspect 
of their information search practices. As Anna says, she gives “a cursory reading” of 
aggregators’ news. In the context of economizing on time and resources, news 
aggregators are a perfect addition to pragmatic strategies of passive users: they allow 
them to consume news and to avoid investing effort in looking for news at the same 
time. Looking for the news independently would require more time and effort. Instead, 
a pre-made selection of news is offered to a user right away eliminating any need for 
information search. Participants from this group often emphasize this aspect of their 
information search practices. As Ksenia argues, “I only read news when I am checking 
my e-mail—when there is something on Mail or Yandex [the main Russian news 
aggregators] […] because you have little time for reading news.” Similarly, Larisa 
argues that she reads either Yandex News because it is “on the top” of website, i.e., 
easily accessible, or “popping up news” offered by various websites. Inna notes that 
she mostly uses Yandex News and Mail.ru to find news “quickly.” Like the findings of 
Dellacoras et al. (2015), they often satisfy their interest in public affairs by simply 
reading headings and short snippets. As Boris explains, “I do not read it attentively, 
only headings [of the news in Yandex News]. I do not go into detail.” 
Another strategy to simplify information search online is to rely on TV news and 
to use the Internet as a supplementary source. As Mitchelstein and Boczkowski argue, 
“audience members may integrate consumption of different media (…) using the 
internet to search for in-depth information about an issue they initially learned via print 
or broadcast media” (Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010, p. 1093). Many participants 
mentioned this strategy. As Kirill argues, “if the topic is interesting, you will […] start 
digging […] if doesn’t catch attention, why would I need it [to look for information] 
whatsoever?” Similarly, Olga says she uses information online to complement TV 
news:  
If there was a story about particular event, then I try to analyze the cause. This 
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year French journalists were shot in Paris by Arabs; several people were killed 
– it is a story about particular events. Then I started reading articles on the 
Internet: the articles explaining the cause, caricatures. [Then I] found out the 
whole story about the editors who were warned. 
TV news clearly has a leading role in the described situation. Olga started looking for 
information online only after her initial interest was sparked by TV news. Importantly, 
TV news sets the agenda for the described situation. In Olga’s case, she only started 
looking for information online after her initial interest was sparked by TV news. Similar 
to news aggregators, TV news helps to simplify information searches and dealing with 
the abundance of information online. TV news cues users and focus attention on 
particular issues they may want to check online to get additional information.  
Relying on the scheduled programming of TV news and news aggregators are 
powerful and convenient strategies which help to deal with information abundance. In 
the context of the partly controlled online sphere, the combination of TV news with 
news aggregators and search engines can lead to the biased image of politics and 
society. When looking for additional information through search engines, TV viewers 
often find stories in state-controlled online media. Similarly, since news aggregators 
in Russia are exposed to political pressures (Daucé, 2017; Sivetc, 2018; Wijermars, 
2018), they typically include references to state-aligned sources. Because the 
information found in Russian news aggregators and state-aligned online news does 
not contradict TV news, it is not surprising that participants overwhelmingly report that 
TV news and online news are consistent and do not contradict each other. As Tatiana 
says, “I only watch the news on TV and on the Internet. They are mostly similar. Mostly 
the same information.” Similarly, Andrey says “I repeat: Channel One or ORT say the 
same thing as Yandex, Mail.ru or Lenta.ru. I have not noticed any inconsistencies or 
contradictions.” Victor argues that “TV, Lenta.ru, Yandex News – approximately the 
same.” Similarly, Nikolay argues that “all information is quite objective and consistent. 
[There can be inconsistencies] in particular stories only [but not in reporting news in 
general].” If there are contradictions, they are considered to be minor and insignificant: 
as Ilya states, “if they contradict each other, if they differ from each other, it is only 
minimal.” Similarly, Veronica says that TV and online sources can have “Slightly 
differently angles. Emphasis can be shifted a little bit but not much, only a little.” Boris 
explains that he can allow himself to read “only headings” exactly because the 
information he finds online and on TV “is the same” and he does not “see any 
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contradictions [in different sources]. They say the same things.” “Approximately the 
same,” “no contradictions,” “no inconsistencies,” – are common narratives about 
comparing TV and online news.  
The practices of relying on news aggregators to complement TV news and on 
TV news as a guide for looking for additional information allows TV viewers to use 
consistency as a heuristic for veracity. This simple logical rule dictates: “If others agree 
it’s correct, then it’s probably credible” (Metzger et al., 2010: 429). When the moderator 
asks a question about credibility in the context of multiple contradicting sources of 
information, Veronica replies: “[I will believe] those sources which match, coincide [in 
reporting information].” In the following excerpt, Nikolay jumps from the consistency 
across sources heuristic to agreeing with the official narrative of Russian TV news:  
All information is too objective and consistent to provoke arguments, reporting 
in all sources is the same. There is no point in making something up, maybe 
only in some single separate episodes. Like killing militia members – but these 
are particular details […] In general, I have the feeling that we are all moving 
towards the same goal, political idea; we will win. On the side of republics – 
DPR and LPR – pro-Nazi power will leave.  
This statement mirrors the Kremlin’s official narrative on the Russia-Ukraine conflict 
which sympathetically frames separatist regions as grassroots mobilizations opposing 
far-right forces which gained power in Ukraine. Since information in news aggregators 
and on TV news is identical, the consistency heuristic verifies the validity of the 
Kremlin’s narrative conveyed through TV news.  
6.3.3. Digital-oriented Repertoire 
While some Internet users had to develop complex strategies for dealing with 
information abundance, those few who are genuinely interested in public affairs got 
the opportunity to learn as much as they want. They, as Prior puts it, found “a candy 
store” on the Internet (Prior, 2007, p. 14). Participants with the digital-oriented 
repertoire indicate that they rely on more active strategies for their information 
searches. This group includes both participants who are supportive of Putin’s regime 
and those who are highly critical of it. These participants often show more familiarity 
with the media sphere and specific online news media. Unlike other participants, they 
can recall and name many specific online newspapers and news websites, such as 
the independent Vedomosti, RBK, Meduza, and the state-aligned LifeNews, RIA 
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Novosti, Lenta, etc. Many of them stated that they used social media and blogs to 
search for information during the conflict. This group partly overlaps with the politically 
engaged participants who rely on consistent political schemas and demonstrate 
applicability effect described in the previous chapters. These participants are more 
politically sophisticated – they know more about both domestic and international 
politics and remember recent political events. Also, they often show more 
sophisticated knowledge of both politics and media during focus groups. For instance, 
most focus groups participants share the idea that media cannot be trusted fully 
because the coverage is always determined by some political or economic interest. 
However, only participants with a digital-oriented repertoire can correctly name the 
owners of media outlets. When one of the participants claims that viewers should also 
know what oppositional Internet channel Dozhd is broadcasting, Alexander, 
sarcastically replies that Dozhd’s belonging to the opposition is questionable because 
“it belongs to Gazprom-media,” government-affiliated big business. Such participants 
use various sources for information search.  
The information search strategies of the participants with the digital-oriented 
repertoire are also different from those with the broadcast-oriented repertoire. First, 
instead of using news aggregators, they rely mainly on social media, blogs, and online 
news sites. For instance, Sergey claims that he uses “The Internet and Livejournal [a 
Russian blogging platform]” to search for information about the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict. Similarly, Alexander searches through discussions and videos in the pro-
separatist group “Donetsk. Lugansk. Novorossia” to receive information about the 
military confrontation. These groups are “huge, they contained everything [about the 
conflict]. Facts, statistics, links to other sources.” He proceeds: “it is only after that I 
was noticing that there was some information on TV news too […] I saw a lot of 
omissions—the information I was finding on social media was lacking on TV news.” 
Compared to the previous group, the participants with the digital-oriented repertoire 
use the information found on the Internet to evaluate TV news rather than TV news to 
evaluate information found on the Internet. Finally, the users in this group often have 
a wide network of other political sophisticates whom they know personally or online. 
As Sergey argues, “I [personally] know people [who can be a reliable source of 
information about the conflict] […] I do not know people in Syria […] but Ukraine – I 
have sources who can provide reliable information.”  
Do active information seeking strategies of participants with digital-oriented 
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repertoire help them to develop more objective and balanced view of the conflict? In 
most cases, they do not. While the understanding of the conflict of participants with 
the broadcast-oriented repertoire is defined by TV news and reinforced by news 
aggregators and situational use of search engines, the understanding of the conflict of 
participants with the digital-oriented repertoire is predefined by their political 
preferences. In most cases, they find information that confirms their schemas.  
For instance, Alexander is an active supporter of the Russian government and 
a vocal critic of the Ukrainian government. He harshly criticizes the involvement of the 
West in Ukrainian domestic politics: “What is your [Western countries’] business [in 
Ukraine]? Why don’t you come to other countries to join protests, say, to Russia?” 
Alexander thinks that TV news in Russia is “more credible in Russia than in Ukraine 
and the United States.” Finally, he considers the war in Donbass to be an insurrection 
of people who “fight for their interests which are similar to Russia.” These views largely 
coincide with the official narrative on the Russia-Ukraine conflict provided by Russian 
TV news. His views are also consistent with the agenda of the online sources which 
he uses. As he says, “I read the news in [public] groups about Luhansk and Donetsk 
on social media.” In particular, he mentions the group “Donetsk. Lugansk. Novorossia” 
and the left pro-government anti-Ukrainian blogger Colonel Cassad. Such groups and 
bloggers have a clear, pro-governmental ideology. The information from these groups 
is likely to reinforce his opinion about the nature of the conflict. 
Sergey, another political sophisticate, mentions that his political views were 
formed decades ago at university. He is a vocal critic of Russian media and 
government. He cannot “stand [TV] news” and believes that “federal channels […] 
exploit propaganda” and “hide facts.” According to Sergey, watching TV news is equal 
to “brainwashing yourself” because the government actively manipulates people. At 
the same time, he believes that TV news’ focus on Ukraine and external enemies is a 
maneuverer which helps the government to shift attention from “real corruption and 
[political] inaction” in the country. These views are likely to be reinforced by his 
preferred online media sources. When discussing information search, he mostly 
mentions “alternative [to TV news] sources,” such as Livejournal and personal 
contacts. His very sharp anti-government sentiment seems to be confirmed by the 
information he receives from the Internet. What he found in Livejournal, for example, 
is the confirmation that “they [the government] try to hammer into the heads [of 
viewers] the idea that there are only enemies and nationalists around [in Ukraine].” 
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The information from these sources is likely to reinforce rather than challenge his 
opinion about the nature of the conflict. Unlike participants with the broadcast-oriented 
repertoire whose perceptions are determined by TV news and reinforced by news 
aggregators and state-aligned online news media, participants with the digital-oriented 
repertoire choose sources based on their political preferences. Instead of relying on 
the feeling of consistency across sources which results from passive information from 
search strategies, they selectively expose themselves to information which reinforces 
their views (Bennet and Iyengar, 2008). 
6.4. Conclusion  
I turn now to implications of the data presented in the analysis for the process 
of news reception in a high-choice media environment for Russian politics and media 
in particular and for electoral authoritarian regimes in general. Based on the data, I 
identified three news repertoires. 1) TV viewers with a digital-oriented repertoire rely 
on television news and complement it with online news media, social media, and 
search engines. As a result, they actively search online for information and can 
partially circumvent the regime’s framing of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in TV news. 
However, they also look for information based on their political preferences and rely 
on sources which are ideologically consistent with their views. In other words, they 
demonstrated clear signs of selective exposure (Bennet & Iyengar, 2008; Lazarsefeld, 
1944; Stroud, 2014). 2) TV viewers with a broadcast repertoire use the Internet for 
pragmatic purposes but rely exclusively on TV news for political information. As a 
result, they escape the effect of synchronized reporting in TV news and digital media 
but are receptive to the regime’s narratives about the Russia-Ukraine crisis due to their 
heavy reliance on television. 3) Participants with a broadcast-oriented repertoire are 
in between in terms of the intensity of their use of digital media. They rely on television 
for political information but complement it with news aggregators or stories in state-
aligned online news media found via search engines. As a result, they encounter 
identical information across media, overwhelmingly report that information in television 
news and various digital media is similar and conclude that the reporting of regime-
controlled television is credible.  
These findings offer a number of insights into the nature of political 
communication in Russia. “Computational propaganda” or “the use of algorithms, 
automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information” 
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(Woolley & Howard, 2017, p. 3) has recently become a burgeoning area of research. 
My findings demonstrate the specific mechanisms through which “computational 
propaganda” is exercised in Russia and show that it can perform a variety of functions 
which are not reducible to direct persuasion. For instance, some scholars implicate 
Russian news aggregators in the filtering out of information which disagrees with the 
narratives of the Russian government rather than seeking to persuade citizens directly 
(Daucé, 2017). Similarly, networks of automated bots on social media can be used to 
promote the stories of specific news media outlets and channels in the rankings of 
search engines rather than to convince citizens directly (Stukal et al., 2017). However, 
there is no evidence which would show how this strategy affects the individual 
psychology of news reception.  
I show that news aggregators and online news media can affect citizens 
through consistency heuristic which can be summed up as: “If others agree it’s correct, 
then it’s probably credible” (Metzger et al., 2010, p. 429). As a result, they perform 
intuitive contextual verification by comparing TV news with information on news 
aggregators and in state-aligned online news media (Meola, 2004; Metzger, 2007). 
However, contextual verification requires a proper context which can be used to verify 
information. Since the information found in these sources is homogenous and does 
not contradict TV news, this verification produces the effect which is opposite to the 
critical evaluation of TV news. My data suggest that state-controlled television news, 
online news media, and news aggregators in Russia form a media ecology with a 
complicated division of labor: while TV news broadcasts are responsible for spreading 
political narratives, news aggregators and state-controlled online news media are 
responsible for attracting additional attention and reinforcement of these narratives. 
To what extent can these findings be generalized to other authoritarian regimes? In 
the recent decade, many authoritarian regimes have been experimenting with the tools 
to control the online sphere (Greitens, 2013), such as blocking, filtering, censoring 
content online, and attempting to shape online public discussions (Deibert & 
Rohozinski, 2010; King et al., 2013). However, the regime’s capacity to shape the 
media sphere crucially depends on the resources available (Egorov et al., 2009). 
Hence, these findings should be relevant for resource-rich autocrats, such as Russia 
and China, which possess considerable resources and are ready to invest them in 
advanced techniques of control.  
Finally, these findings are of special interest in the context of research on 
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algorithmic polarization. Participants with the broadcast-oriented repertoire 
demonstrate what can be called the orchestrated filter bubble effect. The previous 
research on filter bubbles in democracies shows that the concerns associated with 
filter bubbles appear to be exaggerated: the effect of filtering on the diversity of 
consumed news is modest, and algorithms actually increase, rather than limit, the 
sheer amount of content users are exposed to (Flaxman et al. 2016; Fletcher and 
Nielsen 2018; Haim et al. 2018). Fletcher and Nielsen call this phenomenon 
“automated serendipity.” Since users’ news repertoires are often quite narrow, 
algorithms increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of incidental exposure to 
information from other parts of the political spectrum (Fletcher and Nielsen, 2018). 
However, in authoritarian contexts in which the diversity of political content may be 
reduced by governmental interference, “automated serendipity” may not be not as 
efficient in producing the laudable results it does in democracies. My findings show 
that this strategy can result in an orchestrated filter bubble effect which is different 
from the personalized filter bubble studied in the context of polarization in democracies 
(Pariser, 2011). The tendency of algorithmic media to filter out preferences-
inconsistent content in politically diverse systems is underlined by the complex 
interaction between citizens’ preferences, media content, and algorithm-assisted 
filtering of media content based on citizens’ preferences. Rather than offering content 
based on users’ prior clicks and search behavior, the orchestrated filter bubble effect 
experienced by my focus group participants was imposed in a top-down fashion by 
the state and based on the agenda of state-controlled television. The findings show 
that the multiplication of media sources which results from the advent of high-choice 
media environments can have different effects on political communication depending 
on specific political and institutional settings. 
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This study set out to explore the following research questions: How do citizens make 
sense of TV news under an electoral authoritarian regime? The secondary research 
questions were: 1) How do citizens form opinions based on information from TV news 
under an electoral authoritarian regime? 2) How do citizens evaluate the credibility of 
TV news under an electoral authoritarian regime? 3) How does the combination of TV 
news and online news affect citizens’ opinions about politics in an electoral 
authoritarian regime? This chapter summarizes the main empirical findings of the 
dissertation and explains answers to these questions. This chapter is structured as 
follows. I first summarize the research problems and the main argument stated in the 
introduction. Then I summarize the main empirical findings of each chapter. The 
summary of empirical findings is followed by a discussion of the contributions of these 
findings to various research fields and areas of public debate. After discussing the 
contributions, I consider directions for further research and provide research-informed 
reflection on the current status of Russian media, politics, and citizenry.  
7.1. Summary of the Main Argument 
This dissertation used focus groups as the method to gather data to address 
the issue of news processing in contemporary Russia. On one hand, this study sought 
to contribute to a scarce area of the research on news processing in Russia. While 
there have been many studies of content and production of television messages in 
Russia, few scholars have attempted to analyze how audiences make sense of 
television news. Given shrinking media diversity and the intensity of the government’s 
attempts to manipulate the public agenda since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict 
in 2013, this task has become even more urgent. While “Russian propaganda” has 
attracted disproportionately large attention of both domestic and international 
observers, little is known about how the coverage of the conflict on Russian television 
is perceived and processed by TV viewers with different backgrounds and political 
opinions. However, in addition to simply adding one more piece to the puzzle of news 
processing in Russia, this dissertation uses Russian TV viewers’ processing of news 
about the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a case study to engage with a number of broader 
academic discussions. Specifically, this study used focus groups with Russian TV 
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viewers in an attempt to enrich the current knowledge about news processing under 
electoral authoritarian regimes. While many studies have investigated news 
processing across authoritarian regimes, scholars have mostly focused on how, why, 
and under what conditions citizens trust or distrust news. While authoritarian regimes 
provide fewer incentives to see political engagement as a meaningful activity, the 
influence of political engagement – a critical resource which determines whether 
citizens can consciously and meaningfully engage with media and political information 
– on news processing in authoritarian contexts has rarely been an object of analysis. 
As most authoritarian regimes transitioned to high-choice media environments in 
which abundant online sources crucially mediate the influence of broadcasting 
television, the question has become even more complex.  
This study addresses these issues by using Russia as an example of an 
electoral authoritarian regime and by analyzing Russian TV viewers’ news processing 
through the framework of political communication, political science, and psychology. 
Ultimately, this study is informed by the key tenets of the cognitive revolution which 
dictate that people adapt to circumstances by choosing (albeit unconsciously) the 
most beneficial cognitive strategies in a given context. As a preeminent political 
psychologist Philip Tetlock (2000) suggested, people are better thought of as cognitive 
managers rather than as cognitive misers. Instead of always choosing the least 
effortful cognitive strategies, they “deploy mental resources strategically as a function 
of the perceived importance and tractability of the problem” (p. 240). Hence, people 
can invest more mental resources in an activity if they feel that it is important, and their 
actions can yield tangible outcomes. Authoritarian environments rarely create stimuli 
and conductive environment for political learning. Specifically, electoral authoritarian 
regimes are often characterized by political corruption and absence of competitive 
politics, constrain media freedom, restrict uncontrolled political participation, and even 
deliberately demobilize voters during controlled elections. I have relied on the 
assumption that these conditions crucially affect three essential prerequisites which 
are necessary for citizens’ meaningful engagement with news and politics. Electoral 
authoritarian regimes affect incentives to acquire political information and engage with 
the news. While there are small minorities of citizens who lean towards politics due to 
motivation which originates in individual political socialization, most citizens need to 
have the perception that political learning can have tangible effects. To borrow some 
of Anthony Downs’ insights (1957), those citizens are rationally ignorant. Their 
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rationality consists of minimizing the effort invested in learning and processing 
information. Thus, they acquire information only when its benefits outweigh the cost of 
learning it. When political participation is constrained, and politics is not competitive, 
citizens understand that acquiring political knowledge can hardly influence elites’ 
decision and rationally chose to invest in other activities, which have more tangible 
outcomes. In addition, electoral authoritarian regimes affect cognitive tools, which help 
citizens to make sense of news and political information. Contemporary media 
environments bombard citizens with astonishing amounts of information (Feng et al., 
2015; Graber, 1988). To deal with this endless information flow, individuals have to 
rely on heuristics and various information shortcuts, such as opinions of politicians, 
parties, and media organizations. However, under electoral authoritarian regimes, 
political and media institutions are often associated with profound skepticism. As a 
result, opinions of parties or media organizations are often not considered 
independent and authoritative enough to be used as heuristics. Finally, electoral 
authoritarian regimes constrain opportunities to easily acquire politically diverse 
information in the news. In the context of the advent of high-choice media 
environments, the diversity of political content in media is one of the key factors which 
can counterbalance the increased political polarization of the public. While high-choice 
media environments present a challenge for authoritarian regimes by multiplying the 
number of available media sources, autocrats still attempt to control the media to make 
the information space as homogenous as possible to convey their agendas. As a 
result, media consumers in high-choice media environments under authoritarian 
regimes often encounter the news which are multiple but not diverse. 
I argue that the absence of incentives to engage with political information, the 
environment which does not give useful cognitive tools to process political information, 
and partly homogeneous information spaces which do not provide politically diverse 
content result in a set of distinct processes and strategies underlying the news 
processing of the Russian TV viewer. The results of this study show how these three 
features of an electoral authoritarian regime are reflected in the individual political 
psychology of Russian TV viewers and news processing. First, although there is a 
small group of politically engaged participants, most participants in the study were 
politically disengaged. Political disengagement translates into a very specific way of 
making sense of TV news and forming opinions about politics. With no coherent 
political schemas, TV viewers deal with political information the best they can. They 
 177 
process the news by mobilizing the most accessible considerations. As a result, their 
opinions contain both critical and supportive reactions towards media and the regime. 
Although they are dissatisfied with the life under an authoritarian regime and have 
many critical ideas, they cannot articulate them as consistent opinions. Second, in 
dealing with news and political information, they find little help from heuristics provided 
by the political environment, such as ideology, party agendas, and reputation of media 
sources. As political and media institutions are not seen as independent and 
authoritative, TV viewers understand that information generated by these institutions 
cannot be used as reliable shortcuts to navigate political information. As a result, while 
evaluating TV news, TV viewers cannot entrust media and political institutions with the 
job of interpreting public affairs. Instead of reputation of media organization or opinions 
of parties and politicians, they prefer to rely on other heuristics which seem more 
reliable, such as common sense and cultural stereotypes. In addition, the actual 
heuristics they use to evaluate credibility of news are very different from how they 
conceptualize credibility. Although they report very high distrust towards media, they 
can trust or distrust particular messages depending on a combination of various 
cognitive strategies and cues. Finally, as TV viewers have to navigate the high-choice 
media environment, they are bombarded with an astonishing amount of information. 
As most participants are politically disengaged, they cannot engage in the detailed 
analysis of information and perform a quick and intuitive cross-verification by 
comparing multiple sources. As the government attempts to control many media at the 
same time via both algorithmic and non-algorithmic tools, this cross-verification 
confirms TV news agenda. In essence, due to absence of motivation to actively search 
for information and learn about politics, they find themselves in the orchestrated filter 
bubble which is used to advance and reinforce TV messages.  
7.2. News Processing Under an Electoral Authoritarian Regime 
This argument allows me to both critically re-evaluate the findings of previous 
research on news processing in Russia and to use Russia as a case study to 
contribute to the research on news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes. 
The analysis of news processing in Russia does not form a coherent picture. While 
regular public opinion polls show a close relationship between exposure to state-
aligned media and susceptibility to regime narratives (e.g., Volkov, 2015), scholars 
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report more ambivalent findings and diverge in their estimations of how much capacity 
and inclination Russian citizens have to interpret news critically. Some scholars show 
that the use of state-aligned sources, such as TV, increases the agreement with the 
official narrative of the state and vote for the party in power (Enikopolov et al., 2011; 
Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020; Shirikov, 2019; Szostek, 2017a; White & Oates, 2003). 
Some scholars report that citizens are able to perform critical analysis of political 
information and identify political bias in news in Russia (Mickiewicz, 2005; 2008). 
Other scholars hypothesize that these contradictory reactions to the media can co-
exist and propose explanations for this ambivalence. Citizens can be aware of 
manipulation in media, but they accept this bias and trust news for a variety of reasons, 
such as fear of economic and political malaise or nostalgic feelings for Soviet television 
(Hutchings & Rulyova, 2009; Oates, 2006). What is the reason for this divergence in 
estimations, and what capacity and inclination do Russian citizens have to interpret 
news critically? While there are vast differences between these studies in terms of 
methodology, and time periods, research questions and subjects, I argue that this 
variation can be partly attributed to the instability and contradictions which are inherent 
to the audience itself and caused by little interest in politics. Much like these latter 
theories, I show that critical and supportive reactions can co-exist in TV viewers’ 
heads. However, I argue that previous scholarship has not paid enough attention to 
the role of political engagement and psychological mechanisms which crucially 
mediate news processing. Ignoring psychological foundations of news processing, 
scholars treat TV viewers as if they had coherent opinions akin to sophisticated 
ideologues, not regular TV viewers. I have provided two explanations for the existence 
of this ambivalence: the incoherent nature of political ideas which results from little 
political engagement and the gap between TV viewers’ explicit ideas and heuristics 
used for evaluating news which are largely intuitive and automatic.  
On one hand, the instability which is inherent in TV viewers’ reactions results 
from little political engagement. Some of the TV viewers in this study are political 
sophisticates. They knowingly accept political bias in the media because it fits their 
political preferences, as described by previous scholars. Most of them do not have 
enough interest in politics to think these ideas through and integrate them into a 
coherent attitude. My findings suggest that the reason for this co-existence of 
supportive and critical reactions towards the regime and the media is political 
disengagement rather than coherent attitudes shaped by cultural or historical legacies. 
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Distrusting but knowingly accepting biased news requires integrating these two 
attitudes into a coherent whole. Instead, most of the focus group participants had no 
coherent political schemas. As Mickiewicz argues, abstract political issues for such TV 
viewers are “isolated from the richness of the experiences that figure so prominently 
in daily information processing” (Mickiewicz, 2008, p. 71, 78). Similar to findings of 
Savin et al. (2018), these participants can be called the “inadvertent audience”: 
interested enough in politics to follow the news, but not interested enough to form 
stable opinions. Just as Walter Lippmann’s Ms. Sherwin of Gopher Prairie who tried 
to imagine military engagements between French and German soldiers during World 
War I as a personal duel between general Joffre and German Kaiser (Lippmann, 1922, 
p. 12), they processed political information by building bridges between news and 
whatever knowledge they had at hand: from personal experience and previous news 
reports to opinions of friends and colleagues. Since these ideas are stored in different 
layers of memory and are not united by overarching schemas, the answers of my 
informants regrading trust in media or support for the regime are highly dependent on 
contingent factors, such as the wording of questions or recent experiences. These 
factors make some ideas more easily retrievable from memory and can help account 
for both divergence in estimations of how much capacity Russians have to interpret 
news critically among scholars and give an alternative perspective on findings of 
scholars who emphasize the ambivalence of TV viewers’ opinions.  
On the other hand, I show that this ambivalence can result from the gap 
between explicit ideas and automatic and intuitive heuristics for making sense of the 
news. My findings suggest that there is a gulf between what TV viewers say about TV 
news and what they really do when they evaluate TV news. Critical attitude does not 
translate into critical practice easily. While being aware of the authoritarian nature of 
the political system, participants think that news should not be trusted. At the same 
time, in practice they rely on a very situational toolkit of heuristics which are used for 
both verifying credibility of state-aligned news and challenging it. If one treats TV 
viewers as sophisticated ideologues with coherent opinions, their ambivalent reactions 
can be seen as paradoxical. If one adopts a psychology-driven approach, this 
ambivalence will simply be understood as a result of the gulf between explicit ideas 
and intuitive cognitive strategies. These two dimensions – the mechanisms underlying 
making sense of news and the distinction between explicit ideas and intuitive 
strategies - should be considered in order to build a more detailed and plausible vision 
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of news processing in Russia.  
In addition, this argument allows me to contribute to the understanding of the 
nature of news processing under other electoral authoritarian regimes with some 
reservations. Political engagement is a crucial factor which determines both news 
processing and authoritarian survival. Electoral authoritarian regimes are often 
characterized by constrained media freedom (Leeson, 2008), perceived electoral 
corruption (Kostadionva, 2009; Simpser, 2012), non-competitive politics (Croke et al., 
2015; Frantz, 2018), and autocrats’ deliberate demobilization strategy (Linz, 2000; 
McAllister & White, 2017; Robertson, 2011) which can render political engagement as 
a futile activity in the eyes of citizens. At the same time, political engagement crucially 
determines whether citizens can meaningfully engage with political information (Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1995; Zaller, 1992). Although some studies indirectly touched upon 
the role of political engagement in news processing in authoritarian contexts (e.g., 
Meyen & Schwer, 2007; Zhang, 2012), the connection between news processing, 
political engagement, and authoritarian survival has largely been outside the scope of 
analysis. My findings allow me to clarify how political engagement can affect news 
processing and in turn, authoritarian survival. The findings demonstrate that without 
proper motivation for political learning and participation, citizens under an electoral 
authoritarian regime might not be able to form consistent opinions. The participants of 
this research accumulated dissatisfaction with many aspects of life in an authoritarian 
context. They are dissatisfied with the manipulative nature of media, poor living 
conditions, and the government’s policies. However, they do not have enough 
motivation to learn about politics to integrate these ideas and impressions into a 
coherent whole. As a result, they do not challenge, rather than support, the fragile 
authoritarian equilibrium.  
To what extent can these findings be generalized to other electoral authoritarian 
regimes? Not all electoral authoritarian regimes are born alike: the level mobilization, 
perception of electoral integrity, and competitiveness can vary across regimes. The 
electoral authoritarian regime in Ukraine is more competitive than the electoral 
authoritarian regime in Russia, and electoral authoritarian regime in Georgia is 
characterized by higher electoral integrity than electoral authoritarian regimes in 
Russia and Ukraine. Hence, these findings should be more applicable to electoral 
authoritarian regimes which are characterized by their less competitive nature, higher 
level of electoral corruption, restricted media freedom, the deliberate reliance on 
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demobilization as a strategy, and other factors making political engagement seem as 
futile.  
7.3. Low-Information Rationality Under an Electoral Authoritarian 
Regime 
In addition, this argument allows me to contribute to a better understanding of 
the functioning of low-information rationality in an authoritarian context. Scholars 
assume that in dealing with news and political information, TV viewers rely on a wide 
variety of heuristics provided by the environment (e.g., Popkin, 1994). The array of 
such heuristics is always mixed and includes both heuristics drawn from daily life, such 
as common sense and cultural stereotypes, and heuristics drawn from the political 
environment, such as opinions of trusted politicians and parties, authoritative experts, 
and reputation of media sources. It is not exactly clear how TV viewers would utilize 
the cues provided by the political environment where political system and ideological 
forces do little to represent meaningful variety of political preferences and interests, 
and media enjoy little trust. 
Based on my findings, I have provided a nuanced analysis of the intuitive folk 
psychology of processing news and political information of the Russian TV viewer and 
demonstrated how TV viewers adjust low-information rationality to an authoritarian 
environment. I found that only a small group of political sophisticates who are 
supportive of Putin’s regime directly rely on the ownership heuristic and their political 
preferences to interpret the news. For other participants, the balance between different 
types of heuristics is shifted towards common sense and cultural stereotypes. Most 
heuristics used by less politically active TV viewers are based on common sense and 
simple logical rules, such as “violence is difficult to fabricate,” “professionally-looking 
journalists are likely to provide reliable information,” “people with superior knowledge 
have better understanding of events,” “if there are signs of persuasive intent, the 
information is not reliable.” Some strategies of less politically active TV viewers are 
shaped by the historical and cultural experience of the post-Soviet society, such as 
“any politics is based on manipulation and opposes the interests of the people” and “if 
information is provided by the state, the state will bias the information in accordance 
with its interests.” None of them rely on the structure of the contemporary Russian 
political information environment, such as party structure, reputation of particular 
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media, opinions of politicians or experts. Heuristics constitute the mind’s “adaptive 
toolbox” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 2000, p. 30). They adjust to specific features of 
informational environments which proved to be useful to predict outcomes and make 
inferences. As TV viewers do not consider parties, politicians, and media 
organizations as sources of reliable and authoritative information for interpreting the 
matters of public concern, they recalibrate their cognitive toolkits and rely more on 
common sense, cultural and historical experience.  
To what extent can these findings be generalized to other electoral authoritarian 
regimes? Distrust with political institutions caused by political corruption and electoral 
fraud is fairly common across authoritarian regimes (Kostadionva, 2009; Martinez i 
Coma & Trinh, 2016; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 2012). Similarly, news media 
in authoritarian contexts are often associated with profound distrust (e.g., Gehlbach & 
Sonin, 2014). The reliance on personal experience rather than credibility of media 
organizations or opinions of parties and politicians in authoritarian contexts can be 
corroborated by other studies by findings of other scholars (e.g., Pjesivac et al., 2016; 
Szostek, 2017; Truex, 2016). Hence, one can expect citizens to process information 
in similar way under other electoral authoritarian regimes. 
7.4. Electoral Authoritarian Regime in the High-Choice Media 
Environment 
Finally, this research allows me to contribute to a better understanding of how 
the development of new media technologies reshapes politics and society. The 
proliferation of media – or high-choice media environments – is not a deterministic 
phenomenon, which inevitably brings similar outcomes in any context. Rather, it is a 
process which crucially depends on particular political, economic, and institutional 
environments. My study traces the outcomes of this process under an electoral 
authoritarian regime. The research on the impact of high-choice media environments 
on political communication in democracies suggests that the earlier concerns 
associated with polarization brought about by the growing number of available media 
are exaggerated. While new media polarize the public by offering a wide variety of 
entertainment for those who prefer entertainment and a wide variety of political content 
for those who prefer political content, contemporary media environments are far from 
a set of completely homogeneous preference based “echo-chambers” and algorithm-
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based personalized “filter bubbles.” If media and political systems themselves are 
relatively diverse, this diversity (even if it is a diversity of biased political information) 
will counteract individuals’ tendency to tailor their media diets in accordance with their 
political preferences and exclude information from the other side of the political 
spectrum, even if this tendency is assisted by algorithms.  
However, this diversity is significantly reduced in Russia as the government can 
and do implement concerted pressure over many media sources at the same time. If 
there are actors who possess enough financial, political, and coercive resources to 
enforce relative homogeneity across many media sources, this strategy results in the 
orchestrated filter bubble effect as demonstrated by this study. This orchestrated filter 
bubble effect is different from the personalized filter bubble effect identified in the 
research on polarization in market-based systems (Personal, 2011). Instead of the 
preferences of citizens, it is based on the agenda of state-controlled television. When 
TV viewers find media content with identical political framing in both television news 
and a variety of online media, this similarity across sources is interpreted as a sign of 
credibility of television news. The government’s strategy, the aim of which is to provide 
similar accounts of events in television news and several online sources, plays on TV 
viewers’ intuitive understanding of credibility. This intuitive understanding of credibility 
dictates that information can be verified through comparisons of multiple sources 
(Meola, 2004; Metzger, 2007). The findings show that the multiplication of media 
sources which results from the advent of the high-choice media environment can have 
different effects on political communication depending on specific political and 
institutional settings. 
In addition, these findings contribute to the understanding of “computational 
propaganda” in authoritarian contexts. My findings demonstrate the specific 
mechanisms through which “computational propaganda” is exercised in Russia and 
show that it can perform a variety of functions which are not reducible to direct 
persuasion. Some scholars argue that instead of spreading information and 
persuading citizens directly, Russian news aggregators filter out information which 
does not agree with the narratives of the Russian government (Daucé, 2017), while 
automated bots on social media promote specific news media and stories in the 
rankings of search engines (Stukal et al., 2017). My findings advance these ideas by 
showing that state-controlled television news, online news media, and news 
aggregators in Russia form a media ecology with a complicated division of labor: while 
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TV news broadcasts are responsible for spreading political narratives, news 
aggregators and state-controlled online news media are responsible for attracting 
additional attention and reinforcement of these narratives.  
To what extent can these findings be generalized to other authoritarian 
regimes? The regime’s capacity to shape the media sphere crucially depends on 
available resources (Egorov et al., 2009). While many electoral authoritarian regimes 
resort to blocking websites, creating repressive legislation and controlling Internet 
infrastructure, only resource-rich and technology-savvy autocrats such as Russia and 
China can afford more advanced techniques, such as comprehensive systems for 
censoring online content (King et al., 2013) and paid commentators and bots for 
shaping online public discussions (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Hence, these findings 
should be relevant for resource-rich autocrats who possess considerable resources 
and invest them in advanced techniques of control.  
7.5. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The study identified many important aspects of news processing which are 
relevant for both the research on Russian media and the research on news 
processing, polarization, and high-choice media environments under electoral 
authoritarian regimes. However, as always, it raises as many questions as it answers. 
This study reveals several potential avenues for research. Some of these avenues are 
related to the shortcomings of the method used in this study. Others would allow 
scholars to explore the processes identified in this dissertation further.   
Several potential avenues for research opened up by this study are related to 
the shortcomings of the method used in this study. For instance, the experimental 
design based on reaction time and perceived importance tasks (e.g., Nelson et al., 
1997) could lend causal validity to the relationships between accessibility, applicability, 
political engagement, and the political regime which is an integral part of the first 
argument of the dissertation. After exposing citizens to news broadcasts and gauging 
their political sophistication, one could measure their reaction time to the concepts 
related to the broadcasts and perceived importance of the issues covered in the 
broadcasts. If political sophisticates demonstrate changes in perceived importance but 
no changes in reaction time, while political novices demonstrate changes in reaction 
time, it will mean that political sophistication determines whether subjects rely on 
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accessibility or applicability as mechanisms of news processing. Furthermore, as 
knowledge and sophistication are very domain-specific (Shank & Abelson, 1977), it is 
logical to assume that the same person can rely on the most accessible considerations 
to process a message containing unfamiliar information and a consistent schema to 
process a message containing familiar information. If one gauges the subjects’ 
familiarity with the topics of the news broadcasts and finds that subjects rely on 
applicability while processing information about familiar topics and accessibility while 
processing information about unfamiliar topics, these findings would lend further 
validity to the causal relationships between accessibility, applicability, and political 
sophistication. Finally, one could test these hypotheses in a democratic and an 
authoritarian context. If subjects in democracies rely on applicability and schemas 
more than under authoritarian regimes, these findings would lend causal validity to the 
first argument of the dissertation posing that low political engagement under 
authoritarian regimes determines the reliance on accessibility as a mechanism for 
news processing.  
Another interesting avenue for research emphasized in this study is the 
heuristics used to process political information in democracies and authoritarian 
contexts. The analysis of the role of heuristics in news processing is mostly limited to 
democracies. As a result, if competitive political systems have more credible media, 
they will mediate the processes analyzed. In a way, Russia constitutes an outlier or a 
“deviant” case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Undermined political competition and media diversity 
can allow scholars to understand the role of heuristics in news processing better. While 
the present study gives some insights into how heuristics can function under an 
electoral authoritarian regime, a comparative study of low-information rationality in a 
democratic and an authoritarian context would generate a far more grounded and valid 
understanding of the role of political institutions in news processing. For instance, one 
could expose subjects in democratic and authoritarian contexts to the same sequence 
of news broadcasts and use verbal protocols (Riech, 2002) to explore the cognitive 
heuristics used to evaluate these broadcasts. If subjects in democratic contexts rely 
more on political heuristics provided by political and media institutions, while subjects 
in authoritarian contexts rely more on cultural stereotypes and daily life, this would 
lend additional validity to the second argument of the dissertation, posing that citizens 
under an electoral authoritarian regime are prone to relying on non-political sources of 
heuristics. A more complicated design could rely on dynamic process tracing (Lau & 
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Redlawsk, 2002) to explore the same phenomena. One could expose citizens in 
democratic and authoritarian contexts to the same sequence of news broadcasts, ask 
them to come up with opinions about these broadcasts, and provide them with the 
“information board” containing operationalized heuristics as additional information. 
Recoding what information subjects use, how long it is used, and the order in which it 
is used, one could lend additional causal validity to the second argument of this 
dissertation.  
Another interesting avenue for research emphasized in this study is cross-
media diets and their effects on news processing. While this study provides some hints 
about the mechanism underlying the orchestrated filter bubble effect and the 
conditions under which it can arise, these hints are far from being a comprehensive 
understanding. A simple survey-based study investigating the reliance on news 
aggregators and agreement with the agenda of the state-aligned television could lend 
causal validity to the idea of filter bubble effect identified in this study. A more 
complicated design could explore the relationships between real media consumption 
and perceptions of news credibility. For instance, in the analysis of fake news 
consumption, Guess and colleagues combined surveys with individual web-traffic 
analysis (Guess et al., 2018). Such a combination would be perfect for investigating 
the orchestrated filter bubble effect. By tracing and categorizing all sources of 
information used by subjects and correlating these data with their perception of 
credibility of news, one could provide more reliable data to prove or disprove the 
orchestrated filter bubble effect identified in this dissertation. In addition, this study 
shows that cross-media repertoires are complex structures which are shaped both by 
the information-seeking activities of participants and the types of engagement set by 
different types of media. More comprehensive understanding of the relationships 
between cross-media diets and political sophistication requires both these factors to 
be considered. A study based on individual web-traffic data and survey investigating 
participants’ political knowledge and interest in politics, perceptions of credibility and 
trust in news, and opinions about politics would allow these complex relationships to 
be traced between modes of cognitive engagement set by different media, political 
engagement of participants themselves, and the resulting effects on media and 
political information processing. Finally, one could test the hypothesis about the 
orchestrated filter bubble effect in democratic and authoritarian contexts. For instance, 
if one finds that the use of news aggregators in a democracy reinforces citizens’ 
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political preferences, while the use of news aggregators under an electoral 
authoritarianism reinforces the agreement with the narratives of the state-aligned 
television, these findings would lend causal validity to the third argument of this 
dissertation, posing that a government’s concerted pressure over many media sources 
at the same time can trigger consistency across heuristic sources and create an 
orchestrated filter bubble effect. 
Possible preference falsification in an authoritarian context can further 
undermine the generalizability of the findings. Expressing dissenting views in an 
authoritarian context can distort research findings. Individuals can feel not safe 
enough to express ideas which contradict the official policy which is known as social 
desirability bias in social psychology (Krumpal, 2013) and preference falsification in 
political science (Kuran, 1997). Two objections can be made here. First, the amount 
of critical commentary regarding the media, the government, and Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict voiced during focus groups was quite surprising in the 
context of the authoritarian regime and intense political confrontation. Almost every 
focus group discussion was ridden with criticism which makes preference falsification 
unlikely. Perhaps my self-presentation as a student working on doctoral research did 
not provoke many concerns. Alternatively, the moment when focus groups were 
conducted – 2016 and 2017 – coincides with the general fatigue resulting from the 
conflict as evidenced by many ideas expressed during focus group discussions. This 
fatigue could have made research participants more willing to express criticism. 
Second, while scholars show that preference falsification is a significant factor which 
distorts survey results in Russia (e.g., Kalinin, 2016), this study explored the 
mechanisms underlying news processing rather than the proportion of citizens who 
are critical of the regime. Even if some research participants did not express their 
genuine views or expressed the views which were thought to be “safer” in the 
authoritarian environment, this confounding factor was unlikely to influence how 
participants were expressing their views, that is, accessibility and applicability 
mechanisms. A more rigorous experimental design could lend further validity to the 
results. Recently, the list experiment or item counting technique (ICT) has become a 
widely used tool to counter preference falsification in authoritarian countries (e.g., Frye 
et al., 2017; Kalinin, 2016). Instead of asking citizens’ opinions, researchers assign 
subjects to the lists of items which contain non-sensitive items with one extra sensitive 
item for the treatment group. Subjects are asked to name only the number of items 
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they agree with, and the true proportion of respondents supporting the item is 
calculated as the difference between control and treatment group. A study exposing 
citizens to news reports and measuring the results via ICT could overcome that 
shortcoming.  
In addition, the choice of the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a case study can limit 
the generalizability of the findings. Proposed by Mueller (1973) in his early work on 
war and attitudes towards foreign policy, the “rally-around-the-flag” dictates that 
popular support of political leaders will increase during war or international crisis. This 
hypothesis enjoys considerable the support of scholars across countries (e.g., Baum, 
2002; Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020). However, my data do not demonstrate much 
“rallying-around-the-flag.” Quite the opposite, the initial support of Putin’s regime and 
Russia’s involvement in the conflict during focus group discussions got drowned in 
intensive criticisms of the regime. A plausible explanation for the absence of strong 
“rally-around-the-flag” effect is that the study was conducted in 2016 and 2017. The 
“rally-around-the-flag” effect is known to generate only a short-term increase in 
support of political leaders. To the contrary, by 2016 the coverage of war and 
international conflict had become routine for Russian TV viewers. Still, a study which 
investigates Russian TV viewers in times of less intense international confrontation 
would allow one to draw more valid generalization.  
While the methods described above could strengthen the arguments of this 
dissertation rather than advance new ideas, this study also opens a number of 
avenues for new research. For instance, ideology and partisanship remain an 
interesting topic for research in authoritarian contexts. Starting from the landmark 
studies of the Columbia School (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), 
ideology and partisanship are considered to be the most important factors mediating 
news processing. Once a citizen’s ideology and favorite party are identified, scholars 
can predict not only this citizen’s favorite politicians and attitudes towards particular 
policies, but a wide array of other factors which influence news processing. Ideology 
and partisanship predict whether citizens will watch particular TV channels (Iyengar & 
Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2011), how citizens perceive political bias in news (Vallone et al., 
1985; Rahn, 1993), how they infer and reconstruct obscure or missing elements of 
news reports based on ideological schema (Hamil et al. 1985; Lodge & Hamil, 1986), 
and many other factors. However, ideology is not only a set of ideas. It is also a means 
of getting votes (Downs, 1957). Hence, ideologies and partisanship are closely tied to 
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party systems. Parties and party leaders are responsible for what Converse calls the 
“constraint”: the imposed consistency of ideology. If constraint is high, one attitude 
within a given ideology (e.g., negative attitude towards welfare spending) will predict 
another attitude within a given ideology (e.g., negative attitudes about gun control). 
Constraint dissipates once we reach a less partisan and engaged stratum of the 
population. With lower constraint, elements of ideology can contradict each other 
(Converse, 1964). Since competitive party systems under electoral authoritarian 
regimes are compromised, this institutional framework of ideology is absent in Russia. 
In Russia, parties do not really work as channels to represent meaningful variety of 
ideological differences. As a result, the constraint related to parliamentary parties 
cannot be used as a convenient way to analyze ideology and partisanship. As 
Sirotkina and Zavadskaya explain, in Russia, “the existing party system does little to 
represent actual ideological preferences” (Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020, p. 10). The 
analysis of ideology and partisanship and their effects on news processing under an 
electoral authoritarian regime can be an extreme case or “an outlier”. By comparing 
the results in democracies and authoritarian contexts, one could generate more 
grounded and valid understanding of the role of ideology and partisanship in news 
processing in general.  
Finally, the choice of theoretical framework itself partly limits the research 
findings. As with most studies in political communication, the approach which I 
adopted for this study rests on psychology which is put in the context of political 
science. Both cognitivism adopted by most psychologists today and psychology-driven 
explanation of media influence have been under fire from at least two camps: 
sociology and cultural studies. Ethnomethodology- and phenomenology-driven 
accounts of thinking and behavior question cognitivists’ theories of mind by pointing at 
social nature of cognition. As critics argue, cognitive processes cannot be detached 
from social interactions and particular everyday life contexts (e.g., Coulter, 1987). 
From this perspective, all theoretical apparatus of cognitive psychology– the 
assumptions about mind as information processing system, the role of memory, 
schemas, and heuristics in processing information – “turn out to be either metaphors 
for hitherto unexplicated phenomena or else just empty phrases. They do not literally 
describe anything physical or cultural” (Coulter, 1987, p. 69). In a similar way, the 
approaches to media reception in cultural studies question the key assumption of 
political communication by arguing that the meaning is produced collectively in 
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interactions between media texts and audience members (Hall, 1973; Hutchings & 
Rulyova, 2008).  
Relying on the cognitivist framework, this study borrows many of the 
aforementioned fallacies. While the qualitative turn in political communication has 
contributed much to demonstrating the social nature of opinion (e.g., Delli Carpini & 
Williams, 1994; Lunt & Livingstone, 1996; Popkin, 1994), political communication is 
still psychology-driven and assumes individuals and cognitive processes in their minds 
as a starting point of any social and political processes. In addition, despite the 
enormous diversity of approaches in the field, political communication still suffers from 
what Hall (1973) termed “the lingering behaviorism” of mass media research. It 
assumes that the meaning is located in the media message and then extracted, 
accepted, rejected, reinterpreted, or misunderstood. Since these assumptions are too 
fundamental and ontological, the associated shortcoming cannot be addressed in a 
satisfactory way without completely revamping the theoretical and methodological 
backbone of this study. However, theories are not worldviews which are right or wrong. 
They are lenses which allow scholars to see some aspects of reality while making 
them blind to other aspects and instruments which are used to answer specific 
questions. After all, “models are to be used, but not to be believed” (Theil, 1971, p. vi). 
The cognitivist framework is good enough for answering the questions raised in this 
study, such as the nature of news processing, the role of political engagement in news 
processing, and the effect of political regime on news processing, but can be 
inappropriate for answering other questions.  
7.6. Post-Scriptum  
While this study contributes to a number of academic discussions related to the 
intersection between media, politics, and psychology, it also constitutes a vantage 
point for a research-informed reflection on the current status of Russian media, 
politics, and citizenry. The conceptual tools developed in this study allow for critical re-
evaluation of the role of the media in shaping public opinion in Russia. My findings 
show that Russian television definitely affects TV viewers’ opinions about politics. By 
borrowing the most accessible ideas to form opinions about politics, they rely on 
interpretations of events provided by TV news. However, this effect is short-lived. As 
they are not engaged in public affairs on a routine basis, they do not have enough 
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cognitive resources to fully assimilate ideas provided by state-owned TV. Similarly, 
the effects of the concerted pressure over different media sources implemented by the 
state should not be overestimated. The cross-validation of information across different 
sources and the resulting orchestrated filter bubble effect are very fragile. As this 
cross-validation is not backed up by more serious engagement with politics, this 
orchestrated filter bubble effect is unlikely to lead to the incorporation of a regime’s 
narratives and can vanish as soon as the homogeneity of the information space is put 
into question by more political and media diversity. If this model applies equally to 
other Russian TV viewers, the power of television, which is an important pillar of 
Putin’s regime, is not as formidable as it seems. If participants have as many critical 
opinions as they voiced during the focus groups, it is likely that, coupled with external 
shocks—such as a political crisis or the loss of state control over the media—the 
seemingly formidable popular support of the regime may quickly fade. Most probably, 
the enormously high ratings of presidential approval in Russia may also result from 
accessibility effects rather than ideological convictions. Pollsters often ask general 
political questions—such as questions about the country’s leaders and international 
politics—which my research suggests are likely to trigger accessibility effects. Since 
the Russian media have been paying disproportionate attention to international politics 
for years, what pollsters receive in response to questions about president Putin or 
Crimea might be the content of recent news rather than participants’ opinions. 
In addition, this study presents both a grim assessment of Russian TV viewers 
and a testimony to the cognitive flexibility and adaptability of citizens, which allows me 
to be cautiously optimistic about the prospects and critical abilities of the Russian 
public. Most participants in this study adapted to an authoritarian context as best as 
they could. To make sense of news, they draw on the most accessible ideas and 
memories and cannot form consistent opinions about politics. They rely on time-tested 
cognitive strategies, such as common sense and cultural stereotypes, which cannot 
account for the complexity of the political environment. They attempt to consume 
information from different sources, such as TV news, news aggregators, online news 
media, which, alas, lack substantive diversity. However, in doing so, they demonstrate 
perfectly rational, although not intentional, behavior which is designed to operate 
efficiently within an environment. TV viewers choose a rational strategy to deploy 
mental resources in a way that allows them to have some understanding of the matters 
of public concern because they are still interested in following public affairs and know 
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that politics concerns them. However, they invest only a minimally efficient fraction of 
their time and effort in acquiring political knowledge because they know that the issues 
discussed on TV are beyond their reach. Rather than simply being politically passive 
or unsophisticated, they actively choose strategies of thought and behavior which 
better correspond to an authoritarian environment. If the environment changes 
providing them with the perception that their individual political engagement can have 
effect on the course of political life and more reliable cognitive tools to make sense of 
political information, according to this view, they would recalibrate their strategies and 
engage with politics in more substantive ways. Under more favorable conditions, they 
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Appendix A: An Example of a News Story 
The Maidan Protests in Kiev (4 minutes 38 seconds, aired on November 30, 2013) 
News Anchor: Now news from Kiev. The supporters of Eurointegration who were 
pushed out of the Maidan square early this morning are gathering at another square—
Mikhaylovksya—close to the territory of the monastery where 100-200 participants of 
the dispersed demonstration are sheltered. The officials are making claims related to 
the use of force by police. According to the official data, 35 people were injured and 
35 people were detained. Our correspondent Vitaliy Kadchenko will provide more 
details. 
Correspondent: The riots on Euromaidan started at 4 p.m. When the truck supposed 
to install the New Year Tree entered the square, police demanded that protesters 
leave. All protest actions in the city center were officially banned two weeks ago, but 
the ban has not worked. People in masks started to spread unknown gas, there were 
several noises sounding like gunshots. People started to throw rocks, bottles, and 
burning logs at riot police. Nobody was distinguishing between friends and foes. 
People climbing the roof of the trade center were literally pulled from it. People used 
batons, even their legs to hit. About 40 people were injured including two Polish 
citizens who found themselves at the protest action against Ukraine’s officials to 
postpone Eurointegration as well. Seven people with various injuries were brought to 
the hospital. Police officials say that 12 officers were injured as well. Criminal 
investigations were initiated under the articles “Resistance to police officers” and 
“Hooliganism.” After detention, police officers let them go. About 200 participants were 
sheltered by the Mikhaylovkiy monastery of Kyiv Patriarchate, so called “heretic 
church,” from detention. People started to gather a demonstration in front of the 
monastery—they were given hot tea and warm clothes. They were asked not to use 
swear words and not to smoke inside the monastery.  
Polish citizens: What makes us Europeans are not agreements and associations 
signed by one person. My heart, not my hand and head, hurts when I look at what is 
happening.  
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Correspondent: Despite it being the weekend, the ambassadors of the Netherlands 
and Finland and the chair of the representative office of the European Union visited 
the protesters. They refused to speak from the stage remembering the agitation of the 
chief of the Lithuanian Seim for the Eurointegration before the summit in Vilnius. That 
is how they explained their reasons for being at the square. 
Arja Makkonen, Ambassador of Finland: We have come here because we want to 
know what has happened—to see the situation with our own eyes.  
Kess Klompenhouwer, Ambassador of Netherlands: We decisively condemn violence 
against protesters.  
Correspondent: The Prime Minister of Ukraine, Nikolay Azarov, demanded that those 
who responsible for the violent dispersal of the demonstration be found. He even 
posted it on his Facebook page. The chair of the Cabinet of Ministers assured citizens 
that the ruling party is not interested in this development of the situation and asks 
Ukrainians not to succumb to provocations.  
Azarov Facebook page: I am infuriated and concerned by the events that happened 
on the Maidan square last night. The data I have does not allow one to make definite 
conclusions: who is responsible for this provocation. That is why an investigative group 
was created including officials from the Prosecutor’s Office. It will give a qualified legal 
assessment of all parties involved in the conflict…This group has a clear task: to carry 
out an investigation in a very limited time and give society a clear answer: who should 
receive a punishment, what punishment, and for what.  
Correspondent: The Minister of the Interior promised to find and punish culprits. The 
leaders of the oppositional parties claimed that they are starting to prepare nationwide 
strikes to demand the resignation of the government and early election of the Rada 
[Ukrainian parliament]. Arseniy Yatsenyuk called the assault of Euromaidan by police 
“a special operation of the ruling party.”  
Arseniy Yatsenyuk: We—three opposition parties—have made a decision about the 
formation of the Headquarters of the national resistance. We are starting to prepare a 
nationwide strike. We expect a reaction from our Western partners. Not only words 
but actions. 
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Correspondent: Tomorrow the rally will move to a new place. The announced 
“Narodnoye veche” will take place in Shevchenko park which is also in the city center. 
The opposition announced the mobilization of supporters across the country. The 
deputies of three factions —“Batkivshchyna,” “Udar,” and “Svoboda”—will try to 
enforce compliance with their demands in the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian parliament] 
next week. We all know how it happens. In the meantime, a huge rally in support of 
President Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the agreement with the EU took place in 
Kharkiv on the biggest Square of Freedom in Europe. The directors of big businesses 
gave speeches and reiterated that the main market for Ukraine is Russia and the CIS 
countries. Deteriorating relationships with neighbors can lead to economic collapse. 
Vitaliy Kadchenko, Evgeniy Krivonosov, Sergey Titenko and Grigoriy Yemelyanov, 
Channel One, Kiev.  
Visuals: Map of Ukraine; clashes between police and protesters; throwing rocks and 
bottles; building barricades; rally in front of the monastery; interview with injured Polish 
citizens; interview with the Ambassadors of Finland and the Netherlands; Facebook 
page of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk speaking at the press conference of the 
opposition; peaceful pro-Russian meeting in Kharkiv supporting President 
Yanukovychs’ decision not to sign the EU-Ukraine agreement.  
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Appendix B. Focus Group Scenario 
• First Impressions. Please describe your first impressions about the news report. 
What associations come to your mind? Which elements in the video attracted your 
attention?  
• Emotions. What emotions does this news report provoke? Did you have situations 
when emotions or mood made you avoid watching TV or watch TV more? 
• Credibility. Do you think that this news report is credible? Or is it questionable? 
Why? (If no particular reasons are given, the moderator gives a set of possible 
opinions: the professionalism of journalists, references to experts, state ownership 
of the channel, compelling images et cetera). 
• Negative effects. Do you watch news about Ukraine? Can you say that you started 
watching news more after the beginning of the conflict? Less? Why? 
• Practices of watching. Do you watch news alone or with friends/family? Do you 
discuss the news with them? Do you have arguments or disagreements? Do you 
tend to agree with them, or do you rather stick to your own opinion? Do you try to 
convince others? Whose opinions are important for you in the evaluation news and 
politics?  
• Internet usage. Do you read or watch news online? What online sources do you 
use: blogs, news websites, news aggregators, social networks, YouTube? Is there 
any difference between the same news on TV and online? How do you determine 
what is more credible if and when the stories on TV and online contradict?  
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Appendix C. Socio-Demographic Characteristics and News 
Consumption 
N: 56 participants 
Sex: Women, 53%; men, 47%. 
Age: 18-24, 20%; 25–34, 27%; 35-50, 37%; 51-64, 16%;  
Education: Higher education, 66%; secondary education, 16%; college students, 
16%; 
Income: the question about income was asked but reliable insights can hardly be 
extracted from the data. Many Russian citizens have multiple jobs and sources of 
income. As this income is often not a subject to taxation, many Russians would not 
wish it to be recorded.  
TV news consumption: daily, 53%; several times a week, 27%; several times a 
month, 13%; less often than several times a month, 7%. 
Internet usage: daily, 91%; several times a week, 6%; do not use at all, 4%; 
Name Age Education Employment 
Tatiana 33 college travel agent 
Sofia 46 college social worker 
Fedor 59 college pensioner 
Sonya 41 college entrepreneur 
Mikhail 32 high school auto mechanic 
Maria 27 college engineer 
Alexander 35 college market research analyst 
Galina 56 high school pensioner 
Nina 26 high school sales agent 
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Diana 45 college physician 
Boris 23 college ballet dancer 
Leonid 19 college college student 
Vladimir 46 high school pensioner (disability) 
Yekaterina 52 college insurance agent 
Victor 35 college teacher 
Ivan 45 college taxi driver 
Roman 44 college programmer 
Ksenia 34 college economist 
Kristina 44 high school kindergarten teacher 
Larisa 35 college restaurant administrator 
Svetlana 27 college manager 
Anton 38 high school security officer 
Irina 29 college white collar employee 
Nikolay 52 college real estate agent 
Alexandra 49 high school pensioner (disability) 
Vasiliy 53 college engineer 
Andrey 26 high school cashier 
Kirill 36 college retired military officer 
Natalia 39 college housewife 
Yulia 19 college college student 
Elena 19 college college student 
Sergey 20 college college student 
Petr 20 college college student 




Yegor 20 college college student 
Alexey 19 college college student 
Nikita 18 college college student 
Oleg 26 college HR officer 
Ilya 37 high school waiter 
Artem 40 college sales manager 
Anna 33 college IT consultant 
Anastasia 33 college sales agent 
Kristina 44 high school cashier 
Veronica 58 college pensioner 
Oksana 50 high school unemployed 
Timofey 44 college doctor 
Yana 57 high school pensioner 
Yan 52 college real estate agent 
Yuriy 45 high school factory worker 
Alisa 22 college college student 
Eduard 19 high school unemployed 
Angelika 45 high school factory worker 
Asya 28 college school teacher 
Valentina 61 high school pensioner 
Varvara 39 college cashier 
 231 
Appendix D. Political knowledge 
Domestic politics: well-aware, 7%; aware, 20%; poorly Aware, 58%; not aware, 15%;  
International politics: well-aware, 43%; aware, 38%; poorly aware, 13%; not aware, 6%;  
Current political events: aware, 20%; not aware, 80%; 
The discrepancy between the knowledge of domestic politics and international 
politics is most probably a result of Russian TV’s excessive focus on international 
politics. Since this is not a quantitative study, the questions were designed to get 
additional contextual information about political engagement rather than measuring 
political knowledge. Hence, the questions are few. Questions focused on several 
topics: domestic politics, international politics, and current events. As many scholars 
point out, the best way to measure political knowledge is to ask neutral factual 
questions about politics. Hence, the questions included:  
• Domestic politics: 1) Who is the current speaker of the Russian State Duma? 2) 
What elections took place in Russia in 2016?  
• International politics: 1) Which countries are the members of the NATO? 2) Is the 
U.K. a member of the European Union? 3) Which country accepted the highest 
number of Syrian refugees? 
• Current political events: 1) Where was the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier group going 
to in 2016? 2) How many aircraft carries does Russia have?  
